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Abstract
Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) applications are growing day by day and this will
lead Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) in the close future to share the same airspace
of manned aircraft.This implies the need for UAS to define precise safety standards
compatible with operations standards for manned aviation. Among these standards
the need for a Sense And Avoid (S&A) system to support and, when necessary, sub-
stitute the pilot in the detection and avoidance of hazardous situations (e.g. midair
collision, controlled flight into terrain, flight path obstacles, and clouds).
This thesis presents the work come out in the development of a S&A system taking
into account collision risks scenarios with multiple moving and fixed threats. The
conflict prediction is based on a straight projection of the threats state in the future.
The approximations introduced by this approach have the advantage of high update
frequency (1 Hz) of the estimated conflict geometry. This solution allows the algorithm
to capture the trajectory changes of the threat or ownship. The resolution manoeuvre
evaluation is based on a optimisation approach considering step command applied to
the heading and altitude autopilots. The optimisation problem takes into account
the UAV performances and aims to keep a predefined minimum separation distance
between UAV and threats during the resolution manouvre. The Human-Machine
Interface (HMI) of this algorithm is then embedded in a partial Ground Control Station
(GCS) mock-up with some original concepts for the indication of the flight condition
parameters and the indication of the resolution manoeuvre constraints.
Simulations of the S&A algorithm in different critical scenarios are moreover in-
cluded to show the algorithm capabilities. Finally, methodology and results of the tests
and interviews with pilots regarding the proposed GCS partial layout are covered.
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C H A P T E R 1
Introduction
Initially Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) were deployed mainly in surveillance mis-
sions, however their use has gradually extended to more complex military missions and
nowadays they are finding their ways also in different types of civilian missions. This
increase in operations, flight envelope and applications leads to an increasing pressure
for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to leave the segregated airspace, in which they
were operating currently, and share the same airspace with manned aviation. On the
other hand, the loss of sensory cues valuable for situational awareness and flight con-
trol caused by the separation between the UAV and the operator presents a major
challenge for this integration. In fact, this loss causes a degradation in human piloting
performance, especially regarding the operator ability to estimate and predict aircraft
states in respect to external factors, such as threats, weather, terrain etc. Therefore
it is necessary to introduce additional means, usually not used in manned aviation, to
provide the operator with complete situational awareness [1].
Among the technologies necessary to meet this requirement, the concept of au-
tonomous Sense And Avoid (S&A) system is defined within the proposed regulations,
for example in the report Limitations of the See-and-Avoid Principle of the Australian
Transport Safety Bureau [2], as an artificial system equivalent to the human pilot for
detecting and avoiding hazardous situations. Those include midair collisions, con-
trolled flight into terrain, flight path obstacles and weather. The development of this
system is still an area of open research and involves a number of issues [3]. This thesis
presents the results obtained from the design and simulation validations of a S&A
system concept for UAS.
This chapter gives a short introduction regarding UASs operations and the chal-
lenges related to their deployment in shared airspace. More precisely section 1.1 starts
with some general definitions about UASs . Section 1.2 continues then with the most
interesting examples of their use in current civilian applications. In section 1.3 an
overview of recent initiatives regarding UASs certification is given. In section 1.4,
the human factors issues related with UAS operations are introduced. The problem
of UAS operator situation awareness is analysed in more depth in section 1.5. The
requirements defined for safe UAS operations are then listed in section 1.6. The pre-
sentation of the aims and objectives and the contributions to knowledge of this project
is then given in section 1.7. Section 1.8 summarises the methodology used in the work
accomplishment. The thesis outline and the list of the publications produced dur-
ing the work carried out in this project are included in section 1.9 and section 1.10,
respectively.
1.1 UAVs and UASs
According to the publication CAP 722 issued by the Civil Aviation Authority [4] an
UAV is:
“An aircraft which is designed to operate with no human pilot on board
and which does not carry personnel. Moreover an UAV:
• is capable of sustained flight by aerodynamics means;
• is remotely piloted or automatically flies on a preprogrammed route;
• is reusable;
• is not classified as guided weapon or similar one shot device designed
for the delivery of munitions.”
UAVs are also commonly linked with the word drone. Originally this word indicates
that male honeybee inside the hive having the only role to mate with the queen and
who, differently from worker bees, does not have the task to gather nectar or pollen.
As explained in the article The Flight of ‘Drone’ From Bees to Planes of The Wall
Street Journal [5], the use of this term to indicate UAVs is related with the fact that
in 1935 U.S. Admiral William H. Standley visited a British demonstration in which
a new remote-control aircraft for target practice, identified as DH 82B Queen Bee,
was exhibited by the Royal Navy. When Standley came back to the US, he assigned
Commander Delmer Fahrney with the task to develop something similar for the Navy.
The name drone was then used for the aircraft coming from this work in homage to
the Queen Bee that Standley saw in the UK.
It is worth noting here that the expression Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) applies
to remotely piloted UAVs that are. Usually the UAV flight operations are controlled
and/or monitored by an operator on the ground through the Ground Control Station
(GCS). This is defined in [4] as:
“The UAV control station, which is the facility or device from which the
UAV is controlled and/or monitored for all phases of flight.”
Both the UAV and the GCS are part of a UAS defined as follows [4]:
“An UAS comprises individual system elements consisting of the UAV, the
GCS and any other UAV system elements necessary to enable flight, such
as communication link and launch and recovery elements. There may be
multiple GCS or launch and recovery elements within a UAS.”
1.2 Unmanned Aerial System Today
UAS applications are growing day by day thanks to the continuous refinement and
price reduction of the technologies used in their development. The new applications of
Table 1.1: list of the suggested civilian applications for UASs. Source: [6]
Field Applications
Agriculture crops and harvests monitoring and spraying
Air Cargo short and long distances transport
Border Authorities ground and maritime borders observation for human and contraband
smuggling
Communications cellular, cable and broadband transmissions support (by providing an
antenna in the sky)
Fisheries fish presence monitoring and illegal fishing activities observation
Forestry woodlands monitoring for potential fires, poaching
Law Enforcement traffic and crowds monitoring, pursuit of criminals
Meteorology weather monitoring and patterns study
Oil Companies pipelines monitoring and installation
Power Companies power lines monitoring and installation
Public Authorities disasters management (e.g. fires, hurricanes, floods, tsunamis, volcanic
eruptions, nuclear leaks)
Scientists remote sensing in heart observation and environmental conditions
UAS have extended from the original military surveillance and monitoring to a large
range of civilian uses. Some examples are listed in Table 1.1.
A first attempt in this direction took place in the 2004 when the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration (NASA), together with two of the biggest military
UAV production companies, Northrop Grumman Corporation and the Boeing Com-
pany, started considering the possibility to employ military UAV for civilian disasters
support and predictive flights, and global warming measurements and surveillance
missions [7]. At the same time, NASA worked together with the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to develop the RPV Altair, shown in fig. 1.1.
It took-off on the 20th April 2005 from Palmdale in California [8]. The mission was
aimed to fill research and operational data gaps regarding weather, water, climate and
ecosystem monitoring and management.
The deployment of the U.S. Air Force RPV Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk
(fig. 1.2) during the rescue mission to Haiti following the 12th January 2010 earthquake
was an example of use of UAVs for civilian operations in humanitarian missions. The
aircraft provided aerial photographs used for the planning of the relief and recovery
missions [9]. Similarly, two Aerostar UAV s (fig. 1.3) were loaned from Israel to Chilean
Air Force to monitor the area struck by the 27th February 2008 earthquake [10].
The use of UAV in civilian applications was also undertaken by other countries
around the world: the following are just two examples. In Italy, some research entities
are currently developing and testing UAVs for the deployment on volcanic activity
monitoring missions1. At Svalbard, in Norway, KOLIBRI Geo Services [12] has already
employed UAVs (see fig. 1.4) for avalanche and climate research tasks.
1An example is reported in the article identified in [13].
Figure 1.1: the Altair RPV. Source: [11] Figure 1.2: the Northrop Grumman RQ-4
Global Hawk RPV. Source: [11]
Figure 1.3: the preparation for the flight by
technicians of an Aerostar UAV on the area
struck from the 27th February 2008 earth-
quake in Chile. Source: [10]
Figure 1.4: an UAV used by KOLIBRI Geo
Services for avalanche and climate research
tasks. Source: [12]
1.3 New Rules to Allow UAVs to Fly
Most of the current applications UAS missions are flown in segregated airspaces. How-
ever, as the use of UASs is being extended into other areas and applications, it is ex-
pected that in the near future UAVs will need to operate in non-segregated airspace,
that is shared with other aircraft and flying entities. This obviously requires that
the UAV has to obey the same flight rules of other airspace users in order to avoid
dangerous accidents and incidents.
This problem was immediately recognised by both international organisations and
research entities. In fact, according to the report of International Civil Aviation Au-
thority (ICAO) in reference [14]:
“On 12 April 2005, the Air Navigation Commission requested the Secretary
General to consult selected States and international organisations with
respect to present and foreseen:
• international civilian UAV activities in civilian airspace;
• procedures to obviate danger to civilian aircraft posed by UAVs
operated as State aircraft ;
• procedures that might be in place for the issuance of special oper-
ating authorisations for international civilian UAV operations.”
Before this official act, the European Commission, in the scope of the 5th Framework
Program for Research and Technology Development, had already started a series of
projects promoting the utilisation of UASs for civilian purposes presented in Civil
UAV Activity within the Framework of European Commission Research [15]. These
background experiences led to the definition by the European Aviation Safety Agency
(EASA) of the general airworthiness certification requirements for UAS reported in the
technical report Policy Statement on Airworthiness Certification of Unmanned Aircraft
Systems (UAS) [16]. Those were developed in more detail by the UK Civil Aviation
Authority (CAA) in reference [4]. More technical aspects about these requirements,
especially regarding the collision avoidance, are further explained in the technical
report of EUROCAE WG-73: Unmanned aircraft systems [17], and recalled shortly in
the next sections.
1.4 UAS Human Factors
According to Design and Evaluation for Situation Awareness Enhancement [18],
“A pilot is supported by his visual surveillance of the sky (the See and
Avoid principle) prior information (e.g. near-airport behaviours of air-
craft), and onboard displays and warnings (e.g. the Traffic alert and Colli-
sion Avoidance System (TCAS)). A pilot is also constrained by regulations
on their reactions, including following TCAS instructions, the rules of the
air, and may react in unwritten ways designed to increase their safety (e.g.
signalling intent by exaggerating turns).”
On the other hand, the UASs operations are characterised by greater human factors
challenges compared to manned flight, particularly if the aircraft is directly controlled
by the operator [1]. The main reason behind this is the fact that the operator and the
aircraft are not co-located. This leads to the sensory isolation of the operator from
the aircraft due to the loss of sensory cues valuable for flight control. Therefore, the
UASs operator, rather than using the direct sensory information about the surrounding
environment available for manned aviation pilots, receives only the data provided by
on-board sensors via datalink [19]. These consist primarily of potentially degraded
visual imagery covering a relatively small Field Of View (FOV). Therefore a significant
reduction of the human piloting performance is due to difficulty in scanning the visual
environment surrounding the vehicle and the delays in control and communications
loops.
1.5 Situation Awareness and Equivalent Level of
Safety for UAS
The issues described in the previous section reduces particularly the situation aware-
ness of the UAS operator, that is fundamental for proper decision-making and better
judgement. According to the paper Measurement of Situation Awareness in Dynamic
Systems of Mica R. Endsley [20], situation awareness can be defined as “the perception
of the elements within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their mean-
ing, and the projection of their status in the near future”. In other words, situation
awareness is the mental model of the current and future state of the flight environ-
ment, as the same Endsley explains in Level of Automation Effects on Performance,
Situation Awareness and Workload in a Dynamic Control Task [21]. As stated in [22],
the situation awareness is strongly related to the operator workload and performance.
Endsley [20] define three levels of situation awareness:
Level 1. Perception of elements in the environment that implies the knowl-
edge of the status, attributes and dynamics of relevant elements in the
environment;
Level 2. Comprehension of the current situation in terms of understanding
the significance of those elements in light of one’s goals;
Level 3. Projection of future status in order to anticipate future actions of
the elements in the environment.
Particularly, as stated in [19], the projection time is a fundamental parameter of
the situation awareness. In fact, this value should be great enough to provide the
pilot with all the necessary information about the future status of the UAV without
overloading or confusing the operator with an excessive amount of information. A too
short prediction time could lead the operator to perform wrong actions when reacting
to incoming threats. Therefore the flight plan must be continuously updated during
the mission taking into account the following information [23]:
• changes of mission objectives, e.g. new targets and restrictions;
• non-conformance of the current UAV state, e.g. position errors or change in
UAV capabilities due to failures;
• hazardous weather, e.g. clouds or storms in the flight trajectory;
• separation conflicts, e.g. when another manned aircraft or UAV exceeds the
specified separation criteria;
• integrity conflicts, that are generally related with discrepancies between dif-
ferent information sources.
According to [24], situation awareness is identified as the understanding that the
operator has of the:
• current estimation and prediction of:
– position of UAV in respect on the earth surface;
– position of other aircraft or flying objects;
– distance from the local ground level;
• weather close to the UAV;
• health of the UAV, in terms of malfunctions or other deficiencies;
• status of the UAV, that include the UAV’s operating parameters different from
those related to health;
• logic of the UAV2;
• operational threats, like surface-to-air missile batteries;
• UAV’s mission
• UAV’s progress towards completing the mission
• degree to which the UAV can be trusted, in other words knowing the “probability
that commands sent to the UAV will be correctly executed, and that the data
sent back from the UAV are accurate” [24]
Further, the UAS operator has to be aware from the point of view of the commands
in terms of [24]:
Human’s commands necessary to direct a UAV: the operator needs to spec-
ify to the UAV the current flight course, altitude and airspeed, which are the
sensors and/or weapons to deploy (and when to deploy them), and the degree
of autonomy with which to act.
Human-delineated constraints: these may require a modified course of action
or command noncompliance: in particular, the operator needs to be aware of
any preprogrammed fail-safe modes, such as return to home.
On the other hand, to fly safely in a non-segregated airspace, the UAS has to
operate in compliance with manned aviation regulations and practices [17]. More
precisely “the UAS operational issues linked to UAS specificity must be standardized
in a way that makes UAS behaviour predictable for other aviation actors such as
manned aircraft pilots and Air Traffic Controllers” [17] and guarantee therefore the
interoperability between UAS operations and manned aircraft operations. From the
point of view of the terminology, it is stated that the UAVs must operate at an
Equivalent Level of Safety (ELOS) to manned aviation [25]. From the legal point of
view, this implies, in particular, that the Human In The Loop (HITL) philosophy used
for the UAV control gives to the operator the same legal responsibility of the manned
aviation pilot for the operational safety of the aircraft. Since both roles are supposed
to have the same ultimate authority for operational decisions affecting the aircraft.
This approach helps to reduce opposition from the manned aviation activities to UAV
operations.
2As stated in [24], “the operator needs to have a model in his/her mind based on the UAV’s
internal programming, so that he/she can predict the UAV’s responses to various conditions.”
1.6 UAS Airworthiness
The criteria defined in the previous section lead to requirements in terms of additional
systems to be installed on the UAS and safety procedures to replace the missing
capabilities of the on-board pilot. In chapter 7 of [16] the following airworthiness
certification issues have been defined:
Emergency Recovery Capability, in order to mitigate the effects of critical
failure conditions (e.g. total loss of command and control link) and to avoid
the possibility to create additional hazards to persons or property on the
ground.
Command and Control Link, the UAS flight crew must be aware of the com-
mand and control link signal strength and working state during the whole
duration of the flight in order to act effectively in case of any degradation or
faults the command and control link might experience.
Human Machine Interface has to display the information about the current
operating condition of the UAV in a manner that provide the operator with
the maximum situation awareness about flight safety and failure conditions
and to give indications about the emergency procedures when necessary.
System Safety Assessment has to certify that the risk of uncontrolled crash
or critical failures is remote.
Sense And Avoid (S&A) is the artificial system employed to substitute the
on-board human pilot in the detection and avoidance of hazardous situations
(e.g. midair collision, controlled flight into terrain, flight path obstacles, and
clouds).
1.7 Contributions to Knowledge of this Project
The aims of this work are the development of a S&A algorithm for UASs and the
definition of a possible approach for integrating its advisories in the GCS Human-
Machine Interface (HMI). The algorithm is designed for scenarios including multiple
non-cooperative flying threats and ground obstacles. It uses the hypothesis of a threat
moving on a final straight trajectory to get a quick evaluation of the advisories about
the suggested resolution manoeuvre. These advisories are updated with an high fre-
quency (1 Hz) to track constantly the conflict geometry evolution. The resolution
manoeuvres are estimated as step changes in the heading or altitude autopilots, gen-
erating a simple horizontal or vertical manoeuvre, respectively. The manoeuvres are
evaluated in order to reduce deviation from the original trajectory. More precisely,
they are defined as autopilot command step changes. The value of these commands
are optimised in order to get respectively a sufficient horizontal and vertical separation
between the ownship and all the threats detected during the overall manoeuvre. The
separation is evaluated considering a prediction of the future trajectory of ownship
and threats. This prediction is derived from an estimation of the performances of the
aircraft based on a fitting model. In the definition of the suggested resolution manoeu-
vre, the horizontal manoeuvres are preferred to the vertical ones when the required
heading variation is inferior to a predefined threshold. The resolution manoeuvres are
autonomously performed by the system by enabling the heading or altitude autopilots,
when they are disabled, and applying the evaluated step command.
The proposed integration of the S&A algorithm is based on an innovative Primary
Flight Display (PFD) layout to be integrated in the GCS. The choice for location
and layout of the instruments on display is inspired from the configuration used in
manned aviation PFD. Among the novelties introduced, it is noticeable the use of a
new concept for the original digital displays for the airspeed, altitude, vertical speed
and angle of attack indicators integrating red and green bands on their range. These
bands identify the allowed or forbidden zones of the flight envelope according to the
current condition in terms of conflict risk detected, aerodynamics performances and
structural limitations. Some other original solution are the presence on the display of
buttons allowing pilot to select the autopilots mode and the choice to integrate the
controls for the autopilots settings directly on flight parameters indicators.
The main contributions achieved with this work can therefore be summarised as
follows:
1. The developed S&A algorithm is based on an optimisation approach. This
approach, differently from the other solutions illustrated in section 3.8.2, is
able to provide an update of the generated advisories in a very short time step
(less than 1 s). The algorithm provides therefore a constant tracking of the
evolution of the conflict geometry without the need to use complex models to
predict the future trajectory of threats.
2. Another advantage of the proposed algorithm is the ability to take into account
unpredictable changes of the detected threats trajectory, if their dynamics is
sufficiently slow. In fact, the advisories are continuously updated according
to the detected conflict geometry evolution.
3. The proposed approach provides indication on the resolution manoeuvre easy
to be implemented by a human operator. In fact, the manoeuvres proposed
by the system can be communicated to the UAS operator as simple aural
“climb”, “descent” or “turn” messages similar to those issued by the TCAS
system.
4. The resolution manoeuvres generated by the algorithm are moreover particu-
larly suitable to be displayed on the conventional altitude, vertical speed and
airspeed indicators used both in cockpits and GCSs . This supports therefore
the UAS operator awareness regarding the suggested resolution manoeuvre,
and therefore the detected conflict risks, especially when he/she is concen-
trated on a different task; for example the UAV’s control.
5. The developed enhanced PFD investigates new and original design possibili-
ties for the conventional flight instruments displayed on the GCS. Its design
takes into account the different performances and operating environment of
UAVs in respect with manned aviation. The key driver of the design pro-
cess is the integration of all basic information about the flight condition, the
autopilots controls, the advisories about detected threats and suggested avoid-
ance manoeuvre in just one display. The aim is to reduce the UAS operator
workload caused by the need to search the information on a set of different
displays, instead of just one screen, coherently with the guidelines defined in
section 4.3.
6. The enhanced PFD concept was tested in simulations by pilots flying different
mission scenarios. During tests the feedbacks about the layout characteristics
improving the display’s comfortability for the pilots were collected. A part the
suggested design proposal, this work provides therefore useful guidelines for
the future works aiming to develop more enhanced displays for UAS operators.
1.8 Methodology
The work was accomplished using the following methodology:
step 1: Review of requirements for UAV operations certification (sec-
tions 3.1 to 3.7) including both documents produced by certification au-
torities, e.g. CAA, EASA and EUROCONTROL, and previous literature
in order to define the guidelines for the S&A systems development;
step 2: Review of the previous S&A system studies (sections 3.6 to 3.8)
based on the previous literature aiming to identify the main solutions
proposed and their advantages and disadvantages;
step 3: Review of the concepts of GCS HMI layout previously devel-
oped (chapter 2) to define issues, guidelines and main solutions proposed;
step 4: Review of the GCS displays trends and guidelines (chapter 4)
based on previous experiences described in literature;
step 5: Implementation of a simulation environment (chapter 5) for the
S&A system’s development and testing and including therefore all the
elements of its operating scenario (i.e. dynamics of the aircraft involved in
the conflict geometry, communications between the aircraft transponders,
algorithm computing unit and HMI);
step 6: Development of a S&A algorithm architecture (chapter 6) taking
into account the guidelines defined in step 1 and 2;
step 7: Development of a GCS primary display (chapter 7) for the visuali-
sation of the flight parameters useful for the pilot to monitor the current
flight condition and integration of the S&A advisories in it and taking
into account the guidelines obtained from step 3;
step 8: Validation of the S&A algorithm (sections 8.1 to 8.4) with simula-
tions of complex test cases in the implemented virtual environment;
step 9: Validation of the developed GCS configuration layout (sections 8.5
to 8.7) by pilots simulations and interviews.
1.9 Thesis Outline
This section presents the general outline of the next chapters of the thesis. In chapter 2
some general notes about the use of automation in UAS are given. It starts with
the classifications of different levels of division of responsibility between UAS and
operator. It goes on then with some considerations about the parameters influenced
by this classification. Some notes on the model used for describing the UAS operator
in the UAS operating conditions are moreover illustrated. Finally, the chapter ends
with the presentation of the GCS HMI concepts proposed in previous literature and
UAS applications.
Chapter 3 illustrates some general considerations on S&A systems. More precisely,
it defines performed tasks, functions and operating phases of such a system. The
notes on the Rules of Air to be considered in the development of such a system
and the consequences of the operator involvement in the system are then presented.
The previous work both in manned aviation and UAS regarding autonomous collision
avoidance systems is finally described.
Some notes on the integration of the S&A system in the GCS are then presented
in chapter 4. The chapter starts with some general considerations on requirements
in terms of provided information, functions and implementation issues of the GCS.
The tasks in which the GCS supports the operator are then defined, followed by some
general guidelines on the GCS design. The chapter goes on with the requirements
defined by the previous work done on the integration of such a system and the solutions
proposed.
The general architecture of the simulation environment integrating the developed
S&A system is then presented in chapter 5. This chapter includes also the descrip-
tion of the aircraft simulator used and of the Autonomous Navigation System (ANS)
integrating the S&A algorithm developed and the integrated path following algorithm.
Chapter 6 describes the S&A algorithm. It includes the definition of its assumptions
and of the solutions used for conflict detection, resolution manoeuvre evaluation and
autonomous resolution execution.
The GCS mock-up used for the pilot tests on the integration of the S&A advisories
in the GCS is then described in chapter 7. More precisely, the GCS HMI layout chosen
for this project, its components and the layout used for depiction of the information
on the displays are defined.
The results of some simulations used to validate the S&A algorithm and its inte-
gration in the GCS are then presented in chapter 8. The criteria used to choose the
scenarios presented for the S&A algorithm test and the results of the simulations are
then described. The description of pilots tests procedure and of feedback obtained is
then illustrated. Finally chapter 9 ends with the conclusions drawn by the simulations
and the suggested future works.
1.10 Publications
This section lists the papers produced during this research work listed in chronological
order. The first prototype of S&A algorithm for scenarios considering just a single
flying threat was developed in [2]. This solution was further developed in [3] by
extending it to multiple threats scenarios and including a HMI. The results obtained
in these papers were then collected in [1] as a journal paper. An improvement of the
algorithm and the application on it of an Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) was then
proposed in [4]. A further improvement and its extension of the algorithm also to
ground obstacles is then presented in [5].
[1] Melega, M., Lazarus, S., Lone, M. and Savvaris, A. [2013], ‘Autonomous sense &
avoid capabilities based on aircraft performances estimation’, Proceedings of the
Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part G: Journal of Aerospace Engineering .
[2] Melega, M., Lazarus, S. and Savvaris, A. [2011a], Autonomous collision avoidance
based on aircraft performances estimation, in ‘Digital Avionics Systems Confer-
ence (DASC), 2011 IEEE/AIAA 30th’, pp. 5B4–1–5B4–15.
[3] Melega, M., Lazarus, S. and Savvaris, A. [2011b], Sense & avoid algorithm based
on aircraft performances estimation, in ‘CEAS 2011, The international Conference
of the European Aerospace societies’, pp. 5B4–1–5B4–15.
[4] Melega, M., Lazarus, S., Savvaris, A. and Tsourdos, A. [2013], GPS/INS inte-
gration in a s&a algorithm based on aircraft performances estimation, in ‘21st
Mediterranean Conference on Control and Automation (MED 2013)’.
[5] Melega, M., Lazarus, S., Savvaris, A. and Tsourdos, A. [2014], ‘Multiple threats
sense and avoid algorithm for static and dynamic obstacles’, paper under submis-
sion .
C H A P T E R 2
Control of UAVs
Some of the requirements that were covered in section 1.6 of the previous chapter,
and particularly with regards to the S&A system, require the use of automated and
even autonomous systems. This chapter provides an introduction to the employment
of automation on board of the UAVs . It starts with a short summary of the history of
UAS operations in section 2.1, introducing the approaches used to remotely operate
UAVs up to now. The discussion continues then in section 2.2 with the classification
of modern UAVs based on their autonomy and with the definition of some guidelines
to be considered in the choice of the level of automation for UASs . The model used to
describe the role of a human operator on a highly automated UAV is then summarised
in section 2.3. Finally, in section 2.4 the main solutions proposed in the literature for
the operator GCS HMI layout are listed and their relationship with the UAV level
of autonomy is defined. The presentation of the main trends in the solutions used
for the GCS HMI layout concludes the chapter. The proposed solution used for the
development of the GCS mock-up used in this thesis is detailed in chapter 7.
2.1 Short History of UASs evolution
Remote UAV control evolution is strongly related with UAV’s technology improve-
ments. This section provides a short summary of UAS history. It starts with the
first attempts to use unmanned ground, maritime or flying vehicles in military oper-
ations on the battlefield in the 19th century till the development of todays complex
reconnaissance platforms.
2.1.1 Early Developments
The use of vehicles without an on-board operator historically began in the military
field. They offered a distinct advantage; the loss of lives can be avoided in missions in
which the risk is extremely high, e.g. bombings or deep aerial observations. The article
Remotely Piloted Aerial Vehicles: An Anthology [26] states that UAVs were first used
for war fighting on the 22nd of August 1849. On that date the city of Venice was
attacked by the Austrians with unmanned balloons loaded with explosives. Similarly
balloons were flown by both Confederate and Union forces in the US Civil War in
1862 for reconnaissance and bombing sorties [27].
Figure 2.1: the Hewitt-Sperry Automatic
Airplane. Source: [33]
Figure 2.2: the Kettering Aerial Torpedo.
Source: [32]
A more refined attempt to implement a remotely piloted vehicle was done by Tesla
in 1898 [28]. He operated a radio-controlled motorboat in front of a government
representative, demonstrating the potential military application of this technology.
Tesla patented a remote-control for unmanned vehicles [29]. He indicated this concept
as teleautomation, and became one of the founding fathers of the basic principles for
today’s UAVs .
2.1.2 World War I
The use of remotely operated vehicles significantly increased in World War I. On the
German side the FL-7 wire guided motorboat were loaded with explosives and rammed
into enemy ships. The drivers were initially placed on towers and then on seaplanes
[28]. The wire control method was unwieldy. Therefore in 1916, it was decided to put
Tesla’s wireless radio-control system into service on the FL-7.
Regarding aircraft, the first pilotless model was an aerial target developed in 1916
[30]. At the end of the war it was followed by the Hewitt-Sperry Automatic Airplane
or torpedo (fig. 2.1) [31]. It was a radio-controlled flying bomb integrating the Elmer
Sperrys automatic gyroscopic stabilizer, used to level out aircraft during flight. This
prototype can be considered a first important step in the historical development of
UAVs . The interest of US Army in the project resulted in the successful development
of the revolutionary Kettering Aerial Torpedo (fig. 2.2). It was nicknamed the Ketter-
ing Bug and first flew in 1918 [32]. It weighted just 270 kg, including a 135 kg bomb
as payload. It was designed to be launched from a trolley with rolling wheels and with
detachable wings. Plenty of these aircraft were ordered by the US military, however
the war ended before they can be used in battle.
Figure 2.3: the Standard E-1. Source: [35] Figure 2.4: the RAE Larynx. Source: [36]
Figure 2.5: the Fairey IIIF floatplane.
Source: [37]
Figure 2.6: the de Havilland DH.82B
Queen Bee. Source: [38]
2.1.3 Interwar Period
Following World War I, quite a lot of work was done on UAVs development [34].
More precisely, three models of the early US Army fighter aircraft identified by the
name Standard E-1 (fig. 2.3) were converted as drones. Similarly to the Kettering
Bug, the Larynx (fig. 2.4) was an early cruise missile developed by the Royal Aircraft
Establishment (RAE ) from a small monoplane aircraft designed to be launched from
a warship and flown by an autopilot. It was tested by the Royal Navy between 1927
and 1929.
Following the successes of these first pilotless aircraft, the UK and US started
the development of radio controlled pilotless target aircraft in the 1930s. The Fairey
Queen radio-controlled target was developed by the British in 1931 starting from the
Fairey IIIF floatplane (fig. 2.5), building a small batch of three. In 1935, this first
experiment was followed by the production of larger numbers of another remotely
controlled target, the de Havilland DH.82B Queen Bee (fig. 2.6). It was derived from
a de Havilland DH.82 Tiger Moth biplane trainer. As explained in section 1.2, the
term drone used for pilotless aircraft is linked with the name of this plane. The Queen
Bee was also the first UAV able to return to the launch point and be reused.
During the same period, the US Navy continued developing radio controlled air-
craft. The term drone was used in 1936 by the head of this research group to indicate
radio controlled aerial targets [40]. In 1937 the Curtiss N2C-2 drone (fig. 2.7) was one
Figure 2.7: the Curtiss N2C-2. Source: [36] Figure 2.8: the Culver PQ-8. Source: [39]
Figure 2.9: the Radioplane OQ-2. Source: [26]
of the first outcomes of this research.
It was remotely controlled from another
aircraft, called the TG-2 [41].
Another trend in US Army Air
Forces (USAAF) was to use obsolescent
aircraft as anti-aircraft target drones
[41]. These full-sized targets were iden-
tified by the designation PQ, in order
to be distinguished by the Attack air-
craft identified by the A code. One of
the first examples of these target drones
was the Culver PQ-8 target drone (fig. 2.8) a radio-controlled versions of the tidy lit-
tle Culver Cadet two-seat light civil aircraft followed by the improved Culver PQ-14
derivative of the PQ-8.
The first mass-produced UAV was the Radioplane OQ-2 (fig. 2.9), created by
the Radioplane Company at their southern California-based facility. This company
was formed by a team including the british-born actor Reginald Denny. He served
in the Royal Flying Corps during World War I and developed a fascination with
radio-controlled aircraft in the 1930s. During the war, nearly 15,000 of these aircraft
were rolled out for the US Army and Navy, who used the Radioplanes as targets for
antiaircraft training [28].
2.1.4 World War II
During World War II, on the German side, the first workable cruise missile, the Fieseler
Fi 103, known as V1 (fig. 2.10), and the first ballistic missile, the Aggregat-4 A4, known
as V2 (fig. 2.12), were developed [28]. The Germans were also the first to deploy aerial
drones that were remotely piloted instead of preprogrammed. The Ruhrstahl SD 1400
or FX 1400 Fritz X (fig. 2.11) was a glide bomb with a weight of 3000 pounds and
a warhead weighting 700 lb. It was equipped with four small wings, controllable tail
Figure 2.10: the Fieseler Fi103.
Source: [42]
Figure 2.11: the Ruhrstahl SD1400.
Source: [26]
Figure 2.12: the Aggregat-4 A4. Source: [43]
Figure 2.13: the NAF TG-2. Source: [44]
surfaces and a rocket motor. The de-
vice was dropped from high altitude by a
Dornier Do 217 bomber and then steered
by a bombardier via radio link using a
joystick.
On the other side of the Atlantic
Ocean, the TG-2 (fig. 2.13) was an as-
sault drone developed in 1941 by Naval
Aircraft Factory (NAF ) on which a
camera communicating with a television
screen was installed [34]. After the first
successes of this drone in attack missions, the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics proposed
a television-assisted remote control assault drone program. This program was based
on the use of 162 control planes and 1000 assault drones. However, the risk of reveal-
ing the concept to the enemy and allowing development of countermeasures prior to
full production left assault drones as an unproven concept in the minds of military
planners. Their use was in fact limited to a 4-drone attack on a beached Japanese
merchant ship in the Russell Islands at the end of July and the expenditure of 46
drones in the northern Solomon Islands.
The focus on aerial weapons led the USAAF and US Navy to launch in 1944 Opera-
tions Aphrodite and Anvil, respectively [28, 45]. These projects were based on the idea
to use heavy bombers, including modified Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress and Consoli-
dated B-24 Liberator bombers. All unnecessary equipment were removed from these
aircraft to carry 10 tons of Torpex, an explosive more powerful than TNT. The plane
was controlled in the air by a crew (fig. 2.14), arming the explosives and then bailing
Figure 2.14: a pilot sitting in one of the
stripped-down bombers used in Aphrodite
project; once airborne the pilot bailed out
from the plane. Source: [46]
out using parachutes at an altitude
of 10 000 ft. The aircraft would then
be remotely controlled through radio-
controlled actuators from a nearby
mother ship, fitted with television re-
ceivers and radio control equipment.
In this phase, two television cameras
mounted in the drone’s cockpit (one
looking out from the nose of the air-
craft, and one aimed at the instruments
panel) would have been used to steer the
plane into the target. These UAVs were
meant to attack targets difficult to be ap-
proached by manned bombers because of
the high level of protection around these
targets.
Figure 2.15: the VB-1 Azons. Source: [47]
These programs were however prema-
turely stopped by a serious accident. One
of the converted B-24 was sent from Eng-
land by the US Navy the 12th of August
1944 to eliminate a suspected German
supergun in northern France, supposedly
able to hit London, more than 100 miles
away. The aircraft was destroyed by a
premature detonation of the volatile Tor-
pex. The crew, pilot Lieutenant Wilford
J. Willy and co-pilot Lieutenant Joseph P. Kennedy Jr., Kennedy’s younger brother,
was killed in the accident. The Army and Navy decided therefore to terminate the
operations.
Similarly to the strategy used in the Operations Aphrodite and Anvil, since the early
1944, some B-24 s were used to drop more than 450 Army-developed VB-1 Azons
(fig. 2.15). These were radio remote-control glide bombs with a weight of 1000 lb
steered visually by bombardiers, over the Pacific and Burma.
2.1.5 Post-War
Remotely operated weapons, including aircraft, evolved very slowly in the immediate
postwar years [28]. Particularly while the US Army and the US Navy worked on the
development of such systems the US Air Force did not recognise unmanned aircraft
as professional weapons.
Piston engines were normally used for target drones, few pulsejet propulsion drones
were built and used as target drones by US military in this era [34]. They had the
problem of limited speed and range due to the fact that their air intake vanes were self
Figure 2.16: the McDonnell T2D2-1 Katy-
did. Source: [48]
Figure 2.17: the Curtiss KD2C Skeet.
Source: [49]
destructing. Among these, a pulsejet-powered target, the T2D2-1 Katydid (fig. 2.16),
later the KDD-1 and then KDH-1, was developed during the war by McDonnell for
the US Navy. This drone was air-launched. Its layout was based on a cigar-shaped
fuselage, a straight mid-mounted wing and a V-tail on which the pulsejet engine was
placed. Another cigar-shaped drone was the KD2C Skeet series (fig. 2.17), a pulsejet-
powered target built by Curtiss. A small number of these drones were obtained by the
Navy after the war. In this configuration the pulsejet was placed inside the fuselage
with the intake in the nose. The wings were low-mounted with tip tanks and the tail
was a triple-fin.
The B-17 s were also used as drones in 1946 to collect the radioactive data in
Operation Crossroads [34]. They were radio-controlled from a jeep during takeoff and
landing and from another B-17 during flight. These planes gathered samples from
inside the radioactive cloud on Bikini Atoll. In a test two of them were flown directly
above the explosion. Both of them gained height when reached by the shock wave and
the lowest was damaged. Similar tests were performed by the US Navy with Grumman
F6F Hellcat drones. A similar use of B-17 drones was done in Operation Sandstone
in 1947, and in Operation Greenhouse in 1951. In the last operation several Lockheed
P-80 Shooting Star jets were modified into drones by Sperry Corporation and used.
Their complexity caused a very high accident rate.
After World War II, Radioplane developed another very successful series of piston-
powered target drones. They were designed in 1980s as the Basic Training Target
(BTT ) family and remained in service for the rest of the 20th century [34]. In this
family, the Northrop Radioplane RP-71 Falconer (fig. 2.18), designated the SD-1 by
the US Army, was the first US Army reconnaissance drone [45]. It was produced in
1955 and it was based on a target vehicle design. The Falconer was launched by two
rockets and recovered by a parachute. It could transmit crude video recorded by the
still film camera with which it was equipped.
Drones were used as decoys at least since the 1950s, when the Northrop GAM-67
Crossbow (fig. 2.19) was tested in such a role [34]. The McDonnell Douglas ADM-20
Figure 2.18: the Northrop Radioplane RP-
71 Falconer. Source: [50]
Figure 2.19: the Northrop GAM-67 Cross-
bow. Source: [51]
Figure 2.20: the McDonnell Douglas ADM-
20 Quail. Source: [52]
Figure 2.21: the Northrop Q-4. Source: [53]
Quail (fig. 2.20) was the first operational decoy drone. They were used on Boeing
B-52 Stratofortress bombers to make easier the penetration of defended airspace.
Combat aircraft were capable of reaching Mach 2 by the late 1950s. Faster targets
became therefore necessary [34]. A turbojet-powered Mach 2 target was designed by
Northrop in the late 1950s. It was originally designated as the Q-4 and later as AQM-
35 (fig. 2.21). It had the shape of a slender dart with wedge-shaped stubby wings,
swept conventional tail assembly, and a General Electric J85 turbojet engine.
2.1.6 Vietnam War
UAVs technology sensibly improved its effectiveness during the Vietnam War and
their use became extensive [27]. One of the first jet-propelled drones was the Firebee,
part of the family of drones manufactured by Ryan Aeronautical Company (fig. 2.22).
The first prototype was created in 1951 and flew for the first time only four years
later. It was used primarily by the US Air Force for intelligence-gathering missions
and radio-communications monitoring.
The Firebee was then evolved into the AQM-34, an aircraft with roughly the same
size of today’s General Atomics RQ-1 Predator UAV, from which comes the modern
concept of unmanned reconnaissance aircraft [45]. The AQM-34 was used from the
mid-1960s to the mid-1970s in tens of thousands of reconnaissance missions at varying
altitude levels [27] over North Vietnam, parts of China, and even the Soviet Union in
order to reduce the risks related with manned reconnaissance flights. The Lockheed
C-130 Hercules was used to transport these UAVs to the mission target zone. After
Figure 2.22: the family of Teledyne Ryan targets and RPVs. Source: [54]
Figure 2.26: the D-21 on its M-21. Source: [57]
the mission completion they were
parachuted for recovery [34].
The M-21 is a variant of the A-12,
the earliest in the Blackbird family de-
veloped by Lockheed. This aircraft was
used to launch the D-21, a drone fly-
ing at a higher altitude than the M-21
(fig. 2.26). The M-21 included a sec-
ond cockpit for a launch control op-
erator. This concept was developed
as part of a project in operation from
1963 until 1968. It was used in four
missions between 1969 and 1971 to spy on the Lop Nur nuclear test site. The opera-
tions with these aircraft stopped in 1966 after a collision during a launch between a
D-21 drone and the M-21 mother ship.
Figure 2.23: the Northrop BQM-74F.
Source: [52]
Figure 2.24: the BQM-155A (RQ-5A).
Source: [55]
Figure 2.25: the RQ-2A. Source: [56]
2.1.7 Modern Era
Israel also had interest in developing UAVs . More precisely, in the 1970s, Israel started
to develop new UAV designs based on the modification of existing UAVs [45] and
continued with as a aggressive development of new UAV concepts [27]. Among Israeli
UAVs operations, particularly ingenious was the mission of a swarm of Northrop BQM-
74 Chukar (fig. 2.23) to the Golan Heights during the Yom Kippur War of October
1973 [45]. The flying fleet was wrongly identified by Syrian military with a massive air
attack against its potent Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM ) batteries. Dozens of SAM s
were therefore launched against the incoming aircraft, causing the depletion of the air
defenses. In the following years, Israel became a reference in the world for specific types
of UAVs , particularly in the 1980s, when lighter and smaller UAVs were developed.
Among these, the IAI RQ-5 Hunter (fig. 2.24) and AAI RQ-2 Pioneer (fig. 2.25)
UAVs extensively used by US in the 1991 Gulf War were actually derived from Israeli
systems [27].
Israel was also responsible of a radical change of attitude towards UAVs [34].
They were considered too unreliable and expensive to be used as weapons, but in 1982
Israeli Air Force won against the Syrian Air Force by using a strategy based on the
coordinated use of UAVs alongside manned aircraft. This strategy allowed the quick
destruction of dozens of Syrian aircraft with minimal losses. The drones were used in
these operations as electronic decoys, electronic jammers as well as for real-time video
reconnaissance.
The first flight of the General Atomics RQ-1 Predator (fig. 2.27), one of the best-
known modern UAV, took place in 1994 [45]. This drone comes from a design by
Abraham Karem, a former engineering officer for the Israeli Air Force. The aircraft
was developed for long loiter reconnaissance work and is considered by the military
Figure 2.27: the RQ-1L. Source: [58] Figure 2.28: the RQ-4A. Source: [59]
Figure 2.29: the AeroVironment Wasp:
an example of MAV. Source: [60]
Figure 2.30: the AeroVironment RQ-
11A: an example of man-portable UAV.
Source: [61]
as a medium altitude UAV. The Predator was used in military operations in the
Balkans in 1995 and Iraq in 1996. It showed particularly its effectiveness in Operation
Iraqi Freedom and in Afghanistan [34]. The original design of the RQ-1 evolved into
different variants that are currently used to patrol the US-Mexico border, collect air
samples for scientific research, and destroy ground military targets [45].
Another well-known drone is the Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk, a high-
altitude, long endurance aircraft with impressive performance and sensor capabilities
[45]. It was developed from a 1995 request of the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA). It is able to fly for more than 32 hours at a stretch and loiter at
altitudes as high as 65 000 ft. The sensors with which it is equipped are able to see
through clouds, dense fog, haze, and dust storms. The data transmission rate is very
quick and can provide operators with very high resolution imagery of wide swaths of
the ground below.
Another interesting application of UAVs in the field are miniature UAVs , designed
to be carried by infantrymen in the battlefield [34]. They range from Micro Air
Vehicle (MAV) (e.g., fig. 2.29), which can be launched directly by an infantryman, to
man-portable UAVs (e.g., fig. 2.30), that can be operated like an infantry anti-aircraft
missile.
2.2 UAV Level of Autonomy
It was widely demonstrated that the automation of some basic flight and mission
tasks on manned aircraft and UAS can lead to a reduction of the operator’s workload
and better piloting performance [23]. The division of responsibility of a task and the
support of that task between UAV and operator in terms of Pilot Authorisation and
Control of Tasks (PACT) levels, [18] use the following classification:
Level 0: the operator has full control of the UAS;
Level 1: the operator has full control of the UAS, but can request advice on
actions to the UAS;
Level 2: the operator has control of the UAS, with advice on actions provided
by the UAS;
Level 3: the operator controls the UAS, and accepts or rejects UAS’s proposed
actions;
Level 4: UAS has full control of each of its actions unless it is revoked by the
operator;
Level 5: UAS has full control of its actions.
It should be noted that this classification is slightly different in some interpretations.
More precisely the levels 4 and 5 may be subdivided to include the idea of operator’s
approval/veto and variable levels of UAV action reporting. These task levels vary
according to the environment and the urgency of a task. Regarding flight control
mode, reference [4] defines the UAVs flight control mode classification as tabulated in
Table 2.1.
Generally speaking, reference [23] identifies the following aspects related with the
definition of level of automation of a function on a UAS:
Time available for replanning: if the function involve time-critical events, the
time available might not be enough in order to let the operator understand
the problem and take the appropriate decision.
Complexity of the conflict or problem: the reasoning capability of the hu-
man mind, based on a wider knowledge than the UAS, is necessary for higher
level decisions and decisions in unfamiliar situations.
Consequences of a wrong decision: this is closely related to the aspect of li-
ability and responsibility.
Dilemma between controlling and monitoring: it is clear that the operator
might become overloaded and fatigued if he/she takes care of all the controlling
tasks. On the other hand, if the task of the operator is just monitoring
the progress of an automatic system, he/she might become bored and less
attentive.
From a general point of view, the main disadvantage of the HITL control is the fact
that the human behaviour is variable and this produce errors [62]. Moreover, humans
are creative and might decide to change their responses, choosing non optimal options.
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On the other hand, on aircraft with preprogrammed fight routes, the high automa-
tion of the system prevents the remote operator from managing directly the short-term
dynamics of the aircraft [62]. Therefore, he loses awareness of potential imminent
dangers. This makes difficult for him/her to produce the corrective actions that are
usually performed by the on-board pilot. Moreover, humans have the advantage of be-
ing more flexible. More specifically in this context paper Tadema et al. [63] identifies
the following key points:
• they integrate perceived data with other information to resolve ambiguities
and detect contradictions,
• they are able to recognise and exploit advantageous opportunities,
• they adapt more easily to changing environment,
• they take more appropriate decisions than computers when sudden changes
happen.
Therefore it could be worthy to include the operator in the control loop by allowing
him/her to make strategic decisions on-the-fly, when the effectiveness of predetermined
flight plans is reduced as highlighted in Semi-Autonomous Human-UAV Interfaces for
Fixed-Wing Mini-UAVs [64].
For these reasons, when a fully autonomous control mode is implemented, the
following functions must be implemented [62]:
Operator override capability: operator has to be provided with the authority
to override the automation when deemed necessary.
Autonomous mode back-up: high-level automation of decision selection and
action is justified in highly time-critical situations in which the time is insuffi-
cient for a human operator to respond and take appropriate action. Moreover,
the ability of the human operators to identify appropriate solutions diminishes
when the operator situation awareness is reduced. On the other hand, a com-
puter is able to determine a logic-based appropriate action much faster than
a human operator.
2.3 Supervisory Controller
As the autonomy of the UAV increases, the operator role involves higher levels of multi-
tasking [23]. More precisely, as vehicle autonomy increases, the role of the operator
changes from that of a manual controller, using stick and rudder inputs, i.e. class 1 in
Table 2.1, to a supervisory controller , that provides higher level system inputs such as
navigation waypoints and target speeds, i.e. class 4 in Table 2.1, while the automated
systems determine the means to achieve the performances required by the inputs.
A supervisory controller is defined as that type of operator who is responsible for
coordinating human and machine tasks and goals. A successful coordination requires
the operator to have a correct understanding of the tasks and goals of the automated
systems and the prediction of how the system will react to environmental perturbations
as well as to operator inputs. It is therefore necessary to minimise breakdowns in
human-machine coordination in order to make it easier for the operator to understand
and predict vehicle behaviour.
The presence of an outer loop control, due to the specification of higher level goals
(e.g. navigation waypoints), produces the following two consequences generally related
with supervisory control systems. The first one is the time lag between operator
input and system response increases. That’s why predictive displays are generally
recommended in order to overcome the effects of this time delay. Operator awareness
of UAS performance weakens, i.e. he is taken out of the loop. This imply that it is
important to ensure a clear view of automation behaviour to the operator in order to
support operator mental models and system awareness.
operator
displays controls
system
sensors actuators
task
Figure 2.31: flowchart of the
supervisory control model.
Source: Adapted from [65]
Reference [65] define the supervisory control model
sketched in fig. 2.31, in which the system commands
are provided by the operator to the GCS. In this case,
the GCS typically consists of a set of displays show-
ing information about the system status, including ve-
hicle attitude, altitude, navigation status, and a set
of controls to allow the operator to enter navigation
waypoints, airspeed and altitude. The function of the
GCS is to translate higher level commands into sets
of inputs to the actuators producing the desired sys-
tem performance. UAS operator is then in charge of
five basic human roles. These are planning, teaching,
monitoring, intervening and learning.
In the planning role, the operator defines the way
to implement a desired change in vehicle performance
in order to accomplish the vehicle routing alteration.
It involves, for example:
• choice of the control variables to manipulate, e.g. to change the vehicle head-
ing or to insert new waypoints,
• development of criteria to assess the system actions, e.g. to decide which are
the displays that provide the best feedback on the desired action,
• determination of constraints to be considered for the automated systems activ-
ities management, e.g. to define if the new routing is compatible with onboard
navigational capabilities such as Required Navigation Performance (RNP).
This role is the base for the subsequent roles including UAV activities programming
and monitoring of the system behaviour.
When the planning has been defined, the operator must teach the UAV control
systems by providing the UAS with the appropriate instructions. The fact that the
operator is providing high-level instructions to the system is important because ex-
cessively high automation levels could lead to unpredictable or critical situations, in
which automated systems do more than expected. In this conditions, the coupling
between control systems could, in fact, lead to unintended consequences1. This situa-
tions is particularly difficult to be detected. Therefore all projected changes resulting
from operator inputs must be highlighted on the GCS displays.
After providing the inputs to the control systems, the operator has to monitor
the system performance to ensure that it evolves as desired. This role includes those
activities necessary to adjust the system performances in response to small deviations
(trimming) and to fault detections.
If undesired system performances are detected, an operator intervention is nec-
essary (i.e. the level 4 PACT defined in the previous section). Please note that in
some highly autonomous UAV no possibility is left to the operator to assume manual
control2. In this case an intelligent automated detection/intervention system might
be necessary. On the other hand, when the operator have the ability to intervene in
system behavior, the operator intervention has to be simplified by the provision of
quick and low workload method to re-instruct/re-program the automated systems.
Finally, the operator can learn lessons based on the given plan, system inputs,
system behaviour, and interventions (if any) that could be useful for the system control
in future situations. To get the most effective learning, the GCS must “support an
accurate mental model of the system and allow the operator to understand why the
system behaved as it did” [65].
2.4 GCS Human-Machine Interface Design
The GCS architecture depends on the flight control mode of the UAS, as per the
classification illustrated in section 2.2. The possible solutions range from concepts
based on the conventional stick, rudder and throttle for class 1 to more innovative
fully automated flight control interfaces for class 4 to 6 [19].
The primary functions performed by UAS operators in the GCS during a mission
are the same as those performed by the flight crew of manned aircraft during a flight.
They are classified as follows [66]:
flight management is the primary control and the navigation of the aircraft;
communications management including both communications with air traf-
fic control and with other crew members during the flight;
systems management deals with the management and interaction of UAS op-
erator with functions performed by the system: this implies a GCS designed
to provide the operators all the information regarding system status and po-
tential system failures [19];
1E.g. the changes to the horizontal dynamics in conventional aircraft can cause unintended con-
sequences in vertical dynamics
2E.g. Global Hawk only provides a limited manual control capability
tasks management is the function that manages all the tasks and the associ-
ated resources necessary to mission accomplishment: this is both a supervisory
and a supporting function to the previous three functions and involves moni-
toring, scheduling, and allocating the tasks and their resources.
The chosen solution used for the GCS have to be a trade-off between precision of the
inputs, intuition and speed of response, in order to get an in-the-loop feel supporting
efficient task completion [64]. From this point of view it is fundamental to take into
account in design the human factors guidelines already defined for manned aviation
[19].
The paper Vehicle teleoperation interfaces [67] classifies the HMI for vehicle tele-
operation proposed in literature into four categories:
direct control interfaces include all traditional systems based on hand-controllers
and video feedback;
multimodal/multisensory interfaces based on multiple control modes or the
use of fused data displays (e.g. virtual reality);
supervisory control interfaces are designed for high-level command genera-
tion and monitoring;
novel interfaces use unconventional input methods or are intended for unusual
applications.
A more detailed description about these solutions is presented in the following sections.
2.5 Direct Control Interfaces
Direct control interfaces are the most common control method for vehicle teleoper-
ation. An example about their application in UAS is given in fig. 2.32, that shows
the GCS of the MQ-1 Predator. In this type of HMI, the UAV is controlled directly
via hand-controllers (e.g. joysticks, TrackPointTM controllers [64]), and visually super-
vised by the operator through vehicle mounted cameras. The operator is therefore part
of the control loop and he/she depends on real-time video for external environment
perception. As explained in [67], this kind of control is often referred to as inside-out
piloting because the operator feels like being inside the vehicle.
It is particularly suitable when real-time human decision making or control is re-
quired and the environment can support high-bandwidth, low latency communications.
Outside these conditions, direct interfaces could still be used despite a sub-optimal per-
formance. In particular, this kind of control is difficult and not accurate when there
is any kind of delay related with transmission or other causes.
In order to make the training easier, some of the GCS based on this concept are
designed with a layout and controls similar to that of some aircraft cockpits. In some
other cases designers attempt to improve operator performance with the use of a kind
of telepresence via head-mounted video, binaural sound, and physical cues.
Figure 2.32: the MQ-1 Predator GCS: an example of direct control. Source: [68]
Experimental work on these type of systems [64] have shown that the main ad-
vantage of this type of HMI is the fact that they allow the operator to have a quick
and easy understanding of the physical motion of aircraft attitude. They are therefore
characterised by fastest response times. Moreover, these kind of HMIs “do not require
a focal shift between the onboard camera feed of the UAV and the HMI itself” [64].
However, this type of HMI requires physical components with sizes and power
requirements that could make them detrimental or even prohibitive in some circum-
stances [64]. More precisely, for large vehicle the UAV control stations built as a part of
system have enough space and a suitable power supply for a physical interface allowing
fast and easy control. On the other hand, wilderness search-and-rescue applications
based on small vehicle such as Advanced Tactical Vehicle (ATV) could not allow a
location suitable to host this kind of HMI. Moreover, previous research demonstrated
that direct interfaces can produce in some istances an inaccurate attitude judgement
and inadequate situation awareness, and failure to detect obstacles [67].
2.6 Multimodal/Multisensory Interface
It could be difficult for the operator to have an accurate perception of remote en-
vironment and to make quick control decisions, when the UAV is in a complex and
quickly changing situation, as stated previously in [67]. In these conditions multi-
Figure 2.33: example of multimodal interface, the OmniSense Sensor Display and Map
Display. Source: [69]
modal/multisensory interfaces are more suitable because of their effectiveness in the
command generation and of the rich information feedback. This kind of HMIs pro-
vides a variety of control modes (individual actuator, coordinated motion etc.) and
displays (text, visual etc.). They are particularly suitable for applications which de-
mand context specific actions3.
Multisensory displays provide a single integrated view, also called virtual reality
(e.g. in fig. 2.33), derived from the information acquired from several sensors or data
sources. Moreover, they offer the advantages of improved situation awareness, facilitate
depth judgement and speed decision making [67]. In fact, virtual reality provides to
the UAS operator with an external point of view that make it possible for him/her to
control the aircraft from the outside.
2.7 Supervisory Control Interfaces
The name of this type of control, shown in fig. 2.34, means that this type of con-
trol acts similarly to a supervisor interacting with subordinates [67]. The mission to
be accomplished is divided by the operator in a sequence of subtasks which are exe-
cuted by the UAS. Therefore the UAS must have a degree of autonomy to be able to
safely accomplish the tasks required by the operator. This kind of HMI are designed
for high-level command generation, monitoring and diagnosis and are ideal for appli-
cations involving low-bandwidth or large delay communications channels. They are
currently few in number, but they are expected to grow with the increase of autonomy
in UAS applications. Supervisory control interfaces simplify navigation despite they
still involve many design challenges including display layout, management of human-
system interaction and simplification of sharing/trading of control.4
3i.e. “when it is necessary to select control modes and displays based on situational requirements”
[67]
4In fact, as stated in [67], “supervisory control interfaces must provide mechanisms for the operator
and the robot to exchange information at different levels of detail or abstraction. This is particularly
Figure 2.34: an example of supervisory control interface for UAV. Source: [70]
Figure 2.35: web-based interface for remote driving developed from the Swiss Federal In-
stitute of Technology in Lausanne). Source: [67]
2.8 Novel Interfaces
Despite the name, this kind of vehicle teleoperation interfaces are now commonplace.
Their novelty is sometimes based on unconventional input methods.
An example of novel interface are the Web-based interfaces described in [67], e.g.
fig. 2.35, that are World Wide Web based application. This kind of HMIs are advanta-
geous from different points of view. Firstly, they can be accessed world-wide. They are
Figure 2.36: physical icon interface.
Source: [70]
moreover highly cost-effective. Finally they re-
quires little (or no) operator training. On the
other hand, Web-based teleoperation have differ-
ent issues from more traditional systems, for ex-
ample the variable communication bandwidth of
the Internet.
Another interesting example is given in [64],
where the attitude of a small model airplane (see
fig. 2.36) used as a physical icon of the real UAV is
converted by a computer into roll and pitch com-
mands for the real UAV. This kind of HMI is
called physical icon interface.
The following sections present in detail some
very interesting and quite complete HMI based re-
spectively on touch-screens, Personal Digital As-
sistant (PDA) and speech commands.
2.8.1 Soft Controls
In manned aviation the current trend aims to design the displays for aircraft sub-
systems on multi-functional display screens and controls (switches, knobs etc.) which
are mounted on panels in front of the two pilots. The next step, where some of the
research projects development is currently in progress, will focus on replacing hardware
controls with reconfigurable touch-screen based controls on the display. This type of
controls are called in soft controls [71].
However, despite the interest in the topic, many issues regarding the design of these
displays and control are still left unanswered and makes it difficult to implement them
in a cockpit environment. Some of these issues include:
1. ease of using soft controls as compared to hard controls,
2. absence of tactile and aural feedback,
3. loss of dedicated, geographical, location of controls,
4. limited display real estate,
important when the robot has problems performing a task and the operator needs to ascertain what
has happened”.
5. navigation between displays during configuration tasks and emergency situa-
tions,
6. accuracy in mapping between the display schematic and sub-system compo-
nents,
7. response time and display update rate of complex systems,
8. reliability of soft controls5 for high-risk domains, and
9. several environmental effects (e.g. vibration, glare).
More precisely, it was identified that it is necessary to redesign the input modality of
the HMI taking into account the following guidelines. The touch logic for activating
the touch areas must be improved. An effective design must be based on a lift-off touch
logic. In fact, in this logic the action related with soft control selection is executed
only after the finger lifted off from the soft control touch area. This solution make
possible for the user to select the control even if he fails to hit it on initial contact
by simply dragging his/her finger into the touchable area. In the same way, if the
control is accidentally touched, the user can avoid the selection by simply dragging
his/her finger out. This is an important feature, particularly when the control has a
very limited extension on the screen.
Moreover, synoptic displays (buttons and icons) must be enhanced and based on
graphical solutions to distinguish between touchable and non-touchable areas. (e.g.
giving to touch areas a 3-D button shape and making them opaque and using 2-D
transparent boxes with rounded corners for non-touchable areas). Furthermore, the
visual feedback about the position of the operator finger in respect with the control
has to be provided to the operator (e.g. by making the buttons depressed into its slot,
when the operator’s finger is in the touch area, and making it come out of its lot when
the operator lift-off the finger). It would be possible to reproduce the tactile and aural
feedback associated with hard switches that is missing with soft controls, by using a
click-clack recorder sound to be played when activating and releasing a button.
Regarding the integration of alerts, procedures, displays, and controls, the computer-
based displays have the advantage of enabling the integration with other systems in
the cockpit, like alerting systems and electronic checklist system, making it possible to
efficiently navigate between displays, especially during abnormal situations. The pilots
feedback collected in [71] showed a good appreciation of the pilots for this proposed
approach.
This thesis describes in chapter 7 an example of partial GCS mock-up derived from
the concept of a GCS based on soft controls.
5In the previous experiments reported in [71], “the pilots stated that it was sometimes difficult to
activate a touch area”.
2.8.2 PDA Based Interface
In some cases, conventional control stations could be impractical (or impossible) due
to monetary, technical or other constraints in some applications. An interesting al-
ternative is the PDA, like the one shown in fig. 2.37, having the advantage of being
lightweight, shirt-pocket portable, and have touch-sensitive displays [64].
Figure 2.37: an example
of PDA based interface.
Source [64]
In particular, its small size and light weight make it
perfect to be used in highly mobile environments like the
one often associated with mini-UAVs . Of course, cause of
the reduced dimension of the screen, the few instrument
displayed do not require a high mental workload. More-
over, the trackpad characteristic of the laptop-based inter-
face could be more difficult to use for novice users rather
than a mouse. More precisely the movement of the cursor
with a trackpad to drag a control could be more difficult to
perform for the users if they also must hold down a track-
pad button than using single- or double-clicks to select new
parameter values.
On the other hand, a PDA implementation of the GCS
is for sure characterised by much lower network and graph-
ics performances than the laptop implementation. More-
over the reduced size of the screen allows only the visual-
isation of a very restricted set of instruments.
2.8.3 Speech-Based Input
Conventional manual input requires the operator to choose and click through sev-
eral menu items producing therefore an “extensive “head-down time” and error-prone
button selections” [72]. Speech-based input is a natural and intuitive communication
method and therefore allows a more efficient information management by the operators
and have different advantages [72]. More precisely this type of HMI reduces resource
competition by freeing operator’s hands from operating some controls and allowing
head-up control. Moreover, they offer a potential reduction of the error caused by
the simplification of complex strings of control actions that is necessary to implement
voice macros. Simulations demonstrated the presence of these advantages for manned
aviation. In particular, this type of control gives improved performances and simplified
operations for certain tasks, compared to switches and keyboards. In the case of com-
mand and control applications, the speech inputs reduce the task completion time in
respect with conventional mouse and keyboard input method. The speech input could
allow the operator simply to specify the end menu item, while the system take care of
selecting it and/or filling it with the appropriate information. Therefore, according to
the experimental results presented in [72], despite the additional processing time for
elaborating each individual voice command, the operators’ performance is improved
for speech input than manual input in a simulated teleoperated UAV control station
environment, both for the flight/navigation task and data entry tasks. However, as
with any of the new technologies, there are other challenges which are necessary to con-
sider. For example, in some conditions the speech input could conflict with intercom
operations and intra-crew verbal communications.
2.9 Chapter Summary
The solutions used to remotely operate the various UAV classes nowadays are based
on standard models derived from previous experiences gained from developing and
operating UASs . The ancestors of UAVs were the aerial targets and radio-controlled
flying bombs firstly employed by the US during World War I. In their evolution the
first concepts of assault drones appeared during World War II. The first use of UAVs
for scientific analysis was recorded in 1946, when some remotely operated B-17 s col-
lected radioactive data. The main application of UAVs from that time onwards was
intelligence gathering. It started with the AQM-34 of Ryan Aeronautical Company
employed in tens of thousand of reconnaissance missions from the mid-1960s to the
mid-1970s. The great effectiveness of drones on the battlefield was demonstrated in
the 1980s, when Israeli Air Force won against the Sirian Air Force with a strategy
based on the coordinated use of UAVs alongside manned aircraft. Nowadays UAVs
classes range from miniature UAVs carried on the battlefield by infantrymen, to big-
ger aircraft, such as the General Atomics RQ-1 Predator used in military and civilian
application.
UASs can be characterised by different flight control modes according to the en-
vironment and the urgency of the task in which they are employed. The level of
autonomy ranges from the case in which the operator has full control of the UAV to
that in which the UAV is autonomous. Generally speaking the choice of the level of
autonomy for every UAS function include different aspects. Main factors include the
time available for replanning, complexity of the function, consequences of a wrong
decision and differences in terms of performance for a human operator controlling
or monitoring the UAS. The behaviour of human operators is in fact variable and
this could lead the operator not selecting the optimal options. On the other hand,
humans have the advantage of being more flexible than computers and make there-
fore more appropriate decisions when sudden changes occurs. For these reasons, when
the UAV navigate autonomously, an operator override capability should always be pro-
vided. Similarly, when a function is manually controlled, an autonomous mode back-up
should be implemented. This is necessary for highly time-critical situations, in which
the time is insufficient for a human operator to respond and take appropriate action.
When the UAV is autonomous the operator acts as a supervisory controller pro-
viding to the UAS high level inputs such as navigation waypoints. The supervisory
controller is therefore responsible for coordinating human and machine tasks and goals.
He needs so to have a correct understanding of the vehicle behaviour in order to easily
predict it. This implies that the model of the supervisory controller have to include
the communication with the the GCS. The operator derives from it the information
about system status, including vehicle attitude, altitude, navigation status, a part set-
ting the navigation waypoints and parameters. In this model the operator take care
of five basic roles; first of all he/she plans the change in vehicle performance neces-
sary to get the desired change in the vehicle routing. Then he/she teaches the UAV
control systems how to get the planned change in the vehicle routing by providing it
with appropriate instructions. He/she monitors then the system performance to en-
sure that it evolves as desired. He/she has moreover to intervene if undesired system
performances are detected. Finally he/she learns from the experience gained from the
previous roles.
The GCS has therefore an important role in supporting the operator regardless
of the level of autonomy of the UAV may be. More precisely the GCS structure de-
pends on the flight control mode of the UAV operating in. Generally speaking the
GCS supports the primary functions performed by the operator that include: flight,
communication, systems and mission task management. The final design of the GCS
is therefore a trade-off between precision for intuition and speed of response. Its lay-
out has in fact to allow the pilot to efficiently complete these functions. The design
of the GCS should therefore take into account the human factors guidelines defined
for manned aviation. Different solutions were proposed in literature for vehicle tele-
operation. The most common method for vehicle teleoperation is the direct control.
The UAV is controlled directly via hand-controllers, such as joysticks, and visually su-
pervised by the operator through vehicle mounted cameras. Multimodal/multisensory
Interfaces are more complex and characterised by a variety of control modes (in-
dividual actuators, coordinated motions, etc.) and displays (text, visual, etc.). In
supervisory control interfaces the operator provides to the UAS high-level command
generation, monitoring and diagnosis. The related subtasks are then executed by the
UAS that should have therefore a suitable degree of autonomy. Moreover, there are
different new vehicle teleoperation interface concepts, currently classified as novel in-
terfaces, that are spreading in the world of UAS. Among these, a promising option
are solutions based on reconfigurable touch-screens integrating controls on the display,
which will be covered in more detail in chapter 7 of this thesis. Another interesting
concept are PDA based solutions. Finally some studies can be found in the literature
also regarding GCS using speech based inputs.

C H A P T E R 3
Sense and Avoid Literature Review
A lot of previous work has already been done in the development of S&A systems for
UAS. A part the research done both in univerties and companies, aviation autorithies,
such as Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and EASA, already started working
on proposals regarding S&A systems requirements and standards. Among these, much
work was done based on the standards defined for the Airborne Collision Avoidance
System (ACAS) developed for manned commercial aviation.
This chapter illustrates guidelines and previous works found in the literature re-
garding the development of S&A systems. It starts with section 3.1, that covers some
general considerations of the S&A system. The S&A system functions are then defined
in section 3.2. Section 3.3 describes the typical operating phases. The Rules of Air
that have to be considered by the system in the avoidance manoevre execution are
then identified in section 3.4. The topic of the operator involvement in the operations
of the system is discussed in section 3.5. Section 3.6 summarises the work previously
carried on in manned aviation for developing collision avoidance systems for both air-
borne and ground threats. A standard for the alerting logic is proposed in section 3.7.
Finally section 3.8 illustrates the design factors and the different solutions proposed
in iterature for S&A systems.
3.1 General Considerations
The UASs airworthiness requirements regarding S&A capabilities depend strongly on
the aircraft operating mode, that can be [73]:
Visual Line Of Sight (VLOS), that is, according to the ICAO definition:
“A mode of UAS operation in which the flight crew monitors the
flight path in relation to other aircraft, persons, vehicles or struc-
tures through direct and unaided visual contact with the aircraft,
in order to maintain separation and collision avoidance.”
Beyond VLOS (BVLOS), also called Radio LoS (RLOS), and when a com-
munication relay (e.g. a satellite) is employed, it is referred to as Broad
RLOS (BRLOS). In this mode the aircraft is controlled from a GCS equipped
with the necessary instruments and displays.
In VLOS flight conditions, UAVs are constrained to fly at very low altitude in
order to be visible and therefore controllable by the operator. ICAO rules prescribe
that, except for take-off and landing flight phases, the minimum flight altitude has
to be above 500 ft. Moreover, flying threats, terrain and obstacles are detected and
avoided by the UAS operator using his/her eyes. Therefore the S&A system is not
compulsory for VLOS UAV operations.
The situation is different in BVLOS/BRLOS, where the S&A system is necessary
to support the UAS operator in the accomplishment of the following tasks [17]:
1. maintaining appropriate separation distance1 from other airspace users;
2. avoidance of collision with terrain and obstacles;
3. avoidance of severe/adverse weather;
4. maintaining appropriate flight visibilities and distance from clouds;
5. visual observation of lighting and markings;
6. visual observation of in-flight interception signals;
7. visual observation of the landing/departure runway;
8. visual observation of next aircraft where reduced separation is approved2.
3.2 Functions
According to the classification that was given in section 2.2, S&A usually operates at
PACT level 3 [18]. In fact, the system communicate to the UAS operator the potenzial
hazards detected and the suggested resolution and allow him/her to decide whether or
not to execute those solutions. However, in the case of an imminent collision situation,
if the operator is unresponsive or do not react in time, S&A operates at PACT level 5
and autonomously executes the hazard avoidance actions.
Taking into account all the considerations proposed by Hutchings et al. [18], Coul-
ter [74] and Albaker et al. [75], the following functions are therefore performed by the
S&A system:
Environment sensing, in which the system monitors the airspace using sensors
to detect and identify every potential hazard for the UAV. The aim is to
get a synthetic description of the airspace in terms of of the current state of
the threats including their position and, if they are airborne then also their
velocity and heading.
Conflicts detection, where the informations collected in the previous phase are
elaborated to determine which of the objects detected are “real threats”.
Resolution estimation defines the necessary resolution manoeuvre if an immi-
nent conflict risk is detected.
Advisories communication, where the advisories about conflict risks and the
suggested resolution manoeuvre estimated in the previous two tasks are re-
1 The separation distance is defined as “the minimum distance between an aircraft and an hazard
that maintain the risk of collision to an acceptable level of safety” [17].
2For example, the vicinity of an aerodrome or in Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) climbs
and descents.
ported to the UAS operator. The operator task is then to accept, reject or
ignore the suggested route changes or ignore them. In fact, even tough the
system is capable of operating autonomously, a S&A system must normally
report to and share the responsibility for its tasks (including safety) with the
UAS operator. He/she is therefore a part of a S&A system, linked to the UAV
via a low-bandwidth communications link.
Autonomous resolution is the autonomus execution of the calculated resolu-
tion manoeuvre and it is executed if the operator does not react to the advisory
of the minimum safe time before impact3.
3.3 Operating Phases
The functions defined in the previous section are performed in three distinct phases
[18]:
strategic conflict management: long range potential conflicts are assessed us-
ing all available information sources to take early measures to prevent conflict;
conflict resolution advisory: the system communicates to the UAS operator
the estimated avoidance manoeuvre and the operator can accept or refuse the
advisory;
autonomous resolution execution: when the minimum safe time before im-
pact is imminent, and there is no input from the UAS operator the system
execute the resolution manoeuvre in order to avoid the imminent collision.
Regarding the strategic conflict management, automation is a fundamental tool to
compensate for the limitation in human performance in predicting the aircrafts future
status [76]. It acts as supporting tool to the human operator in the conflict risks
detection. This part of the system is designed to sense the proximity of potential
threats, involving airspace users, ground and terrain obstacles risks and assess the
encounter geometry in case of other flying agents. Generally, the prediction algorithms
used in automated conflict detection provides an automatic evaluation of the conflict
risks detected over a certain temporal span [77]. It indicates therefore when and where
the conflict will happen and which aircraft or threats are involved.
In the case where a conflict risk is detected, the conflict resolution advisory phase
performs the following tasks:
define the escape trajectory necessary to maintain separation and avoid col-
lision with all threats taking into account Rules of Air (that will be covered in
the next section, section 3.4), aircraft performances limitations and operator
response delay;
3This parameter is defined as the “time before impact, after which, due to latencies in the system,
a successful collision avoidance manoeuvre is impossible” [18].
monitor the evolution of the encounter geometry during the resolution ma-
noeuvre in order to ensure its effectiveness and update it if necessary;
communicate to the UAS operator the suggested manoeuvre.
The autonomous resolution execution is engaged when the UAS operator does not
react timely to an imminent threat4. This function is an example of the autonomous
mode back-up defined in section 2.2. This element must be implemented in order to
enable the UAS operator the possibility to override any collision avoidance manoeuvre,
if the situation demands this. This is the command override capability described
previously in section 2.2 and it is also engaged in the event of a loss of the data link.
3.4 Rules of Air and S&A
As stated in section 1.6, a S&A system has to take into account the same collision
avoidance requirements of Rules of Air for manned aviation, delineated in the ICAO
Annex 2 [78], in order to guarantee the ELOS, defined in section 1.5. This section
identifies the subset of Rules of Air to be considered for S&A systems.
Regarding the minimum flight altitude, all the aircraft, apart the ones involved
in particular types of missions, have to take into account the following low flying
prohibitions:
failure of power unit: in case of power unit failure, the aircraft shall not fly
below the altitude necessary to make an emergency landing without causing
dangers to persons or property on the surface;
the 500 ft rule: the aircraft shall not be flown closer than 500 ft to any person,
vessel, vehicle or structure;
the 1000 ft rule: when flying over a congested area of a city town or settlement,
the aircraft shall fly at an vertical distance of at least 1000 ft above the highest
obstacle on ground within a horizontal radius of 600 m of the aircraft;
the land clear rule: when flying over a congested area of a city, town or settle-
ment, the aircraft shall not fly below the altitude necessary to make a landing
out of the congested area in the event of a power unit failure;
flying over open air assemblies: when flying over an organised open-air as-
sembly of more than 1000 persons, the aircraft shall fly above the higher of
the following values:
• 1000 ft,
• such altitude to permit a landing out of the assembly in the event of
a power unit failure.
Whenever an aircraft is flying in circumstances in which more than one of the low
flying rules apply, it shall fly at the highest altitude required by any of them.
4See section A2.1 of reference [17].
Figure 3.1: converging encounter geometry: all aircraft shall apply the right hand rule,
except that power driven aircraft shall give way to gliders or aircraft towing objects.
Source: [79]
Collision risks between aircraft must be generally managed considering the Right
of Way Rules here shortly summarised:
converging encounters (fig. 3.1): both aircraft have to follow these rules:
• flying machines shall give way to airships, gliders and balloons.
• airships shall give way to gliders and balloons,
• gliders shall give way to balloons,
• mechanically driven aircraft shall give way to aircraft which are tow-
ing other aircraft or objects.
• when two aircraft are converging in the air at approximately the same
altitude, the aircraft which has the other on its right shall give way;
head-on encounters (fig. 3.2): each aircraft shall modify its course to the right;
overtaking encounters (fig. 3.3): when an aircraft is being overtaken in the
air, this aircraft shall have the right-of-way and the overtaking aircraft, whether
Figure 3.2: head on encounter geometry: both the aircraft shall turn right. Source: [79]
Figure 3.3: overtaking encounter geometry: the slower aircraft has the right of way. If
overtaking, it shall alter course to the right. Source: [79]
Figure 3.4: depiction of the operator involvement in the S&A system by use of switches.
Source: [81]
climbing, descending or in horizontal flight, shall keep out of the way of the
other aircraft by altering course to the right. When there is no collision risk
the overtaking aircraft has to keep out of the way of the other aircraft until
that other aircraft has been passed, notwithstanding any change in the rela-
tive positions of the two aircraft. Finally, a glider overtaking another glider
may alter its course to the right or to the left.
3.5 Operator Involvement in S&A Systems
It is recognised in [80] that, in conditions in which the time to conflict is long enough,
the involvement of the operator in the S&A system can mitigate the following issues:
• falsely identified threats, resulting in unnecessary avoidance manoeuvres;
• critical information, e.g. changes in mission targets and/or tasks, flight re-
planning due to Air Traffic Control (ATC) or detection of threats in the
environment, that cannot be considered by the S&A system when computing
the avoidance manoeuvre.
The level of operator involvement or Level of Authority (LOA) of a S&A depends
on the allocation of the authority between the operator and the system in the tasks
performed by the system [80] illustrated in fig. 3.4 as follows [81]:
Block D: detection of the potential threats,
Block S: assessment of the conflict risks,
Block A: evaluation and execution of the avoidance manoeuvre.
The involvement of the operator in the system can be seen as a switch between two
subsequent tasks. When the switch is closed, it implies that the system needs the
operator consent, and therefore his/her involvement, to close the switch and perform
the passage between the tasks. Otherwise the operator is not involved in that passage.
More precisely, the first switch is related with the judgement of the nature of de-
tection (true or false alarm). When the system requires to the operator to confirm
detected traffic in order to proceed with the assessment of the resolution manoeuvre,
this switch is open by default. The switch is then closed by the operator’s confirma-
tion. Another possible approach is that in which the default status of the detection is
defined as correct and therefore the switch is closed. In this case, the system can be
programmed to let the operator open the switch when a false alarm is detected.
The second switch determines whether the operator consent is necessary to provide
the assessed conflict risks information to the block A, evaluating the resolution.
The third switch is meant to enable the resolution manoeuvre execution. The case
in which the operator consent for the resolution manoeuvre execution is required is
represented by a switch open by default. Since the operator can assess the manoeuvre
only in a limited time before its autonomous execution, a timer controls the switch
together with the operator. Alternatively, when the resolution manoeuvre evaluated
by the S&A system is directly executed by the system, that is the case of the fully
automatic resolution, the switch is closed by default.
The configuration of the switches in the figure defines therefore the LOA. These
switches can be used to define the system autonomy classification in Table 3.1. A fully
autonomous system would have LOA[D]=8, LOA[S]=8 and LOA[A]=8. When the
LOA is equal to 6 or 7, the operator can only intervene on an already initiated action
by declaring a false alert or canceling the execution [81]. The modes characterised by
LOA[D]=5 provide the operator a predefined amount of time in which the operator
can assess the validity of the detection. When LOA[D]=6, LOA[S]=6 and LOA[A]=5,
the system provides the operator the time to assess the avoidance manoeuvre, that
can also be used to assess the validity of the conflict detection. It is also interesting
to note that for all combinations for which LOA[D]>4, LOA[S]>4 and LOA[A]>4 the
system is operative also in case of a control-link failure [80].
3.5.1 Effect of Link Latency and Criticality
Operator involvement introduces in S&A systems a latency caused by the time neces-
sary to accomplish the following operations [81]:
1. downlink data for depiction to the operator,
2. allow the operator to assess data and decide,
3. uplink the decision.
Morever, when the S&A system does not have a sufficient authority to execute the
conflict resolution, the datalink is a critical element for the conflict avoidance. A S&A
system has therefore to be designed in order to ensure autonomous operations in the
following conditions [82]:
1. loss of data link situation.
2. when the latency of the communication between the UAV and the operator
would cause a situation in which the UAV response is too late to avoid the
collision.
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The loss of data link can be addressed by implementing a function that reconfigures
the system in order to operate autonomously.
Regarding the second issue, a mode of operation based on operator consent with
a limited veto time should be used [81] in those cases where the time necessary to
the operator to assess the situation and the Time-To-Conflict (TTC) sufficient for a
successful avoidance manoeuvre can be estimated. The maximum available veto time,
here identified as tV/T, is, in fact, defined with the following relationship:
tV/T = tT/C − tM − tT (3.1)
where tT/C is the TTC, tM is the time necessary to the system to accomplish the
avoidance manoeuvre and tT is the time necessary to transmit the data, including the
downlink of data to the operator GCS and uplink of the chosen avoidance manoeuvre
to the system. It is then possible to estimate a minimum time span, that is function
of conflict geometry and of ownship and flying threats speeds, below which any delay
between detection and resolution significantly increases the collision risk likelihood.
Prior to this time span, the involvement of the operator in the conflict detection
process is useful to assess the information on which the conflict detection is based, and
therefore identify false alarms and assess the manoeuvre generated by S&A system.
According to this definition, the required minimum detection range dD necessary for
a fully autonomous system is given by the following formula:
dD = VR ∗ (tV/T + tT) (3.2)
where VR is the maximum relative velocity between ownship and threat, tV/T is the
maximum allowed veto time and tT the transmission time. This information can be
used to evaluate in which the time the autonomous manoeuvre has to be initiated in
those cases in which time is not sufficient to allow the operator to assess the situation
[82]. Therefore the benefits of operator involvement can be pursued with the following
conditions [81]:
• an authority level of 5,
• a specified maximum veto time tV/T, defined as in relationship given in eq. (3.1),
• a detection range, that is the sum of dD defined in eq. (3.2) and of the minimum
detection range for a fully autonomous system.
3.6 Automatic Collision Detection in Manned
Aviation
An ACAS was introduced in commercial aviation in 1999. It was initially called
TCAS and is currently developed in bosom of the ACAS project of Eurocontrol.5 In
the latest version of ACAS, when a collision risk is detected an alert and suggests
5More information in reference [83].
a potential resolution manoeuvre is given to the pilot. However the system is able
to track only aircraft equipped with a mode S transponder 6 and can partially detect
mode A/C transponders . The ACAS is not able to locate aircraft without transponder
or equipped with old types of transponders, listed in Table 3.2.
Differently from S&A system, it does not include any autonomous resolution execu-
tion function, as defined in section 3.3, that executes the suggested manoeuvre when
the pilot is not reacting. In fact, as explained in [85], ACAS has characteristics and
performances different from those required by a S&A system for UAS. One of the main
reasons is that the differences in the climb performance of the various UAVs are not
compatible with current TCAS requirements. More precisely the limitations on the
climb performance could make impossible for the operator or the S&A system to exe-
cute the suggested manoeuvre by TCAS advisories. Moreover, most of small general
aviation aircraft and all aerostatic balloons are not fitted with a mode S transponder.
Therefore this system is not able to track all potential flying threats. Finally the ACAS
is designed such as that it suggests to the pilot only last-minute avoidance manoeuvres
in order to provide minimal separation to avert a collision [3]. Extended the use of
this system to UAS, then such a functionality would typically lead the aircraft to come
into close proximity to the other aircraft before initiating its avoidance action. This
behaviour is not compatible with normal safe airspace operations. In manned aircraft,
this is avoided because the S&A functions are accomplished by either using ATC or
Visual Flight Rules (VFR) to manoeuvre, before any ACAS resolution advisories are
deemed necessary. However, in UAVs the S&A system would substitute the manned
aircraft counterpart.
Also a Terrain Awareness Warning System (TAWS) has been already developed
and certified for manned aviation.7 Differently from a complete S&A system, it simply
alerts the UAS operator about the ground collision risks without providing conflict
resolution advisory function as defined in section 3.3 ofthis thesis.
3.7 Alerting System Design
As it was stated in section 3.2, S&A system communication to the operator is based
on two types of advisories. They are usually in the following two types that are the
same used for ACAS advisories [87]:
Traffic Advisory (TA) supports the operator in detecting potential conflict-
ing threats by alerting him/her;
Resolution Advisory (RA) communicates to the operator the recommended
avoidance manoeuvres.
As shown in fig. 3.5, in an ACAS they are issued according to the following procedure
[77].
6More information in reference [84].
7More information in reference [86].
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Figure 3.5: relationship between TCAS II advisories and protected volume: (a) horizontal
view, (b) vertical view. Source: [87]
When colliding threat is within 50 s of loss of separation with the ownship, the
verbal warning Traffic Traffic is used to communicate the TA and the color of the
colliding threat icon on the display is changed to yellow. If traffic reaches a loss of
separation that is less than 25 s, the color of the threat icon becomes red and the RA
indicating the required avoidance manoeuvre is issued verbally.
As suggested by Xu et al. in [77], The sequence used for the alerts levels can be the
same three-levels scheme used by the ACAS system. This scheme is preferable to a two-
level or dichotomous one (conflict vs. no-conflict) because of its grater accuracy. More
precisely, the presence of imperfections in a multiple-level alerting system is less prone
to errors than in a two-level system. As explained in [88], this logic was inherited from
the McDonnell Douglas MD-11 aircraft system alerting convention where three alert
levels are identified. A first level alert is used for information that must be communi-
cated to the operator but do not require the operator to intervene, like when a long
range potential conflict is detected. The alert function is just to point out the detected
Figure 3.6: example of sepa-
ration and collision zones pro-
posed for a S&A prototype.
Source [89].
traffic. The second level alert requires operator’s ini-
tiative. In S&A systems this alert can be used when
a conflict is detected and operator has the responsibil-
ity to avoid the collision. A third level alert is an alert
requiring immediate action by the operator. It can be
used for the case of the actual loss of separation, that
happens when the minimum legal separation is reached
by the aircraft.
Moreover, a S&A system can be based on the notions
of two spatial zones, indicated as Collision Avoidance
Zone (CAZ) and CDZ, and the three alerts related with
their thresholds defined by the RTCAs Airborne Con-
flict Management (ACM) committee [90]. An example
is shown in fig. 3.6.
The CAZis the smallest and therefore most critical zone around each aircraft. The
penetration of this zone causes a near miss or actual collision between aircraft. This
zone includes the three different components shown:
Assured Collision Avoidance Distance (ACAD) is the declared near miss
distance;
Position Uncertainty is the accuracy limit of the aircraft’s position determina-
tion;
Trajectory Uncertainty is a measure of the aircrafts ability to maintain a de-
sired trajectory.
The sum of trajectory uncertainty and position uncertainty of each aircraft with the
ACAD defines therefore the minimum measured separation distance necessary to main-
tain the true separation distance equal to the ACAD despite position measurement
and/or technical flight error.
The CDZ is a bigger zone around each aircraft.As soon as this zone is penetrated
a loss of legally required separation between the aircraft occurs. The only difference
between CDZ and CAZ is that, as displayed in figures, the Assured Normal Separation
Distance (ANSD) is typically much larger than the ACAD.
The related alert levels are listed below in order of decreasing level of criticality
[90]:
CAZ violation is the alert produced by an imminent penetration of the CAZ
to inform the operator about the necessity of an immediate and aggressive
manoeuvres to avoid the penetration of the CAZ;
CDZ violation is issued when a penetration of the CDZ occurs and it requires
the UAS operator to carefully decide and accomplish a manoeuvre to avoid
the loss of separation;
low level is an optional advisory level that can be activated before the CDZ
violation alert to provide the UAS operator with the opportunity to monitor
and/or resolve detected conflict risk with minimal manoeuvreing.
It is worth noting that alert boundaries have shapes and sizes that are not fixed but
are function of relative trajectory orientation, rate of closure, position and trajectory
uncertainty values. Among the defined alert levels, low level, if enabled, and CDZ
violation alerts can be considered secondary alerts that could happen frequently in
flight operations. Differently, a CAZ violation alert is a critical alert related to an
exceptional and urgent condition which should only arise when:
• the operator ignores/misunderstands airborne conflict management guidance
following a CDZ alert or
• one or more aircraft manoeuvre creates a conflict with an aircraft in close
proximity.
3.8 Design Factors
Different approaches for the S&A algorithm development have been suggested in the
literature. The following sections summarises the main design factors sketched in
fig. 3.7 and identified in reference [75]. More precisely, section 3.8.1 identifies the
sensors configurations proposed for the environment sensing of S&A systems and the
choices involved in the detection of conflict risks. In section 3.8.2 the solutions proposed
for the avoidance manoeuvre planning are analised. Section 3.8.3 finally discuss some
considerations on the general design of the system.
3.8.1 Conflict Detection
Detection of conflict risks requires the identification of potential threats in the airspace
proximity close to the ownship and continuous data update and collection recording.
Therefore it is necessary to provide the system with the tools to enable the detection
and identification of specific type of threats. These tools can be simple databases,
e.g. for detecting ground threats in fixed position, or sensors set for the detection of
moving threats, e.g. traffic, or obstacles not considered in databases.
Sensors used can be classified as cooperative or non-cooperative. The cooperative
sensors are sensors that enable exchange of information like position, heading, speed
and waypoints, e.g. transponder mode S and ADS-B8. These sensors can be used to
greatly improve improve the detection/identification of all airborne aircraft/ground
moving threats9. Non-cooperative sensors do not have any exchange of information
with potential threats. Example of such sensors are: laser range finders, optical flow
8See example in [91].
9In the case of the transponders, both the ownship and the potential threat must be equipped
with a transponder with certain characteristics.
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Figure 3.8: trajectory projection methods. Source [75]
sensors Electro-Optical/Infrared EO/IR, radar systems,10 stereo camera pairs or mov-
ing single camera11 or mixed configuration of sensors of both types12.
According to the performances and the configuration used to install the sensor
set, it is possible to obtain different encounter sensing dimension. This design factor
is defined as the extension of space surveilled for the conflict risks monitoring. The
algorithm can consider one of the following three options:
two dimensional horizontal plane (2D-H ), when just a region of the space
close to the horizontal plane crossing the position of the aircraft is monitored;
two dimensional vertical plane (2D-V ), when just a part of the airspace
close to the vertical plane is monitored;
three dimensional state information (3D) , when a region or all the close
airspace is monitored.
The encounter current information projection is the solution used for the dynam-
ical projection of state variables of UAV and threat into near future for the collision
risk detection. The fundamental projection methods identified in reference [75] are
sketched in fig. 3.8 and identified as straight projection, worst case projection, proba-
bilistic methods and path plan sharing.
In the straight projection, the states are projected into the future along a single
trajectory, without considering directly uncertainties.13 This simplifies the problem
but can only be applied in situations in which aircraft trajectories are easily predictable
and for short periods of time. In fact, this approach does not take into account the
possibility that the intruder aircraft can do any manoeuvre during the time range
considered.
10See examples in [92–94].
11See examples in [95–99].
12See an example in [100].
13See an example in [101].
The worst case projection on the other hand assumes that the intruder aircraft
could perform any range of manoeuvres. If any of these trajectories causes a conflict,
then the related alert is produced.14 It has to be limited to a short projection time in
order to limit the computation requirement.
Probabilistic methods model the uncertainties to describe risk variation in the future
trajectory of aircraft. This requires the development of a complete set of possible future
trajectories, each weighted by a probability of occurrence, producing a probability
density function.15 A positive characteristic of this method is that the decisions can
be taken on the fundamental likelihood of the conflict. In particular, safety and false
alarm rate can be assessed and considered directly. The disadvantage is that the
logic behind this method may be difficult to model the probabilities of the future
trajectories.
Finally, path plan sharing provides path trajectory and aircraft specific informa-
tions (such as position, heading and velocity) to all other aircraft in the vicinity.
More precisely, data from each aircraft are sent to monitoring ground stations and all
neighbouring aircraft as a broadcast. This approach gives all aircraft a 3D picture of
neighbouring aircraft movements, precise projection of encounters states trajectories
and exact collision parameters estimation.
Another important design factor is the approach of the S&A system to the detection
and accordingly the resolution of conflicts in multiple encounters scenarios. The system
can handle traffic situations with multiple aircraft with two approaches:
single conflict management, where the conflicts are avoided sequentially in
pairs in multiple conflict secenarios;
multiple conflict management, if all threats are handled simultaneously.
3.8.2 Avoidance manoeuvre Planning
Different design factors are identified in [106] regarding the evaluation of the resolution
manoeuvre. First of all, the constraints imposed by hazards, e.g. vehicle manoeuvreing
capabilities and right of way rules, should be considered in order to get a reliable
conflict resolution. Also the latency in the remote operator receiving the manoeuvre
advice, acting upon it and then commanding the aircraft should be taken into account
[3].
Moreover, the allowed type of manoeuvres considered by the algorithm are strongly
related with the avoidance manoeuvre choice. These could include speed changes
(speed up/slow down commands), lateral (turn left/right) and vertical manoeuvres
(climb/dive). These actions may be issued separately or in a combined way. Further-
more, when an avoidance manoeuvre is combined, it can be performed simultaneously
or in sequence.
14See an example in [102].
15See examples in [103–105].
Also the coordination among ownship and flying threats influences the manoeuvre
choice. The manoeuvre obtained can be therefore coordinated or uncoordinated. Co-
ordinated manoeuvres are accomplished when there are more alternative versions of
the escape action and the system choose the options for the ownship and intruder air-
craft, respectively, in order to avoid the generation of new conflicts16. Uncoordinated
manoeuvres refers to the worst case scenario, in which the intruder does not respond
to the critical situation and only the ownship execute the resolution manoeuvre.
Considering the computational implementation of this part of the system, several
approaches have been proposed in the literature. The main categories are predefined
collision avoidance, protocol based decentralised collision avoidance, optimised escape
trajectory approaches and e-field methods [75].
Predefined collision avoidance is based on a fixed set of predefined rules. It does
not perform any additional computation to determine the escape trajectory17. The
advantage is to reduce the response time to avoid the conflict. On the other hand the
manoeuvres are less optimal than those computed in real-time.
Protocol based decentralised collision avoidance defines a solution for a team of air-
craft based on inter-agent communication including sharing position, velocities, way-
points and heading. Aircraft take decisions based on a common set of rules decided a
priori.18 This method is decentralised and guarantees safety. However, the trade off is
that unnecessary long trajectories can be generated.
The optimised escape trajectory approaches involve an optimisation problem that
can be defined in a lot of different ways. These approaches generally combine a kine-
matic model with a set of constraints.19 An optimal resolution strategy is then com-
puted based on most desired optimisation constraint.
E-field methods are based on the use of a force field to map the volume between
aircraft in terms of a potential field. Each aircraft is considered as a charged particle
and repulsive forces between aircraft are used to generate manoeuvreing trajectories20.
The advantage of this method is that conflict avoidance is continuously available us-
ing simple electrostatic equations. On the other hand, the algorithms presented have
limited relevance because sharp discontinuities may occurs in the commanded ma-
noeuvres. Furthermore, it requires a high level of flight guidance, leading to increase
in complexity beyond issuing simple manoeuvreing commands.
In hybrid S&A systems continuous and discrete states are combined21. In particu-
lar, the vehicle and its manoeuvre are modelled as a hybrid system. Its reachable sets
of states are filtered based on safety specifications to get a safe subset of the reach
16An example is the criteria used for TCAS, in which, if aircraft A is diving on a route that leads
to a conflict with airplane B climbing, the manoeuvre chosen for A is the climb while a descent is
suggested to B.
17See an example in [107]
18See examples in [108–111].
19See an example in [112, 113].
20See examples in [90, 114–118].
21See an example in [119].
set. Then Hamilton-Jacobi equations are employed to calculate control commands
that guarantee UAV staying in its safe set. Although this method is decentralised and
assures safety, it scales poorly for large UAVs .
Finally, also the trade-off between the complex computations performed by an
approach versus the time requirement to resolve the conflict has to be considered in
the definition of the system algorithm. The final choice has to ensure that the definition
of the conflict resolution happens in a time short enough to guarantee effectiveness
to the system. Therefore the complexity of the calculation needs to be bounded to
provide an approach that is effective and robust but also reasonably simple.
3.8.3 General notes
Further work is also necessary in developing and defining the type and the layout
of HMI assuring an easy and effective interaction between the system and the UAS
operator [19, 106]. The performance of the operator in assessing the situation depends
in fact on the HMI layout. This topic is discussed in more detail in section 4.5 of the
next chapter.
The interactions and the trade-offs between all the aforementioned issues must be
defined considering certification requirements, limitations and performances of tech-
nology. The effects of the human operator involvement in the system management
when it is not completely autonomous, should also be taken into account. Finally the
level of autonomy, that was classified in Table 2.1 and spreading from manual operator
in the loop to fully autonomous, influences both the resolution manoeuvres estimated
by the algorithm and the HMI design [106].
As explained in reference [3], the presence of so many important aspects in the
design leaves an open question. It deals with the possibility to define a single S&A
standard algorithm or several different algorithms to meet the varying capabilities
of different UAVs . Strongly related with this aspect is the assumption that perfor-
mances of all aircraft in the avoidance manoeuvres are interoperable. As explained in
section 3.6, this is a basic assumption in the ACAS development. This hypothesis is
the base for making possible the explicit coordination of manoeuvres between aircraft
equipped with S&A systems in order to assure compatibility.
3.9 Chapter Summary
The requirements of S&A capabilities for UAS depend strongly on the aircraft oper-
ating mode. This is defined VLOS when the operator monitors the separation of the
UAV in respect to other aircraft, persons, vehicles or structures through direct and
unaided visual contact with the aircraft. In this case the operator have to visually
detect and avoid flying threats, terrain and obstacles and the minimum flight altitude
is 500 ft. BVLOS or RLOS are acronyms used when the communication between op-
erator and UAV passes through a communication relay (e.g. a satellite). It is finally
indicated as BRLOS the case in which the GCS includes instruments and displays to
communicate with the operator. Both BVLOS and BRLOS require a dedicated S&A
for separation assurance and collision avoidance.
A S&A system has to perform a precise set of tasks to effectively perform its func-
tion. First of all, it has to monitor the surrounding environment to detect potential
hazards (environment sensing). The real threats have then to be identified from the in-
formation collected in the previous task (conflicts detection). If necessary, a resolution
manoeuvre has then to be estimated (resolution estimation). The information of the
detected conflict risks and suggested resolution have then to be communicated to the
UAS operator on the GCS, in order to allow him/her to accept or reject the suggested
manouevre (advisories communication). The resolution has then to be autonomously
executed if the operator does not react in time (autonomous resolution).
These tasks are executed in three distinct phases. In the first phase, the strategic
conflict management, the potential conflicts are assessed at long range and early pre-
cautions are taken for avoiding the collision. If necessary, the resolution manoeuvre is
then evaluated and communicated to the operator in the conflict resolution advisory
phase, in order to allow him/her to accept or reject it. Finally the system override the
operator in controlling the UAV in order to avoid the conflict risk, when the collision
is imminent; this is the autonomous resolution execution.
Many factors should moreover be considered in the design of the S&A system
algorithm. First of all, a S&A system has of course to take into account the collision
avoidance requirements already defined in the Rules of Air for manned aviation. This
is necessary in order to guarantee compatibility with manned aviation operations in the
non-segregated airspace. These requirements regard both the minimum flight altitude
and the right of way rules.
Despite the autonomous nature of UAS operations, the involvement of the operator
in the S&A can be very beneficial to the system peroformance. It is useful to mitigate
the problems related with falsely identified threats and critical information, such as
mission and flight replanning or undetected threats. Of course the UAS operator’s
involvement introduces in the system the latency caused by the time necessary for the
communication with the operator. Moreover, the communication datalink between
the UAS and operator, becomes a critical element of the system. Therefore the S&A
system has to be designed in order to ensure autonomous operations in those critical
conditions in which the delay related with latency caused by the operator activity
could lead to dangerous situations, such as collisions, or when the datalink is lost.
In manned aviation flights, collision and conflict risk alerting systems have already
been developed and deployed. These include TCAS or ACAS, mainly used in commer-
cial aviation to detect conflict risks with aircraft equipped with mode S transponders.
Another system is the TAWS for monitoring terrain collision risks. The advisories
issued by a S&A system follow a procedure and a levels scheme very similar to that
of the ACAS system. These advisories include both TA, alerting the pilot about con-
flict risks, and RA, communicating the resolution manoeuvres when issued. The alert
criticality is defined according to a three levels scheme where two concentric zones are
centered around the current position of the ownship (CDZ and CAZ). These zones
are used to define the alert criticality and change the advisory accordingly.
The S&A algorithms proposed in the literature differs depending on different de-
sign factors. First of all, the sensors used to detect the potential threats could be
cooperative, when they enable exchange of information between the ownship and other
aircraft (e.g., transponders mode S and ADS-B) and non-cooperative when they detect
the threat without any form of communication with it (such as radar and cameras).
The airspace zone in which the collision risk is searched could be a bidimensional
plane, such as the horizontal (2D-H ) and the vertical (2D-V ) one, or a threedimen-
sional (3D). Different models are moreover used for projecting the threat state in
the future and detecting the conflict risks (straight projection, worst case projection,
probabilistic methods and path plan sharing). The situations in which more conflict
risks are detected can be moreover solved sequentially in pairs, as in single conflict
management, or handled simultaneously, i.e. multiple conflict management.
The S&A algorithms differs also regarding the constraints considered in the reso-
lution maneouvre evaluation, such as vehicle manoeuvering capabilities, right of way
rules and latency caused by the operator involvement. Finally, the type of resolution
manoeuvre (speed changes, lateral and/or vertical manoeuvres) and the method used
for its evaluation are design factors of the S&A system. The final solution should be
chosen as a trade-off between the complexity of computations performed by the algo-
rithm and the time available to safely resolve the conflict. It is also very important to
define the layout of the GCS in order to allow an easier and more effective understand-
ing of the S&A advisories by the operator. The final design of the S&A system should
also take into account certification requirements, limitations and performances of the
technologies employed. It should moreover take into account the level of autonomy of
the UAS. All these factors might make it impossible to develop just one S&A system
standard and hence require different implementations might be required for different
UAVs .
C H A P T E R 4
Previous Works on GCS and S&A
Integration
The sensory isolation of the operator from the UAV results in a reduction in his/her
situation awareness (see sections 1.4 and 1.5 in chapter 1). The GCS plays a signifi-
cant role in supporting and carrying out the mission successfully. It should therefore
be designed to increase the effectiveness of communications between UAS and opera-
tor, minimize the operator workload and the mental load to extract and process the
information.
This chapter covers some general considerations about the design of information
displays on GCS and main solutions proposed in the literature. More precisely, sec-
tion 4.1 defines the requirements in terms of information provided for a GCS display
set. In section 4.2, the issues related with the design of the GCS taking into account
the human operator nature are identified. Some guidelines to reduce the operator
workload are then defined in section 4.3. The description of the PFD, a standard
instrument commonly used in manned and unmanned aviation to display the flight
condition information is given in section 4.4. Section 4.5 defines some useful guidelines
to be considered in the design of the S&A system displays to be integrated in the GCS.
The last sections describes then the HMI solutions proposed in literature to increase
the operator situation awareness in GCSs .
4.1 GCS and situation awareness
One of the main tasks of GCS is to support the operator situation awareness, as defined
in section 1.5. In UASs the level 1 of situation awareness deals with the knowledge
about:
mission, including flight plan and targets;
hazards, including terrain, obstacles, threats, airspace restrictions, traffic and
weather;
performances, including datalink coverage and sensor capabilities.
The level 2 of situation awareness requires the integration of these aspects to allow
the operator to perform the following functions necessary for mission accomplishment
[120]:
• monitor/assure conformance with timing constraints in the air tasking order
and the airspace control order;
• monitor/assure conformance with vehicle endurance constraints;
• monitor/assure separation with terrain;
• comply with datalink constraints (coverage and link availability);
• assure planning within payload parameter constraints;
• monitor/assure deconfliction with traffic and restricted areas;
• monitor/assure deconfliction with known threat areas and adverse weather;
• comply with contingency plans for system failures and degradations.
The GCS must moreover support the operator in understanding the effects of
changes in the expected environment on the future situation, that is the level 3 situa-
tion awareness [120]. This imply that, when new information become available and/or
the mission changes1, the GCS must support the operator in the accomplishment of
the following tasks:
• analyse the options, determine the overall impact of the choices or information,
and assemble the required changes to the plan;
• decide on the choices;
• execute the re-planning.
From this point of view, automated prediction functions have to substitute the operator
in the cognitive task related with the projection of the current status into the future.
This is necessary because the high mental workload required from the operator required
by this task. More precisely, these prediction functions are necessary to support the
operator in evaluating:
• proximity of planned route to static constraints (terrain, obstacles, threat
areas or restricted areas);
• conflict risk prediction with other traffic;
• the effect of plan changes on mission success during interactive re-planning,
particularly regarding:
– impact of changes on the time needed to reach the target,
– impact of changes on assigned time slots in the area of interest,
– impact of changes on loiter time and endurance.
Finally it is necessary to consider that the introduction of the automation in flight
management tasks typical in civilian aviation is related with a number of further
situation awareness related challenges [23]. This implies that the introduction of au-
tomation must be supported by a suitable design of the GCS HMI. From this point
of view, it was pointed out in section 2.3 that the requirements in terms of informa-
tion are different for a supervisory controller and for a manual controller [65]. More
precisely, in a system based on manual control, the operator has direct control on the
deviation from the performance, that he/she set on the GCS. In fact, he/she moni-
tors directly the information regarding any deviation, particularly in terms of vehicle
1Generally speaking, the events requiring a reassessment of the plan and a possible operator action
include [120] re-tasking required from mission controllers, ATC instructions, new threats, weather.
attitude, altitude, airspeed, and provides to the system the input necessary to return
to the desired state. On the other hand, a supervisory control system, i.e. an UAV
with a high level of autonomy, requires the operator to understand:
• the goals the automated systems are attempting to achieve,
• the control methods used to achieve those goals,
• the extent to which system performance matches operator expectations.
In fact, in this case the same automated system performs the inner loop control func-
tions, i.e. control surface activation. Therefore the information regarding the auto-
mated systems operations are more important than the aircraft attitude and airspeed
[65]. These include information about:
• automated system status, i.e. its operating mode,
• system goals, i.e. the performance targets,
• flight control computer functions, such as controls operating range limitation
according to flight envelope limits.
4.2 UAS and Operator
The development of a GCS integrating all the functionalities defined in the previous
section includes several HMI aspects [121]. First of all, as stated in [122], it is necessary
to take into account the performances of the sources used to feed its indicators2. More-
over, also the bandwidth and the latency time of the communications link between the
UAV and the GCS influences the quality of visual sensor information3 communicated
to the UAS operator.
The guiding principles derived from airworthiness criteria must aim to minimise
human error and workload both in normal and adverse operating conditions. From
this point of view, the number, the type and the layout of displays are important
parameters. Moreover, the warning indications must be properly included. Handling
of emergency procedures has also to be taken into account. The colour coding used
in the displays should be based on relevant existing criteria of manned aircraft. In
the GCS design, it is necessary to define also the minimum number of UAS operators
necessary for safe operations. Finally, it is fundamental to identify the parameters
related to flight safety that need to be displayed, including also those related to specific
UAS features such as communication link status [121].
Table 2.1 (see chapter 2, page 25 defines the UAVs flight control mode classification
in which the various levels identified are shades varying between the two following
extremes:
2E.g. spatial and temporal resolutions provided from the sensors, field of view provided from the
cameras etc.
3E.g. temporal and spatial resolution, color capabilities and field of view of visual displays, data
transmission delays
• the operator acts as a pilot and flies the UAV and navigates from waypoint to
waypoint [123];
• the operator is simply a supervisor (see description in section 2.3 of chapter 2),
who monitors the UAS while it performs its mission as per the flight plan previ-
ously set by the operator.
As described in section 4.1, it should be noted that the second case too could lead to
conditions in which the operator has to take over control of the system and replan the
flight route.
In such a condition the presence of the human operator as agent inside of the
UAS introduces significant issues. These are related to the multiple tasks delegated
to the human operator4. The multiple tasks are based on all four stages of the human
information processing system including sensory input, perception/cognition, selection
of action and execution of action [123]. These stages compete for the same attentional
resources when they are performed concurrently. In fact, according to Dixon [123]:
“For example, while on a reconnaissance mission, an UAS operator
must scan a map (stage 1) in order to determine where the ownship is and
where the next waypoint is located (stage 2), determine which direction
to fly to (stage 3), and then proceed towards the next waypoint (stage
4). These four stages must be repeated constantly throughout all mission
requirements, whether occurring serially or simultaneously.”
Therefore, considering that many of these tasks are based on the same overlapping
information processing resources, the operator capability is often unable to satisfy
the resource demand. This causes task interference and performance degradation.
Furthermore, monitoring aircraft parameters requires a significant amount of mental
resources. The operator has to monitor constantly the system gauges for possible
problems or failures5. Once a problem is detected, the operator has to perform the
appropriate diagnosis, and then undertake the necessary action to address the the fault
and protect the aircraft and the mission integrity.
4.3 GCS Design Guidelines
The operator workload described in the previous section can be reduced by imple-
menting GCS displays supporting both display salience and easy extraction of critical
information [65]. Previous research showed that automated system complexity and
autonomy are difficult to be understood by operators. This lack of knowledge about
the automated system performance makes difficult for him/her to identify relevant
displays and/or interpret correctly system information. As a result the performance
4Some issues also applies to UAS manually flown, i.e. UAS with low-level automation.
5e.g. icing on the wings, low fuel levels, etc [123]
Figure 4.1: the GCS C4I System, a generic GCS for controlling various unmanned vehicle
missions in real-time developed by Aeronautics. Source: [124]
of the operator in monitoring the complete system is reduced. Therefore GCS dis-
plays has to be designed in such a way as to guide the operator attention to critical
information.
Generally a GCS includes a set of computer display screens, similar to those shown
in fig. 4.1. They display most of the information available in a conventional aircraft
cockpit together with some UAS specific information such as communication links
and systems status. This large amount of information competes for display space.
Therefore intelligent display technology or cueing techniques are necessary to direct
operator attention to divergent information6. It is moreover important to define the
information that must always be visible due to their importance7.
Moreover, a GCS must also be designed in order to minimise the workload re-
6Branching menu structure are a widespread example of these techniques. They offer the advantage
of having much of the information not visible. In fact, high volume of information available previously
demonstrated to make difficult for the operator to retrieve important information in GCSs (keyhole
effect).
7E.g. the attitude of the aircraft is such a critical information that it is required from the certifi-
cation to be standby display information.
quired to extract the relevant information, usually called information access cost8.
The information access costs can be minimised by [65]:
• automatically indicating relevant information,
• integrating dimensions,
• ensuring display methods compatible with the type of information displayed.
Reconfigurable displays offer the advantage to allow the operator to change the
display elements according to his/her preferences. This allows the operator to adapt
the displays in order to optimise the display control strategy. On the other hand,
too much control of the display elements may produce configurations which are not
optimal for some tasks9. Therefore it is also necessary to identify the displays that
can be reconfigured without jeopardising system performance or safety [65].
4.4 Primary Flight Display
A component that is always present both in manned aircraft cockpits and UAS GCS is
the Primary Flight Display (PFD) (see fig. 4.2). It provides in one integrated display
the data provided by primary flight instruments, navigation instruments and status of
flight [125]. In some cases it includes also powerplant information and other systems
information.
The layout of PFDs is quite standardised nowadays in available commercial models
and include:
attitude indicator is placed on central upper position and characterised by the
conventional round-dial presentation used for artificial horizon;
airspeed/altitude indicators are given by vertical tape displays placed on the
left and right sides of the attitude indicator;
vertical speed indicator is usually placed on the right of the altitude indicator
with the classic analog presentation;
turn coordination is shown on a round-dial instrument using a segmented tri-
angle near the top of the attitude indicator;
heading indicator is based on the round-dial gauge conventionally used for di-
rectional gyros displaying also some navigation informations and is placed on
the bottom of the attitude indicator;
8From this point of view, multi-menu displays are affected by additional data management de-
mands because the operator must determine [65]:
• what information is desired,
• where the information is located and
• how to access that information.
9E.g. the caution or warning information should not in any condition be moved out of the operators
primary field of view in order to allow a timely operator intervention [65].
Figure 4.2: typical layout of a PFD. Source: [125]
rate-of-turn indicator is implemented by a curved line display on top of the
heading indicator.
The PFD aims to provide the pilot the same information given by the conventional
instruments in terms of ease and understanding of aircraft behaviour. This task is
accomplished without changing the standardised way in which the pilot scans the
instruments10 during flight phases based on attitude instruments. However, some
training is still required for the pilots to find the information on the PFD and to
interpret them correctly.
A common problem for experienced pilots used to conventional flight instruments
is that PFD induce deviations from assigned altitudes when they have their first ex-
periences with the tape display presentation of altitude information typical of PFD.
Another common problem for pilots operating with PFD is the fact that they tend
to fixate and attempt to correct small deviations, with the risk of allowing significant
deviations of other parameters.
On the other hand PFDs offer some enhancements when compared with conven-
10This is defined in the document Instrument Flying Handbook issued by FAA in the advisory
circularAC 61-27c.
Figure 4.3: vertical airspeed in-
dicator on a PFD with reference
speeds and operating ranges visu-
alisation. Source: [125]
Figure 4.4: symbols implemented on the attitude in-
dicator of a PFD to assist in recovery from unusual
attitude. Source: [125]
tional primary flight instruments. As shown in fig. 4.3, some PFDs include an airspeed
indicator displaying reference speeds and operating ranges for the aircraft. Depiction
of operating ranges is based on the usual red-green color coding. Moreover, the at-
titude indicator of a PFD can depict red symbols to assist in recovery from unusual
attitudes, as shown in fig. 4.4. In this figure, the symbols on the display advising the
pilot to lower the pitch attitude.
Trend indicators, which process data to predict and display future performance,
are valuable enhancements that can be included in PFD. For example, some PFD are
characterised by trend vectors, predicting aircrafts airspeed, altitude, and bank angle
up to several seconds into the future.
Morever, PFDs offers the advantage of combining “several navigation instruments
into a single presentation” [125]. As can be seen in fig. 4.2, these instrument are
included in the heading indicator by means of two navigation indicators: a course de-
viation indicator and a bearing pointer. Those indicators can be linked to many nav-
igation systems available in the aircraft, including Global Positioning System (GPS),
Instrument landing system (ILS) and VHF Omnidirectional Range (VOR).
Finally a very important feature of the PFD is the possibility of displaying to
the pilot the information collected from other aircraft systems in a single integrated
display. An example is given in fig. 4.5 where the the next waypoint in the planned
flight route, the distance and bearing to the waypoint, and the current ground track
are shown in the bar on top of the attitude indicator. Moreover, the value of the
Outside Air Temperature (OAT) is also given in the lower left corner of the display.
The transponder code and status are displayed with current time in the lower right
corner. The PFD in fig. 4.5 enables the pilot to set the communication and navigation
radio frequencies on upper zone of the display.
Figure 4.5: identification of the items used in PFD for communication of flight status
information. Source: [125]
4.5 S&A Display Design Guidelines
Among the information requirements for the GCS as defined in section 4.1 and which is
of paramount importance is communicating to the operator of any advisories produced
by the S&A system. The most common way to implement this is by means of a
graphical display. Generally speaking a HMI integrating the S&A system advisories
should support all the tasks defined in chapter 3, section 3.1.
In fact, as stated in [126], the use of separate alerting and display philosophies for
warnings about time-critical external conditions, such as terrain, traffic, wind shear,
clear air turbulence and wake vortices bring two main issues both in unmanned and
manned aviation:
lack of integration among the alerting systems, giving rise to alert proliferation
and potential conflicting and contradictory information;
lack of strategic information about the alerts, that fails on providing opera-
tors with resources, i.e. predictive situation awareness and planning ahead,
and time to prepare for or avoid emerging situations
In the particular case of manned aviation, the availability of strategic information for
look-ahead prediction, planning, and situation awareness is noticeably absent among
the abundance of information provided on the flight deck. More precisely, even though
pilots are briefed about an hour prior to their planned departure concerning forecasts,
advisories, and expected delays, they operate in a dynamic environment in which con-
ditions are continuosly changing. Pilots generally have access to real-time tactical
weather information via their weather radar systems and by looking out the wind-
screen. For up-to-date strategic information, pilots rely on supplemental information
from the Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS) briefing facilities, communications
with ATC, dispatch, and the party line, by which pilots overhear other airspace users
reporting current conditions. However, these information are presented verbally or
textually and need to be processed, integrated, and visualised by the crew to under-
stand the relevance to their current flight plan. This increases therefore the pilot
workload.
On the other hand, if the pilot/UAV operator is updated about developing condi-
tions it might be possible that potential cautions and warnings can be avoided. Despite
today’s manned aircraft having integrated alerting systems for conditions inside the
aircraft, e.g. Electronic Centralised Aircraft Monitor (ECAM), Engine-Indicating and
Crew-Alerting System (EICAS), there is no comparable fully integrated alerting sys-
tem for conditions detected outside of the aircraft. An integrated alerting system have
to deconflict alerts, and present information in an integrated manner. This concept
have to be based on the application of human-centered guidelines and on the develop-
ment of a consistent philosophy for designing the components of an aural and visual
alerting system. Key aspects of this concept are:
• ability to de-conflict currently separate alerts such as TCAS and TAWS;
• categorisation (weather, traffic, ground, other) and prioritisation (time-critical,
tactical and strategic) of alerts to reduce operator information processing re-
quirements;
• directional, multidimensional aural cueing to allow quick pre-processing of the
condition11;
• integrated graphical presentation of conditions external to the aircraft to sup-
port better situation awareness: the system have to merge information from
independent alerting systems enabling multiple alerts of external conditions
to be prioritised and de-conflicted before presenting them to the crew.
The goal of this approach is to support prompt, appropriate responses to adverse
conditions based on good situation awareness.
In the following sections some general notes about the main solutions proposed in
literature for displays supporting operator situation awareness and integrating S&A
advisories are presented. From the point of view of general layout, two possible imple-
mentation of the S&A system HMI are described in [106]. The first is obtained by the
conformal integration of the S&A probing data in the Navigation Display (ND), with a
11This characteristics is effective in supporting the operator in time-critical responses and in de-
ciding the priority of the alerted condition relative to the on-going task
solution similar to that proposed in section 4.7, and the Head-Up Display (HUD), that
will be described in section 4.9. The latter is based on a dedicated probing display that
continuosly supports level 3 traffic awareness, showing to the operator the potential
effects of manoeuvres in terms of conflict risks. This is a more refined solution than the
conventional Cockpit Display on Traffic Information (CDTI), described in section 4.6.
Section 4.10 of this chapter covers then Augmented Reality Displays (ARDs), an evo-
lution of Synthetic Vision System (SVS) integrating HUD advantages. Some notes on
the cognitive tunneling are outlined in section 4.11. Finally a short discussion about
the multimodal displays concept is presented in section 4.12.
4.6 CDTI
The CDTI, first introduced in manned aviation, displays the horizontal and vertical
positions relative to the ownship of nearby traffic (e.g. in fig. 4.6). It moreover shows
the traffic information status related to proximity of traffic, TAs and RAs [87]. As
explained in [87, 127], the CDTI has the primary purpose of attention cue and as a
secondary purpose tactical guidance display. It is an attention cue, because it supports
the pilot in visually acquiring the transponder equipped aircraft in the surrounding
airspace. In fact, it informs the pilot about the region of the surrounding airspace
within which to look for other aircraft. It supports therefore a faster and more accurate
detection. The tactical guidance display is related with the capability of the CDTI to
display to the pilot the proper system operation, and to inform him/her on time to
prepare to manoeuvre the aircraft if a RA is issued.
Both colours and shapes are used to assist the pilot in the information interpreta-
tion. On the dark background the ownship is a white or cyan (light blue) aircraft-like
symbol. Its location on the display depend on the display implementation. The sym-
bols used for the other detected aircraft are displayed according to relative positions
in respect with the ownship and symbology depends on the threat status as shown in
fig. 4.7 [87]:
• solid red square for threats (i.e. aircraft which trigger an RA).
• solid yellow or amber circle for intruding aircraft (i.e. aircraft which trigger a
TA).
• solid cyan (light blue) or white diamond for proximate traffic.
• hollow cyan (light blue) or white diamond (the colour is distinct from the
ownship symbol, i.e. if one is cyan the other is white, and vice versa) for
other traffic.
The solid white or cyan (light blue) diamond used for proximate traffic identified
as non-intruding aircraft within 6 NM and 1200 ft from the ownship has a particular
function. If an advisory is issued, it indicates that the aircraft is not the intruding
aircraft generating the advisory, considering that the closest traffic might not neces-
sarily be the most threatening. When the transponder of the detected aircraft is able
Figure 4.6: CDTI example. Source: [87]
Figure 4.7: standardised
CDTI traffic symbology.
Source: [87]
to report altitude, the relative altitude or flight level of this aircraft is displayed in
hundreds of feet. This value is placed above the detected aircraft symbol if this is
at an higher altitude than the ownship and below the symbol in the opposite case.
Moreover an arrow shows when the detected aircraft is climbing or descending with a
vertical speed greater or equal to 500 ft min−1.
4.7 2D Planner Display
According to the experimental work done in [120], a planner touch screen displaying
a map with the current UAV position and the flightplan, if it integrates the layers of
information considered in the previous section (traffic, terrain, available airspace and
weather layers), then it might be suitable for providing level 1 and level 2 situation
awareness to the operator [128].
Traffic depiction must provide real-time information about type of aircraft (e.g.
Identification Friend or Foe (IFF), manned or unmanned aircraft), its position and
the flight parameters, including altitude, airspeed and heading. A symbology and
advisories syntax consistent with TCAS systems must be used for this layer [19]. In
fact, even though TCAS symbology, described in section 4.6, does not provide all the
information required for adequate UAV operators situation awareness, TCAS symbols
and colours provides an useful benchmark that is familiar to UAS operators/pilots and
hence it is less confusing.
An user-activated terrain overlay is necessary for terrain awareness. Indeed, terrain
morphology has to be always taken into account during re-routing. A good example,
cited in [128], is the case in which the weather conditions reduce the flight ceiling so
much that makes it difficult to avoid the terrain). More precisely, as explained in [129],
terrain presentation on a GCS display is useful to increase the awareness of operators
regarding the surrounding terrain. It allow him/her moreover to use terrain data for
navigation and guidance purposes. From this point of view, understanding the overall
shape of the terrain is important to ensure collision avoidance in all flight conditions
with or without the presence of any other factors (e.g. weather conditions). The knowl-
edge of this information is necessary to recognise and execute avoidance manoeuvres
when the related advisory is not provided by on-board systems. A widespread solution
to this issue is to display terrain separation violations by means of a color coding of the
map, in order to distiguinsh terrain below, close or above current flight level. It was
experimentally found in [120] that this approach, similarly to the convention used in
TAWS as described in section 3.6, provides an effective indication of terrain clearance.
Furthermore for UAS operations, this layer should include [128]:
• a Loss of Separation (LoS) indicator to show terrain that could mask the
control signal if the UAV is below a certain altitude;
• a pop-up display to show areas where the terrain could mask the control signal
given the UAV’s present altitude;
• a 3-D display with a variable viewing angle, or a separate top-down display
with a corresponding profile view.
An user-activated overlay have to be provided to indicate the airspace areas that
can be used by the UAV for accomplishing its mission. Finally, another selective
overlay displaying current radar and satellite information about weather hazards, such
as thunderstorms, rain, dust, cloud layers, and freezing temperature boundaries should
be provided.
This planar display has the advantage of allowing easier and more precise horizon-
tal and vertical judgments than 3D displays, (that will be covered more in detail in
section 4.8). This is due to the faithful axis representation [130] and to the fact that
the bearing information for threats [19] are easy to extract.
On the other hand, there is the risk that such a display, so similar to a CDTI,
behaves as a head down attention sink. They divert UAS operator from controlling
the outside world view [131]. More precisely, it was shown in the experiments described
in [132] that pilots flying in a cockpit equipped with CDTI miss a significant part of the
visible traffic and important outside events. This is caused by the added workload and
the resulting head-down time related to the use of CDTI, that could be of substantial
concern particularly for single operator operations.
4.8 Synthetic Vision System
The planner described in section 4.7, allows the operator to assess just two-dimensional
manoeuvre given by a combination of track and flight path angle commands [133]. It
does not show the vertical dimension integrated in the display. This was a reason for
the development of perspective flight path displays, such as SVSs, as a supporting tool
for flight guidance in manned aviation. This solution is highly valued by pilots [134].
It provides the pilot/UAV operator with a clear computer-generated perspective de-
piction of the out-of-cockpit view of the external environment ahead. It includes both
physical (e.g. terrain and obstacles) and non-physical objects (e.g. flight path and
airspace constraints, such as prohibited airspace) [19, 23] (see fig. 4.8). The informa-
tion are taken from high-resolution terrain databases, advanced sensors for database
integrity and object detection, ADS-B traffic broadcasting systems, and satellite nav-
igational systems, e.g. GPS [130]. The result of this solution is a clear view of the
forward view equivalent to that of a bright, clear, sunny day, regardless of the outside
weather conditions [135]. It includes various types of data, such as [23]:
• ownship state and status in a format similar to the PFD described in sec-
tion 4.4;
• 4D navigation plan and task/payload plan;
• digital charts and maps;
• terrain elevation data;
• obstacle data;
• other traffic, enabling the possibility to see and avoid other aircraft;
• weather data;
• ATC-instructions;
• temporary changes and restrictions;
• real-time sensor data (e.g. radar, video/IR), providing up-to-date information
about areas of interest and danger zones.
Moreover SVS usually includes a depiction of planned trajectory from a 3D perspective
to support guidance and control [130]. This predictive display, with both aircraft
prediction and flight path preview information, reduces pilot mental workload [136].
Furthermore, as explained in [137], SVS is designed in order to get enough redun-
dancy of informations to prevent the pilots from misinterpreting the presented data.
Considering altitude, a first clue is provided by the size of the terrain surface grid
allowing an estimation of the altitude above the ground at a first glance. Moreover
the glide slope channel provides a very precise graphical estimation of the required al-
titude for precision approach. Finally a digital readout of the exact value is provided
for both altitude and airspeed in their scale. Similarly to altitude, the visual flow field
(especially the grid) gives to the pilot an indication of the actual speed change. A
spatial flight path predictor and a predetermined flight path indicator are included to
support the pilot in understanding situation and provide a complete situation aware-
ness. The quick situation awareness produced by this system increases pilot’s reaction
Figure 4.8: identification of the information layers included in a SVS display. Source: [130]
promptness allowing precision approaches and landings in adverse weather conditions.
Finally, the predictor length and color change as function of aircraft speed in order to
provide an additional continuous feedback.
4.8.1 SVSs in UASs
The SVS main advantage is the compatibility with the pilot view. In fact, 3D per-
spective display are closer to the pilot’s world view rather than 2D planar displays
[136]. For this reason 3D displays exhibit improved tracking performance, better sit-
uation awareness and lower workload particularly for complex paths in respect with
conventional display formats [134, 138]. Moreover, this advantage is particularly per-
ceivable regarding outside world traffic – and, of course terrain conflict risks – detection
[120, 127]. Moreover, the situation awareness is better improved with a 3D display
than 2D coplanar displays for pilot tasks involving comparisons between the display
and the outside view.
Just to summarise, in manned aviation, SVSs were introduced to:
• increase situation awareness [23, 120, 135],
• support the pilot during limited visibility conditions [23, 130, 135, 139],
• increase terrain awareness and reduce therefore the likelihood of Controlled
Flight into Terrain (CFIT) accidents [130, 134, 140],
• enhance aircraft operational capabilities [139].
Moreover, information requirements for navigation, guidance and control of manned
aircraft and UAV are the main reasons for using SVSs for UAS operator support [63].
Key characteristics for an effective implementation of SVSs concepts to UAVs is the
use of integrated data presentation to support the operator in obtaining level 2 situ-
ation awareness in addition to the immediate feedback on expected future effects of
changes to the situation to support level 3 situation awareness.
In the domain of information presentation, SVSs offers advantages for UAS in terms
of augmentation of the sensor view and visualisation of non-physical constraints. Aug-
mentation of the sensor view is related with the anticipation of environment features
and the compensation for the effects of sensor limitations such as field of view, effective
range and occlusion12. It can be obtained by:
Figure 4.9: SVS display with integrated de-
piction of airspace constraints: the yellow
cylinders show their location. Source: [63]
• increasing field of view,
• adding symbology to support en-
hanced visual acquisition,
• depiction of elements not (yet)
available in the sensor image,
• guidance augmentation,
• integration of Enhanced Vision
System (EVS) sensor image,
• integrated depiction of the planned
path to improve manual control
with a representation based on a
virtual tunnel,
The visualisation of non-physical con-
straints is the the graphical depiction
of SVS terrain and obstacles in an ego-
centered reference frame (e.g. threat vol-
ume depiction). It has the advantage
of producing a mental spatial picture of
the situation more accurate than non-
physical constraints (e.g. restricted airspace) specified as textual messages. Therefore
a spatially integrated presentation of physical constraints in SVSs through the depic-
tion of 3D volumetric objects could be used for non-physical constraints such as the
boundaries of exclusionary airspace. The integration of information regarding special-
use airspace into the guidance and the navigation displays has already been used in
commercial aviation to increase operator’s situation awareness during approaches in
which he/she flies close to prohibited airspace (see fig. 4.9).
In the domain of functionalities, SVSs provide flight path de-confliction with terrain
during planning and predictive look-ahead terrain alerting capability [63]. The first
12caused, e.g. by clouds, precipitation, smoke or terrain
Figure 4.10: depiction of the slant un-
derestimation effect. Source: [130]
functionality consists in the use of the ter-
rain elevation database to detect separation
violations of the desired path in the plan-
ning phase and correct them during the plan-
ning process. The latter is useful to in-
crease safety during off-path flight phases.
This function can provide a timely warn-
ing for terrain separation violations when
the aircraft has to deviate from a conflict-
free planned path based on future path prediction and terrain elevation database.
4.8.2 SVS ambiguities
Figure 4.11: schematic representation of
a 3D traffic display. Source: [130]
On the other hand, the 3D displays have also
some drawbacks and limitations. More pre-
cisely, they are characterised by the following
ambiguities [130]:
• slant underestimation,
• compression effect,
• line-of-sight ambiguity effect.
As displayed in fig. 4.10, the slant underesti-
mation is related with the human tendency
“to perceive a slanted surface within a 3D
display to have a smaller angle (relative to
the vertical) than it actually does” [130]. It
is thought that this bias is the cause for pi-
lots tendency to select descending manoeu-
vres when avoiding conflicts within a 3D dis-
play, similar to that shown in fig. 4.11. The
effect of this bias might be decreased by adding depth cues to the display.
Figure 4.12: effect of compression: three
line segments of equal length but at dif-
ferent orientations appear with different
lengths. Source: [130]
Compression effect is sketched in fig. 4.12.
It is the compression of at least two or three
axes of a 3D world that is necessary when dis-
played on a 2D screen. The resolution of po-
sition along an axis is a decreasing function of
its amount of compression. This reduction in
resolution usually produces bias in estimating
distances along the compressed axis because
of the small number of pixels and of the small
visual angle. Therefore it might be necessary
to spend more cognitive effort to get an ac-
curate estimation of distances and positions along this compressed axis (possibly to
mentally stretch it to its uncompressed state). Of course, the accuracy of estimation
obtained from the mental stretching depends on the accuracy of the transformation of
the compressed axis to its uncompressed state.
The line-of-sight ambiguity effect is the reduction of “the amount of linear infor-
mation available within a visible vector as that vector approaches the line-of-sight
viewing axis” [130], as illustrated in fig. 4.13. This ambiguity degrades the estimation
of the distance and the absolute position orthogonal to the viewing plane of objects in
the display. It makes it more difficult to judge the location of traffic, weather, terrain
hazards and to determine the future position of traffic with respect to ownship.
Figure 4.13: line-of-sight ambiguity ef-
fect: this side-view schematic shows the
3D display viewpoint, the line-of-sight
viewing axis (dashed line) and two ob-
jects A and B. Their location along the
viewing axis (distance), as well as orthog-
onal to the display plane (altitude), will
be ambiguous to the viewer, as reflected
by the “?”. Source: [130]
From a general point of view, it might be
more difficult for the pilot to judge the precise
location and trajectory of aircraft based on a
3D display [141, 142]. Moreover, 3D displays
seem to produce higher mental workload for
the pilots than 2d coplanar displays [141] This
is probably caused by the mental demand re-
quired by the rotations of vectors between
ownship and traffic, that the pilots need to
compensate for in 3D displays. Considering
all these challenges, in order to communicate
all this information about terrain, obstacles
and adjacent air traffic, a PFD had to be com-
plemented with a ND [120, 137]. In fact, the
navigational awareness of a pilot or UAS op-
erator is strongly influenced by “the ability to
make a cognitive coupling between the World
Centered Reference Frame (WRF) and the
Ego-centered Reference Frame (ERF)” [23].
In particular, ERF displays are aligned with
the vehicle movement and therefore no mental
rotations of the presented information have to
be made by the operator. This leads to a re-
duction in the probability of control reversal.
However, WRF displays provide a stable ref-
erence frame in which the coordination between different vehicles or units can be
monitored more easily. Therefore the ERF displays are more beneficial in situations
demanding quick resolutions or manoeuvreing, while planning and other higher-level
decision making are more effective on WRF displays.
4.9 Head-Up Display
In manned aviation, the HUD, such as that displayed in fig. 4.14, is a small see-
through screen positioned just in front of pilot’s line of sight looking ahead out of the
aircraft. Precisely key flight instruments data are projected in a format similar to
the PFD [143] previously described in section 4.4. In UAS GCS the same operating
principle can be obtained simply by superposing on a transparent layer these data
on the forward camera view. In manned aviation, it was developed for fighter jets in
order to reduce the need for the pilot to monitor his/her instrument panel especially
during complex manoeuvres [144], hence enabling the pilot to maintain an external
lookout without losing access to key aircraft instrumentation [143]. This also enahnces
situation awareness in limited (or night) visibility and in proximity of visible terrain,
water, ground-based obstacles or other aircraft.
In civilian manned aviation this advantage is therefore most useful in the initial
climb after take-off and also for the approach and landing phases of flight [143]. These
are the flight manoeuvres involving the majority of all aircraft accidents [143]. These
are also the conditions in which HUD visualize more effectively to the pilot any gaps
between the required aircraft trajectory for a safe landing and the projection of the
aircraft current status in the future [143, 145]. This conclusion is supported by a Flight
Safety Foundation (FSF) study [146] that concluded that if a HUD had been fitted
and operated by properly trained flight crew, it might have prevented or positively
influenced 31% of total loss accidents and 29% of major partial loss accidents.
In UAS operations, this feature is particularly suitable for RPVs , which are usually
employed in flight mission at much lower altitudes than manned aircraft. The benefits
of HUDs compared to the usual cockpit instruments in manned aircraft are several
and classified in the following three general categories [147] that applies also to UAS.
HUDs are usually collimated at optical infinity. This usually reduces, and some-
times removes, the problems related with visual re-accommodation and attention
switching [149] between the instrument view and the out of cockpit view, necessary
for tasks like traffic monitoring or to confirm cleared runway.
Since HUDs are superimposed over the outside world, they reduce the amount of
visual scanning necessary to monitor both instruments and outside world domain for
events that might occur, therefore reducing the risk that an event may occur in one
domain (instrument panel or outside world), while the pilot is monitoring the other.
This risk would therefore leave the event to be detected by peripheral vision, then
unproperly detected, or to be undetected until the pilot takes a look to the previously
unattended domain. HUD can reduce this problem, although it cannot eliminate it.
The “simultaneous viewing of two overlaid scenes does not guarantee simultaneous
detection of events in both scenes” [147].
HUD information can be configured such that it overlays its far domain counterpart.
This could be useful for piloting tasks requiring specific integration of information
between the two domains. When this configuration is used for the HUD, its imagery
Figure 4.14: example of a typical HUD display. Source: [148]
is identified as conformal imagery, since it conforms to features of the outside world
[149]. Examples of this are:
• the horizon line that overlays the true horizon [147],
• a flight path velocity vector in the forward view [149],
• the depiction of the planned trajectory with a virtual tunnel [149],
• the runway overlay that superposing the trapezoid formed by a true runway
[147].
The advantages of conformal symbology affect not only the tasks of focusing attention
on both near and far domain events (e.g. airspeed monitoring, traffic monitoring) but
flight path control also [149]. The use of conformal symbology may moreover reinforce
other motion cues and benefit information retrieval [150].
On the other hand, these benefits are obtained at the cost of cluttering the view
with overlapping images. These could mask events or relevant information (e.g. critical
hazards on forward flight path in the far domain could be obscured by HUD imagery,
or the processing of that imagery itself might be corrupted by the view of the far
domain beyond the aircraft, such as terrain or clouds [149]). This phenomenon could
also be due to perceptual or cognitive masking, that cause some objects in a visual
scene with many overlapping images to become difficult to detect despite they are not
totally obscured [147].
However, as stated in [149], in the comparisons of head-up versus head-down pre-
sentation of identically formatted instrumentation the costs of scanning (head down)
are greater than the costs of the clutter from overlapping imagery (head up). The
implementation and use of HUD technology produces therefore an overall benefit for
most tasks. This is particularly true for confomal HUDs .
4.10 Augmented Reality Display
The video imagery from various cameras mounted on the UAV is particularly valuable
for the UAS operator situation awareness, mainly regarding tasks such as [150]:
• verify clear path for taxi/runway operations,
• scan for other air traffic in the area,
• identify navigational landmarks and potential obstructions,
• perform a wide variety of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance activi-
ties, in the case of gimbal-mounted cameras.
However, the quality of the video imagery can be compromised by factors such as
[150]:
• narrow camera field-of-view,
• datalink degradations,
• poor environmental conditions (e.g. dawn/dusk/night, adverse weather, variable
clouds),
• bandwidth limitations,
• highly cluttered visual scene (e.g. in urban areas or mountainous terrain).
Hence it could be reasoned that the UAV mission effectiveness should increase if the
imagery interpretation is enhanced and made more robust under various operating
conditions.
In ARD (see example in fig. 4.15), similarly to the SVS, spatially-relevant infor-
mation are derived from databases (e.g. terrain, cultural features, maps etc.) and
real-time information are updated by fusing other sources (e.g. intelligence assets, C2
sources etc.) and overlaid as conformal imagery onto the camera image [150]. The
result is a set of computer-generated overlays co-existing with real objects viewed by
the camera and highlight those points and regions of interest to the operator.
The idea of overlaying a synthetic vision system on a sensor image can have both a
positive and negative impact. As stated in [150], previous studies demonstrated that
the presentation of information generated from a computer in a conformal manner
with sensor imagery on an unified display has the following advantages:
Figure 4.15: example of ARD. Source: [150]
• reduction of scanning time and effort required to access and monitor all the
elements,
• reduction of need to mentally integrate spatial information from different
sources,
• decrease of the workload related with attentional focus and management.
Generally speaking, ARDs are expected to have the following benefits both in manned
and unmanned aviation [150]. They improve operator’s situation awareness, by high-
lighting elements of interest on the camera image. They enhance therefore UAS oper-
ator interpretation of imagery, like location of threats, targets, landmarks, emergency
airfields and position of friendly forces. By reducing negative video characteristics,
they maintain the operator’s situation awareness of the environment, if the video
datalink is temporarily degraded or lost or the visibility is limited. Moreover ARD
can include in UAV operations [150]:
• information unrelated with actual sensor imagery, such as threat lethality
envelopes and indicators for ground target search and identification tasks as-
sociated with many UAV missions,
• self-motion cues and depth cues,
• flight guidance symbology, similar to the symbology of HUDs described in
section 4.9, for reduced visibility conditions, especially during terminal flight
operations (i.e. landings).
Among others, the following two issues regarding ARDs must be considered [150].
The cluttering of information overlay may reduce the accuracy of sensor imagery pro-
cessing. The data about objects not visible in real sensor imagery provided by synthetic
vision overlays can increase the clutter (e.g. a threat that is hidden behind a mountain
might be visible on the display, causing the operator’s loss of the occlusion cues, which
are important for depth perception).
However, from a general point of view, as stated in [150], previous work showed
that the use of a separate display is related with a longer scanning time. This is a
greater disadvantage than the additional clutter related with the imposition of the
augmented reality layers onto existing camera view imagery.
4.11 Cognitive Tunneling
The attentional tunneling or cognitive tunneling is defined as the pilot tendency to
focus his/her attention on the the near domain instrumentation, even if important
signals appear in the far world domain [147]. Its direct consequence is the reduction
of pilot’s ability to detect unexpected events. In the particular case of UAVs , it could
moreover involve the missed detection of unexpected, high-interest targets [150].
Some studies brought to evidence that this effect is stronger with HUD than head-
down displays [140]. In the case of HUDs , it was suggested that the cognitive tunneling
may be produced by the fact that the HUD symbology superimposed over the out-
side world view has a compelling nature, regardless its relevance to the flight task.
Moreover, it was observed that the cognitive tunneling effect causes the pilot to fo-
cus his/her attention for an exceptionally long time on the near-domain information
(HUD symbology). On the other hand, not even the minimal amount of attention was
given to the far-domain (outside world), despite the unexpected events included in
this domain. However, the effect is not limited to attention focusing and is typical of a
variety of situations where one source of information with highly compelling informa-
tion makes the pilot ignore other information sources, causing therefore a non-optimal
information sampling pattern.
As stated in [149, 150], conformal symbology may cause a reduction of the in-
cidence of the cognitive tunneling in SVS. In fact, conformal symbology makes it
possible to integrate rather than superimpose augmented information into the visual
scene. Moreover, it was suggested that a conformal SVS in which synthetic and real
sensor information are grouped into one perceptual group should reduce the problems
associated with attentional allocation and therefore cognitive tunneling [150]13. On
the other hand, an increase of the amount of information presented via synthetic vision
13According to [150]: “This is based on object-based models of visual attention that postulate that
complex scenes are parsed into groups of objects, with attention focused on only one object at a time,
with object groups defined by contours, color etc.”
overlays could produce an increase of the cognitive tunneling risk by the operator.
4.12 Multimodal Display
When a GCS is equipped with visual displays presenting sensor information beyond
those provided from a vehicle-mounted camera, the UAV operator may not be able to
choose the optimal visual scanning strategy in order to compensate for the absence of
multisensory cues [19]. In that case, the use of of multimodal (e.g. tactile or auditory)
information displays could be more effective.
Multimodal systems have the advantage of providing the users with better expres-
sive power, naturalness, flexibility and portability than conventional visual displays
[151]. They are based on a set of communication channels. The use of different com-
munication channels allows the simulataneous integration of various modalities, like
visual display, audio, and tactile feedback. This enables the understanding of the dis-
play information by engaging the human perceptual, cognitive, and communication
skills.
Previous studies showed that some aspects of flight control and system monitoring
are improved by auditory and tactile displays [19]. Furthermore, the use of audi-
tory information reduces the workload related with the visual scanning similar to that
achieved with HUD overlay. On the other hand, contrarily to HUD, it is not charac-
terised by any cost produced by the clutter and the use of peripheral vision to process
both the HUD and the outside world layers of information [152]. This reduction of
the visual scanning workload gives the pilot the possibility to allocate more attention
to the complex visual tasks related to flight control (aviating) and traffic awareness
(navigating) [127].
Generally speaking, multimodal displays reduce cognitive-perceptual workload lev-
els [19]. This could be linked to the fact that the distribution of the total load across
the auditory and visual channels makes easier the parallel processing than when the
processing is concentrated within the visual system [127].
Moreover, the following advantages were found in previous studies [151]. The use
of multimodal interfaces lead to an increase in the overall efficiency of interaction.
More precisely, the amount of task-critical errors is reduced in multimodal interaction.
Therefore the use of multimodal techniques is particularly suitable in highly interactive
environments, such as the aircraft cockpit. Moreover, multimodal interfaces are flexible
and can therefore be easily used by a wide range of users, to accomplish different tasks
and in various environments. These include also adverse surroundings (aircraft cockpit,
for example). It should be observed also that users prefer multimodal interactions,
particularly when describing spatial information about location, number, orientation
or shape of an object (spatial domain systems). Finally, the learning process for
using multimodal interfaces is simplified by their greater naturalness and flexibility of
interaction. This characteristic is particularly useful for flight simulator training.
Of course the message comprehension requires the operator to use an amount of
working memory and the comprehension load increases with the length of the message
[127]. This might causes some recall errors on long messages and thereby decreasing
the readback accuracy in some instances. Therefore short message lengths need to be
used to avoid an overload of the subject short-term memory [153].
According to previous research findings, short verbal and linguistic messages are
inherently more compatibly delivered in the auditory, as aural messages, rather than
in the visual channel, as written text messages [127]. This compatibility is related
with the use of fewer resources which is a distinct advantage, particularly in multi-
task situations. On the other hand, spatial information, such as those involved in
target cueing, are less suited for the auditory channel. In fact, the auditory channel
“is fundamentally temporal, not spatial in its characteristic” [127]. Therefore the
auditory modality is not effective in providing target search and cueing information.
This makes the use of separate resources not advantageous for the CDTI.
Moreover, a disadvantage of the auditory delivery of information is the pre-emption.
The auditory modality behaves as an attention sink and has the intrinsic characteristic
to capture the user attention and distract him/her from ongoing visual tasks [127].
This is the reason why the auditory modality is chosen for high priority alerts. A
previous research shows moreover that “the auditory delivery of discrete information
is more disruptive of ongoing visual tasks (e.g. tracking, visual monitoring or flight
control), than is the visual delivery of the same information” [127]. For this reason
previous studies found that in multi-task environment the performance obtained by
the auditory delivery of information is not always superior to the visual delivery.
Especially when considering the case of ongoing navigation and aviation tasks, it is
inferior.
In particular in the case of traffic detection [127], it should be noted that the re-
dundancy produced from the presence of both the auditory and visual information
delivery channels does not lead to an improvement in communication to include all
the advantages of the two communication channels. More precisely, the availability
of the echo of the visual information channel provided by the CDTI avoids that com-
munications are disrupted when the messages are too long. On the other hand, the
availability of the auditory channel does not prevent the disruption of vertical flight
path tracking when the traffic is detected. Moreover, it does not reduce the amount of
looking at the data link display. It seems that the pilots feel the need “to cross check
the visual display with the auditory message when the latter arrives” [127]. There-
fore, the pilots have to be instructed or trained to avoid diverting their gaze due to
the arrival of an auditory information, except if the retention of longer messages is
considered not accurate.
4.13 Chapter Summary
The function of the GCS in a UAS operations is to support the operator situation
awareness. This includes three levels. The first is the communication of mission data,
hazards and UAS vehicle performance to the operator. The second level requires
the operator to monitor the constraints regarding mission timing, airspace, vehicle
endurance, terrain separation, datalink, payload, traffic restricted areas and weather.
Finally, level 3 situation awareness requires the operator to understand the future
effect of changes in the flight plan due to new information and changes in mission
objectives. The GCS should moreover provide the operator with all the information
necessary to effectively accomplish his/her task as a supervisory controller, when the
UAV level of autonomy is very high. The design of the GCS layout have moreover
to consider different HMI aspects. These include the information sources constraints
such as sensors performances and datalink latency. Airworthiness criteria defined for
manned aviation have to be considered to define the warning indications, the displays
configuration and the information displayed.
The presence of a human operator in the UAS loop introduces the issues related
to delegation of multiple tasks to him/her. These involve all four stages of human in-
formation processing system (sensory input, perception/cognition, selection of action,
and execution of action), competing for the same attentional resources when performed
concurrently. Because of this overlapping in information processing resources, the op-
erator capability is often not sufficient to meet all this resource demand. This results
in task interference and loss in performance.
The GCS operator workload described in the previous paragraph have to be min-
imised by implementing GCS displays supporting both display salience and the ease
of extraction of critical information. Currently, the GCS includes in fact a set of dis-
plays showing most of the information available in a conventional aircraft cockpit, in
addition to UAS specific information such as communication links and system status.
This results in a large amount of information competing for display space. Intelligent
display technologies, such as reconfigurable displays, or cueing techniques are therefore
necessary to direct the operator attention to divergent information.
If a S&A system is implemented in the UAS, the related operator interface have
to be included in the GCS. Given that generally this is based on a display, its de-
sign should take into account all the hazards considered by the system such as terrain
impact, traffic, wind shear, clear air turbulence and wake vortices. This is necessary
to avoid the lack of integration between advisories and to provide the operator with
strategic information. The CDTI is the simplest example of S&A GCS interface. It
graphically displays the horizontal position of the ownship in respect with nearby
traffic and provides a numerical estimation of the vertical separation. A direct evo-
lution of the CDTI is the 2D planner display. This is a touch-screen display showing
to the operator a map displaying the current UAV position and the flightplan while
integrating also the layers of information regarding traffic, terrain, available airspace
and weather. A significant step forward is given by the perspective flight path dis-
plays such as SVS that integrate the vertical dimension in the display. They provide a
clear computer-generated perspective depiction of the out-of-cockpit view of the exter-
nal environment ahead, integrating also non-physical objects, such as flight path and
airspace constraints. ARDs are an enhancement of SVSs in which spatially relevant
information are updated with other sources (e.g. intelligence assets, C2 sources etc.)
and overlaid as conformal imagery onto the camera image. Finally Multimodal dis-
plays, including tactile or auditory feedbacks, have the advantage of providing the users
with greater expressive power, naturalness and portability compared to conventional
visual displays.

C H A P T E R 5
Simulation Environment
The testing of the developed algorithm were carried-out inMatlab/Simulink R© simu-
lation environment. The simulations were designed to model the typical operating
environment of the S&A algorithm. They include therefore the dynamic model of all
components of this environment, such as ownship and threat aircraft dynamics, sen-
sors, transponders and control systems. The S&A algorithm is integrated with a Path
Following (PF) algorithm in an ANS to provide the UAS with autonomous navigation
capabilities. This is necessary to enable the S&A algorithm testing both in modes 1
and 4 of Table 2.1 (remotely piloted to fully autonomous) and validate therefore the
applicability of proposed S&A algorithm to both these UAVs flight control modes.
The simulation environment general architecture will be described in the following
section 5.1. Aircraft dynamics used for both ownship and threat aircraft is described
ownship
transponder
autonomous
navigation
system
threats
data
ownship
aircraft
commands
sensors
data
threat 1
aircraft
threat 1
transponder
sensors
data
threat 2
aircraft
threat 2
transponder
sensors
data
Figure 5.1: basic structure of the
simulation environment used to
test the ANS
in section 5.2. Section 5.3 describes the Graphical
User Interface (GUI) for setting the simulation pa-
rameters of the ownship UAV prior to starting the
simulation. The ANS architecture is then defined in
section 5.4. A more detailed depiction of the PF al-
gorithm used for the autonomous navigation is then
illustrated in section 5.5.
5.1 System Architecture
Basic structure of the simulation environment used
to develop and test the ANS system is sketched in
fig. 5.1. Both ownship and threat aircraft blocks are
the Piper J3 Cub 40 model aircraft (see section 5.2).
The ownship is a BRLOS UAV. In this simulation
environment it is controlled/supervised by the oper-
ator from the GCS mock-up described in section 7.3.
It is moreover supposed that ownship and threat air-
craft are equipped with mode S ADS-B transpon-
ders, that are cooperative sensors described in sec-
tion 3.8.1. The ownship ANS received inputs are
the on-board sensors data and the received threats
transponders data. The output of the ANS are the
autopilots commands sent for execution.
According to Table 3.2, the mode S ADS-B transponders output includes the fol-
lowing on-board sensors data:
identification code, that, to simplify the implementation in this simulation en-
vironment, is an integer number different for each aircraft;
barometric altitude;
horizontal Global Positioning System (GPS) position;
GPS position estimation quality indicator, set to 1 in order to simulate op-
timal reception of the position estimated by GPS.
emergency status indicator, set to 0 because the aircraft considered are not
in an emergency condition;
roll angle, derived from magnetometers measurements;
true airspeed, taken from conventional differential barometric airspeed mea-
surements;
ground speed, obtained from GPS acquisitions;
true track angle, extracted also from GPS data;
magnetic heading, obtained from magnetometers;
indicated airspeed, measured from air data system;
barometric vertical rate, once more derived by air data system.
As in real operating environment, data exchange between transponders is enabled
only when the horizontal relative distance between aircraft is within the reception range
of ownship transponder. This distance is computed by transforming the GPS position
of threat from the geocentric reference frame to the North-East-Down Reference Frame
(NED)1 which is centered on the current ownship position and estimating the length
of the resulting vector.
The collisions between the ownship and a flying threat or a ground obstacle are
identified in the simulation environment by a switch. It stops the simulation when
the horizontal or vertical separation between the ownship and any of the hazards is
smaller than the radius or half-height, respectively, of the CAZ defined in section 3.7.
This switch was implemented in a first development stage to allow the identification of
those conditions causing a real collision and detect therefore the conditions in which
the algorithm was failing.
5.2 Aircraft Simulator
A Piper J3 Cub 40 aircraft model, shown in fig. 5.2, is considered for both ownship and
flying threats. Its configuration parameters are given in Table 5.1. The structure of
1This is a reference frame in which the axis are pointing respectively towards North, East and
down direction in respect with the local point of earth surface considered and the origin is exactly in
that point.
Figure 5.2: Piper J3 Cub 40 model aircraft
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Figure 5.3: block diagram of the aircraft simulator: p, q, r are the roll, pitch and heading
angle rates, φ, θ, ψ are the roll,pitch and heading attitude angles, h, V are the altitude and
airspeed; the subscript ref indicates the reference values used in the autopilots
Table 5.1: Piper J3 Cub 40 config-
uration parameters
parameters value
mass 5.3 kg
wing span 2032 mm
wing chord 307 mm
CG position1 345 mm
CP position1 320.2 mm
propeller radius 175 mm
1 horizontal position re-
ferred to the propeller
position
Table 5.2: performance parameters considered for
the actuators simulators
actuator lag
saturation
limit
max
change
rate
ailerons 0.02 s [-20,20]◦ 20 ◦ s−1
elevator 0.02 s [-15,15]◦ 15 ◦ s−1
rudder 0.02 s [-30,30]◦ 30 ◦ s−1
Table 5.3: values of the sensors performance parameters
sensor range resolution f s [Hz] bandwidth [Hz]
accelerometers1 [−50 m s−2,50 m s−2] 0.5 m s−2 50 -
gyroscope1 [−1200 ◦ s−1,1200 ◦ s−1] 0.01 ◦ s−1 50 10.95,12.18,10.95
magnetometers1 [−360◦,360◦] 0.05◦ 50 0.2,0.63,0.2
attack angle [−45◦,45◦] 0.1◦ 50 29.59
sideslip angle [−90◦,90◦] 0.1◦ 50 12.55
anemometer [0 m s−1,50 m s−1] 0.2 m s−1 50 40
barometer [0 m,500 m] 2 m 50 40
vertical rates [−3 m s−1,3 m s−1] 0.005 m s−1 50 40
1 The values of every cell of this row are valid for roll, pitch and heading axes except for the
bandwidth in which are displayed separately the values for every axis separated by a comma.
the simulator is sketched in fig. 5.3. The GUI that will be described in the next section
enables the user to set the initial flight condition and the simulation parameters.
The aircraft dynamics is the non-linear 6Degree of Freedom (DoF) model de-
scribed in [154]. The actuators are simulated by the block Simple Actuator of the
Aerosim blockset in Simulink R©. This is a first order dynamics model taking into ac-
count time constant, saturation and rate limits as listed in Table 5.2. No dynamics
is considered for the throttle. This choice is supported by the fact that the engine is
electrical and related delays are very small. The sensors specifications are tabulated
in Table 5.3. The GPS receiver considers an accuracy for the position of 10 m in the
horizontal plane and 30 m for the vertical position with an update frequency of 5 Hz.
The aircraft is equipped with Stability Augmentation System (SAS), Attitude Con-
trol System (ACS) and Trim Control System (TCS) described in the next paragraphs.
The SAS includes three proportional controllers. They feedback roll, pitch and heading
angular rates measured by means of aircraft sensors to ailerons, elevator and rudder
Table 5.4: specifications used for the
autopilots tuning
autopilot
max
control
input
max
output
change
SAS
roll 30% 15 ◦ s−1
pitch 30% 15 ◦ s−1
yaw 20% 10 ◦ s−1
ACS
roll 70% 20◦
pitch 70% 15◦
yaw 80% 15◦
FPCS
airspeed 100% 0.5 m s−1
altitude 70% 5 m
commands. The aim of these autopilots is to
improve the handling qualities of the aircraft.
ACS includes three Proportional-Integral
(PI) controllers. These feedback the difference
between measured attitude angles, i.e. roll,
pitch and heading angles, and a set of refer-
ence values to the ailerons, elevator and rud-
der commands. This control system holds a set
of commanded attitude angle values, the refer-
ence values. These are defined by operator or
an outer-loop control system, such as the Flight
Path Control System (FPCS).
The TCS is the control system trimming
the aircraft at a reference altitude and airspeed.
This system adds to the elevator and throttle commands the inputs necessary to hold
the reference altitude and airspeed, as specified by the operator or an outer-loop con-
trol system, like the FPCS.
The FPCS includes altitude autopilot and airspeed autopilot. The altitude autopilot
is a PI controller feeding back the difference between measured altitude and a reference
value to the ACS pitch autopilot. The aim is to get an autopilot that holds aircraft’s
altitude to a commanded value, i.e. the reference value. This is defined by the pilot
or by an outer-loop control system, such as the PF algorithm that will be described
in section 5.5.
The airspeed autopilot is a PI controller feeding back the difference between mea-
sured airspeed and a reference value to throttle command. This control system imple-
ments therefore an autopilot holding the aircraft’s airspeed to a commanded value, the
reference value. This can be defined by the pilot or by an outer-loop control system.
The FPCS is therefore a control system holding target heading, altitude and air-
speed as specified by an operator or by any other outer-loop control system, like the
PF system (see section 5.5). The FPCS altitude and airspeed autopilots are designed
as acquire & hold autopilots. In order to take into account the wide range of variations
of the altitude command, they include a logic to limit the flight path angle in order
to avoid the aircraft from entering a stall condition when steep variations of altitude
command are imposed to the autopilot. This logic is obtained by defining the pitch
angle command θc(t) with the following relationship:
θc(t) =

α + γu if hc(t)− hm(t) < hl
α if hl < hc(t)− hm(t) < hu
α + γl if hc(t)− hm(t) > hu
(5.1)
where:
• hm(t) and hc(t) are respectively the current measured and commanded altitude,
• α is the angle of attack value to hold the trim condition defined by the current
airspeed and altitude,
• hl = −5m and hu = 5m are the boundaries outside which the flight path angle
limiter is necessary to avoid the stall,
• γl = −25◦ and γu = 25◦ are the minimum and maximum allowed flight path
angles, respectively.
The control systems are based on gain scheduling . The proportional and integral
gains are scheduled according to the flight condition, defined in terms of altitude
and airspeed. For every flight condition, the autopilots are tuned with the Linear-
Quadratic Regulator (LQR) design techniques by using the following functions of the
Control System Toolbox of Matlab R©:
• lqry for the simple proportional LQR,
• lqi function for the PI LQR.
The specifications used for the autopilots tuning are shown in Table 5.4.
5.3 Simulator Settings
The window to allow the user to set the simulation parameters of the aircraft model
Figure 5.4: snapshot of the Ini-
tial Condition pane
includes the following three tabs:
• Initial Conditions
• Control Mode
• Camera View
The Initial Conditions tab shows the initial con-
ditions of the aircraft dynamics considered at the be-
ginning of the simulation. As can be seen in fig. 5.4,
it includes the following parameters. Initial geocen-
tric position (latitude, longitude) [◦] is the initial
aircraft horizontal position expressed in geocentric lat-
itude and longitude in degrees. The value of these two
parameters is inserted in this field according to Mat-
lab R© syntax for vectors. They are inserted and dis-
played in the textfield as a vector of two elements sep-
arated by a comma or a space and enclosed in square
brackets. The value used for latitude can be a decimal number ranging between -90
and 90. The longitude accepts both values from −180◦ to 180◦ and from 0◦ to 360◦ so it
is compatible with both these standards. Trim altitude [m] is the initial aircraft alti-
tude expressed in meters. A callback was implemented in the GUI to constrain the user
to insert a value inside the range for which the autopilots where tuned. Trim airspeed
[m s−1] (minimum 9.9 m s−1) is the initial aircraft airspeed expressed in meters per
second. The stall value is displayed and another callback is implemented to avoid the
user inserting an airspeed value inferior lower than the minimum allowed value. Trim
heading [◦] is the initial aircraft heading angle expressed in degrees. The accepted
values are inside the range 0 and 360. Aircraft name is the name of the data struc-
ture used in the model workspace to store the aircraft model parameters and settings.
The value of this parameter is displayed on a gray background because it cannot be
modified. Subroutines folder is the name of the folder containing the aircraft model
callbacks and subroutines. This parameter is also on a gray background because this
name is defined only once. Its value is used just when the aircraft model is added in
the Simulink R© model to copy its content in a folder in the model directory.
Figure 5.5: snapshot of the
Control Mode pane
The Control Mode tab specifies the settings of the
UAV control systems. In particular, the following con-
trols are displayed in fig. 5.5. If the check-box enable
control systems is ticked, the user can select one of
the control systems configuration defined in the menu
displayed below in the figure. Otherwise all the con-
trol systems are switched off and the aircraft is con-
trolled with the conventional flight controls (ailerons,
elevator, rudder and throttle) that is the MAN mode
sketched in fig. 5.3. The pop-up menu control mode
allows the user to define the configuration of the acti-
vated control systems that are the other modes defined
in fig. 5.3. More precisely, the following modes can be chosen:
SAS is the configuration in which only SAS control systems are operating and op-
erator uses conventional flight controls (ailerons, elevator, rudder and throttle
commands) to control the aircraft;
ACS is the configuration in which both SAS and ACS are switched on and op-
erator sets desired attitude angles values in real-time;
TCS is the configuration in which both SAS and TCS are switched on and op-
erator sets the desired altitude and airspeed: the aileron, elevator, rudder
and throttle commands coming from the operator through the conventional
controls are summed to the trim values defined by TCS;
FPCS is the configuration in which all control systems (SAS, TCS, ACS and
FPCS) are enabled and operator sets desired altitude, airspeed and heading
angles in real-time.
The check-box enable external inputs mode enables a simulation mode in which
the operator commands in real-time all controls (conventional controls, autopilots
commands and autopilots switches) and the input of the model are the following:
conventional commands including ailerons, elevator, rudder and throttle com-
mands;
autopilots switch that enables switching between SAS and FPCS modes as
defined previously; when this control is switched off the only inputs considered
by the system are conventional commands otherwise all the inputs as specified
below will be considered;
altitude, airspeed and heading commands are the reference flight parame-
ters for FPCS;
climb/descent switch is the control to allow the aircraft to start a climb, when
its value is set to 1, or descent manouevre, when its value is -1, with predefined
flight path angles (25◦ and −25◦, respectively), or to stay in a cruise condition,
when its value is 0;
climb/descent flight path angle commands gives the operator the possibil-
ity to set the value of the flight path angle in real-time to start a climb/descent
flight phase.
Altitude range [m] (minimum, maximum) defines the altitude range considered
for autopilots gains scheduling. Airspeed range [m s−1] (minimum, maximum)
defines the airspeed range considered for autopilots gains scheduling.
Finally, the Camera View tab gives the user the possibility to set the parame-
ters of the forward camera view. This is obtained with a real-time link between the
Figure 5.6: snapshot of the
flight simulator pane
Simulink R© simulation environment and the FlightGear
[155] open-source flight simulator. As can be seen in
fig. 5.6, the parameters displayed in the window are
the following. The control Enable FlightGear in-
terface switches on/off the visualisation of the cam-
era view during simulation. Use network computer
gives the possibility to the user to run FlightGear and
show the external view in real-time on a slave com-
puter on the network. Computer name is the name
of that computer and Internet Protocol (IP) ad-
dress contains its IP address. If necessary, User
name defines the user name of the computer account
used on the slave computer and Password contains
its password. FlightGear Path defines the directory
of the FlightGear software. Update frequency [Hz]
is the frequency used to update the forward camera
view. HUD enables the HUD layer in FlightGear.
Enable FlightGear recording enables the user to
record an “.avi” file of the forward camera view dur-
ing simulation. Sampling frequency specifies the
frequency used for recording.
aircraft
simulator
autonomous
resolution
execution
resolution
evaluation
resolution
data
conflict
detectiontransponder
elevation map
operator-
system
interface
user
selection
switch
autonomous
resolution
switch
operator
command
path
following
ownship
state data
Figure 5.7: block diagram of the ANS system
5.4 ANS Structure
The block diagram of the ANS is shown in fig. 5.7. The switch with the label user
selection selects the modes between the two operating modes:
manual navigation mode where the system input is the operator command;
autonomous navigation mode, where the inputs are given by the path follow-
ing;
The manual navigation mode enables the flight control mode 1, as defined in
section 2.2. In this mode, UAS operator can directly control the aircraft dynamics
using conventional controls. Moreover, operator can set in real-time altitude, airspeed
and heading angle autopilot commands, such as in the FPCS mode described in sec-
tion 5.3. This option was included to allow manual modes simulations in which it is
not necessary an operator to pilot the UAV.
In the autonomous navigation mode, that is the flight control mode 4, as
defined in section 2.2, the FPCS commands are defined by the PF system. The
operator is therefore just a supervisory controller, as this is described in section 2.3,
with the role of setting the waypoints considered by the PF algorithm for the flight
plan.
The five functions of the S&A system introduced in section 3.2 (that are envi-
ronment sensing, conflicts detection, resolution estimation, advisories communication,
autonomous resolution) are performed as follows. Regarding the environment sens-
ing, the flying threats detection is based on their aircraft transponder. The operating
principle of the simulated transponders is described in section 5.1. The detection of
collision risks with ground terrain is based on the ground obstacles detected using
the system elevation map database. This map is based on the ASTER Global Dig-
ital Elevation Model [156]. The conflict detection algorithm, which will be described
in section 6.3, evaluates the collision risks and generates the associated alerts. If
one or more potential conflicts are detected, the resolution estimation algorithm (see
sections 6.4 to 6.7) estimates the resolution manoeuvre. The GCS through which the
advisories communication is performed is then described in chapter 7. The autonomous
resolution block takes over and executes a collision avoidance manoeuvre “if” an immi-
nent conflict is detected “and” the UAV operator does not react to the advisory; hence
breaching the minimum safe time before impact, defined in section 3.2 of chapter 3.
5.5 Path Following Algorithm
The path following algorithm navigates the aircraft through a given set of predefined
waypoints. Those ones are defined in geocentric coordinates as:
~PW/P
∆
=
(
φW/P, λW/P, hW/P
)
(5.2)
where φW/P , λW/P and hW/P are latitude, longitude and altitude, respectively. The
airspeed VW/P is controlled between each of the waypoints and it is maintained to be
a constant one. If it is assumed that the ownship position is:
~PO/S(t)
∆
=
(
φO/S(t), λO/S(t), hO/S(t)
)
(5.3)
Then the waypoint can be represented in the NED reference frame which is centered
in ~PO/S(t). Therefore, the heading angle command ψd(t) and the airspeed command
Vd(t) are:
ψd(t) = arctan
~xW/P,2
~xW/P,1
(t) (5.4)
Vd(t) = VW/P (5.5)
where ~xW/P is the waypoint position in the NED reference frame centered in the
current ownship position ~PO/S(t). The altitude command hd(t) is defined as a linear
variation in the altitude during the flight between each of the waypoints. In order to
accomplish this, the vertical speed Vz(t) is maintained constant and it is estimated as:
Vz(t) =
hd(t) + xW/P,3
tW/P
(5.6)
where tW/P is the elapsed time to reach the waypoint calculated as follows:
tW/P =
∣∣~xW/P∣∣
VO/S
(5.7)
where VO/S(t) is the current ownship airspeed. Therefore, the mathematical expression
of the altitude command hd(t) is:
hd(t) =
t∫
0
Vz(t) d t (5.8)
Due to the uncertainties in the aircraft position, the aircraft might not exactly
reach the desired waypoint. Therefore the aircraft is assumed to reach the desired
waypoints if the following condition is satisfied:∣∣~xW/P ∣∣ < W/P (5.9)
where W/P is a threshold value defined based on the aircraft position accuracy. If the
above defined condition is fulfilled, then the next waypoint is considered for the next
iteration algorithm iteration.

C H A P T E R 6
Proposed S&A Algorithm
This chapter covers some considerations on the parts of the S&A algorithm presented
in previous chapter in section 5.4. Section 6.1 starts with some notes regarding the as-
sumptions used for the development of the algorithm. Section 6.2 introduces then some
preliminary definitions used in the algorithm development. The criteria used for the
conflict risks detection is described in section 6.3. The model used for the estimation of
the aircraft dynamics during the resolution manoeuvre is defined in section 6.4. In sec-
tion 6.5 this model is applied for the estimation of the horizontal resolution manoeuvre.
Section 6.6 describes then the approach used for the vertical resolution manoeuvres.
The logic used for the suggested manoeuvre selection and the autonomous resolution
execution is presented in section 6.7. Finally, section 6.8 provides a short comparison
between the proposed algorithm and previous works presented in the literature.
6.1 Assumptions
The following assumptions were used in respect with the implementation issues defined
in section 3.8. As explained in chapter 5, the system was designed to operate with
the levels of autonomy ranging from manual navigation mode to fully autonomous
navigation mode as defined in section 5.4. The algorithm was developed with a multiple
conflict management approach1 considering both airborne and ground threats. The
aircraft performance and Rules of Air are both considered in the resolution manoeuvre
evaluation (see section 3.8.2). The allowed types of manoeuvre are horizontal, i.e.
changes of the heading autopilot command; and vertical, i.e. changes of the altitude
autopilot command. The conflict avoidance is based on uncoordinated manoeuvres2.
The resolution manoeuvre is updated at 1 Hz, to take into account changes of the
conflict geometry caused by unpredictable trajectory changes of the threats.
6.2 Preliminary Definitions
The Cartesian reference frame used for the development of the algorithm is shown in
fig. 6.1 and is so defined:
origin in current ownship position
1More information can be found in section 3.8.1.
2More information can be found in section 3.8.2.
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Figure 6.1: Cartesian reference frame
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Figure 6.2: graphical representa-
tion of the spherical coordinates
used for vectors parametrisation
axes x on the direction of the projection of the ownship airspeed vector ~Vo in the
local horizontal plane,
axes y perpendicular to x on its left side and lying in the local horizontal plane,
axes z perpendicular to the xy plane and pointing upwards.
As can be seen in fig. 6.2, in this reference frame an arbitrary vector ~v can be
defined through its Cartesian components according to the relationship:
~v
∆
= (vx, vy, vz) (6.1)
but also through spherical coordinates in terms of modulus |~v|, azimuth and elevation
angles α(~v) and β(~v) defined by the following relationships:
|~v| = ∆=
√
v2x + v
2
y + v
2
z (6.2)
α(~v)
∆
= arctan
vy
vx
(6.3)
β(~v)
∆
= arctan
vz√
v2x + v
2
y
(6.4)
rp
hp
Figure 6.3: extension and geometric pa-
rameters of the position uncertainty zone
Figure 6.4: position uncertainty zone (red),
safety zone (cyan) and separation (blue) zone
Another useful parameter is the horizontal projection modulus |~v|h defined as:
|~v|h ∆=
√
v2x + v
2
y (6.5)
Assuming that the ownship position estimation comes from the GPS receiver, it
is necessary to take into account the uncertainty related with position estimation
accuracy of both ownship and threats. This leads to the definition of a PUZ as the
locus in which the true aircraft position lies. According to the conventional format
used to express the accuracy of the GPS position estimation, a cylindrical region is
considered. It is centered on the aircraft position with a radius of rp and a half-
height of hp, respectively, equal to the horizontal and the vertical position estimation
accuracy, as shown in fig. 6.3.
In addition to this, a cylindrical SZ region is defined a cylindrical zone with di-
mensions given by the PUZ dimensions increased by a safety factor in order to take
into account the approximations introduced in the resolution manoeuvre estimation.
Similarly, it is defined by ATC as the separation zone the cylindrical region centered
on the current position of the aircraft, the horizontal and vertical extension of which
are set by the regulation or ATC according to the class of the airspace and operational
conditions [17]. All other aircraft have to stay outside the separation zone in order to
avoid any collision risks. As sketched in fig. 6.4, for safety reasons the safety zone has
to be wider than the position uncertainty zone and smaller than the separation zone.
The CDZ and CAZ dimensions that were defined previously in section 3.7 were
set to a fixed value. This value was fixed in order to get conservative results for the
scenarios considered. It takes therefore into account the dynamics of ownship and
threats aircraft considered. In this work, the CAZ was identified with the separation
zone.
6.3 Conflicts Detection
According to the aforementioned definition in section 6.2, the ownship remains in the
origin of the reference frame for the whole duration of the mission. Based on the
straight projection hypothesis, introduced in section 3.8.1, all aircraft in the close
proximity airspace moves in a straight line. This line passes through the current
position of the threat and is parallel to its relative airspeed ~Vr, defined as the sum
of the ownship’s airspeed vector ~Vo and the threat’s airspeed vector ~Vi, as shown in
fig. 6.5 and given by the following relationship:
~Vr
∆
= ~Vo + ~Vi (6.6)
If the threat trajectory intersects the position uncertainty zone, a collision risk is
therefore being detected.
When a collision risk is detected, a resolution manoeuvre has to be generated in
order to keep the threats outside the safety zone during the overall manoeuvre. More-
over, the control input variation has to be minimized so that to reduce the deviation
distance between the resolution manoeuvre and the aircraft original trajectory.
6.4 General Approach for Estimating the Resolu-
tion Manoeuvre
A safe resolution manoeuvre always guarantees that, during the overall manoeuvre,
the threat is kept outside the safety zone. In order to accomplish this, it is necessary
to estimate the threat’s trajectory ~Pi,r(t) in the reference frame as:
~Pi,r(t) = ~Pi(t)− ~Po(t) (6.7)
where ~Pi(t) and ~Po(t) are threat’s and ownship’s positions, respectively. Their general
expression can be defined as:
~P (t)
∆
= ~P (0) +
t∫
0
~V (τ) d τ (6.8)
where ~P (0) is the initial position and ~V (t) is the speed of the aircraft in a fixed
reference frame.
In the moving reference frame considered, it can be imposed:
~Pi,r(0)
∆
= ~Pi(0)− ~Po(0) (6.9)
(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 6.5: conflict detection approach: (a)three dimensional space, (b)horizontal plane
and (c)vertical plane. The aircraft outside the position uncertainty cylinder is the threat
(red colour) approaching from the left and the one inside is the ownship.
According to the hypothesis of straight projection, the threat’s airspeed is assumed to
be constant:
~Vi(t) = ~Vi = const (6.10)
Therefore eq. (6.7) can be re-written as:
~Pi,r(t) = ~Pi,r(0) + ~Vit−
t∫
0
~Vo(τ) d τ (6.11)
and for the ownship:
~Vo(t) = Vo(t)
 cosψo(t) cos γo(t)sinψo(t) cos γo(t)
sin γ0(t)
 (6.12)
where Vo(t), ψo(t), γo(t) are the ownship airspeed, heading angle and flight path angle,
respectively.
If the ownship is assumed to be equipped and controlled with FPCS, the inter-
actions between the longitudinal and lateral-directional dynamics during manoeuvres
are negligible, and aircraft’s airspeed Vo(t) is not significantly affected by manoeuvres.
This implies that it is possible to define the resolution manoeuvre in which we assume
that the aircrafts airspeed Vo(t) is constant:
Vo(t) ∼= Vo = const ∀t (6.13)
6.5 Horizontal Resolution Estimation
Moreover, a simple turn in the horizontal plane will not cause a significant change in
the flight path angle γo(t), that entail:
γo(t) ∼= 0 ∀t (6.14)
Therefore eqs. (6.11) and (6.12) can be rewritten as:
~Vo(t) = Vo
 cosψo(t)sinψo(t)
0
 (6.15)
~Pi,r(t) = ~Pi,r(0) + ~Vit− Vo
t∫
0
 cosψo(τ)sinψo(τ)
0
 d τ (6.16)
This implies that the change in the heading angle ψo(t) will significantly affect the
threat trajectory, ~Pi,r(t). Therefore the heading angle profile ψo(t) needs to be esti-
mated in order to obtain the threat’s trajectory.
Furthermore, a safe resolution manoeuvre has to be defined in order to keep all the
detected threats outside the safety zone during the overall manoeuvre. To test if this
condition is verified, it is necessary to estimate the threats trajectories. In particular,
during a simple turn in the horizontal plane performed by the ownship, the trajectory
~Pr,i(t) of the i-th threat can be expressed with the following relationship [157]:
~Pr,i(t) = R (−ψo(t))
~Pr,i(0) + ~Vit− Vo t∫
0
 cosψo(τ)sinψo(τ)
0
 d τ
 (6.17)
where:
• the rotation matrix R(−ψo(t)) takes into account the reference frame rotation
caused by the heading attitude ψo(t) changes of the ownship,
• ~Pr,i(0) is the initial threat position in the reference frame considered,
• ~Vi is the threat speed in a fixed reference frame, that is obviously ‘zero’ if the
threat is a point of the contour of a ground obstacle,
• Vo is the ownship airspeed.
Therefore, the threat trajectory ~Pr,i(t) is a function of the dynamics of the heading
angle ψo(t).
Among the different heading command profiles, the step command is the more
demanding for aircraft’s control systems. Such a command profile, makes it easier to
display the resolution manoeuvre to the operator, since the only information that needs
to be communicated is the heading angle variation. Therefore, if it is used a procedure
such as that defined in section 6.5.2, a conservative estimation of the related heading
angle profile ψo(t) can be obtained from the first order dynamics ψ¯o(t) expressed by
the following relationship (see fig. 6.6):
ψ¯o(t) =
{
ψo(0) if 0 < t < t0
ψo(0) + ∆ψo
(
1− e− t−t0τ
)
if t > t0
(6.18)
where ∆ψ is the chosen heading angle command and t0 and τ are the fitting param-
eters.
6.5.1 Conditions for a Conservative Trajectory Estimation
A conservative estimation of these fitting parameters for head-on encounters is ob-
tained if the following condition is satisfied for the rise phase of the heading angle
profile:
|ψo(t)− ψo(0)| ≥
∣∣ψ¯o(t)− ψo(0)∣∣ ∀t > 0 (6.19)
As can be seen in fig. 6.7, an avoidance manoeuvre in the horizontal plane will leads
to one or both of the following effects:
Figure 6.6: parametrisation of the aircraft heading an-
gle response to a step variation of the heading angle
autopilot command
Figure 6.7: parameters consid-
ered for the resolution manoeuvre
optimisation
1. the smallest distance ∆dt,i(t) between the ownship position and the threat tra-
jectory increases to a value greater than the radius of the collision risk zone
rp;
2. the direction of motion ∆ψf,i(t) of the threat changes from its initial value to
avoid an intersection with the collision risk zone.
Let us consider a reference frame moving with the ownship where its position
coincides with the frame origin. It can be assumed moreover that the axes have a
fixed orientation in which the x-axis points to the direction of the initial heading
of the ownship. In this reference frame the equation of threat’s motion becomes,
according to (6.17):
~Pf,i(t) = ~Pr,i(0) + ~Vit− Vo
t∫
0
 cosψo(τ)sinψo(τ)
0
 d τ (6.20)
from which the following expression of the threat heading ψf,i(t) is derived:
ψf,i(t)
∆
= arctan
∂Vf,i,y
∂Vf,i,x
(t) (6.21)
where ~Vf,i is the threat speed expressed in the reference frame moving with the ownship
and non-rotating in the horizontal plane defined by the classical relationship:
~Vf,i(t)
∆
=
d ~Pf,i
d t
(t) = ~Vi − Vo
 cosψo(t)sinψo(t)
0
 (6.22)
Therefore (6.21) becomes:
ψf,i(t) = arctan
Vi,y − Vo sinψo(t)
Vi,x − Vo cosψo(t) (6.23)
Considering that for the angles α and β:
arctanα− arctan β = arctan α− β
1 + αβ
(6.24)
and imposing ψo(0)
∆
= 0 and ψo(t)
∆
= ∆ψ, ∆ψf,i can be expressed as:
∆ψf,i
∆
= |ψf,i(t)− ψf,i(0)| =
=
∣∣∣∣arctan Vi,y − Vo sin ∆ψVi,x − Vo cos ∆ψ − arctan Vi,yVi,x − Vo
∣∣∣∣ =
=
∣∣∣∣∣arctan
Vi,y−Vo sin ∆ψ
Vi,x−Vo cos ∆ψ −
Vi,y
Vi,x−Vo
1 +
Vi,y−Vo sin ∆ψ
Vi,x−Vo cos ∆ψ
Vi,y
Vi,x−Vo
∣∣∣∣∣ =
=
∣∣∣∣arctan VoVi,y (cos ∆ψ − 1)− VoVi,x sin ∆ψ + V 2o sin ∆ψ(V 2i,x + V 2i,y)− VoVi,x(cos ∆ψ + 1)− VoVi,y sin ∆ψ + V 2o cos ∆ψ
∣∣∣∣
(6.25)
in which, considering a small time step of the manoeuvre, ∆ψ is small and ∆ψf,i can
be therefore approximated as:
∆ψf,i ∼=
∣∣∣∣arctan( −VoVi,x + V 2o(V 2i,x + V 2i,y)− 2VoVi,x − VoVi,y∆ψ + V 2o ∆ψ
)∣∣∣∣ (6.26)
Therefore ∆ψf,i increases with the value of ∆ψ. This implies that the estimated change
in the motion direction in the reference frame considered is an increasing function of
∆ψ. On the other hand, a greater change in motion direction generally produces a
bigger distance from the collision route. Therefore a smaller and consequently conser-
vative estimation of the parameter ∆ψf,i is obtained with a smaller value of ∆ψ.
Regarding distance ∆dt(t) and according to fig. 6.7, a raw approximation can be
obtained from the following formula, if ∆ψ is small enough:
∆dt,i(t) ∼= sin ∆ψf,i
∣∣∣~Pf,i(t)− ~Pr,i(0)∣∣∣
h
(6.27)
where the expression |~v|h indicate the projection on the horizontal plane of the vector
~v.
From (6.27), based on (6.20), the following formula is obtained:
∆dt,i(t) ∼= sin ∆ψf,i
∣∣∣∣∣∣~Vit− Vo
t∫
0
 cosψo(τ)sinψo(τ)
0
 d τ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
h
=
= sin ∆ψf,i
∣∣∣∣∣∣
 ~Vi,xt− Vo
∫ t
0
cosψo(τ) d τ
~Vi,yt− Vo
∫ t
0
sinψo(τ) d τ
~Vi,zt
∣∣∣∣∣∣
h
=
= sin ∆ψt(t)
√
(~Vi,xt− Vo[sinψo(τ)]t0)2 + (~Vi,yt− Vo[− cosψo(τ)]t0)2 =
= sin ∆ψt(t)
√
(~Vi,xt− Vo sin ∆ψ)2 + (~Vi,yt− Vo(1− cos ∆ψ))2
(6.28)
Considering the results previously obtained for ∆ψt(t), it can be seen that ∆dt(t)
increases with ∆ψ. Therefore, since the heading manoeuvre change ∆ψ is underesti-
mated in respect with the real value, a more conservative estimation is obtained, being
the smaller estimated distance ∆dt(t).
6.5.2 Heading Angle Profile Fitting
It is well known from calculus that the exponential function and all its derivatives
(first, second and superior degrees derivatives) are monotonically increasing functions.
Therefore the maximum value of d ψ¯o
d t
is obtained for t = t0, while the maximum
max
(
dψo
d t
)
is obtained for a value of t lying inside the rise phase of ψo(t) (see fig. 6.6).
Therefore, indicating with tmax the value of t for which:
dψo
d t
(tmax) = max
(
dψo
d t
)
(6.29)
A conservative estimation of ψo for the rise phase is obtained if:{
ψo(tmax) = ψ¯o(tmax)
dψo
d t
(tmax) =
d ψ¯o
d t
(tmax)
(6.30)
In fact, during the rise phase, for t < tmax it holds:
dψo
d t
(t) <
d ψ¯o
d t
(t) (6.31)
and for ∆t > 0:
ψo(tmax)− dψo
d t
(t)∆t > ψ¯o(tmax)− d ψ¯o
d t
(t)∆t (6.32)
Considering now that for small ∆t holds:
ψo(t+ ∆t) ∼= ψo(t) + dψo
d t
(t)∆t (6.33)
that imply:
ψo(t) ∼= ψo(t+ ∆t)− dψo
d t
(t)∆t (6.34)
So (6.32) becomes:
ψo(t) > ψ¯o(t) (6.35)
Similarly for t > tmax:
dψo
d t
(t) >
d ψ¯o
d t
(t) (6.36)
that imply:
ψo(tmax) +
dψo
d t
(t)∆t > ψ¯o(tmax) +
d ψ¯o
d t
(t)∆t (6.37)
If ∆t is substituted with −∆t in (6.34) it is obtained:
ψo(t) ∼= ψo(t−∆t) + dψo
d t
(t)∆t (6.38)
that implies therefore (6.37) to become:
ψo(t) > ψ¯o(t) (6.39)
From the mathematical point of view the two conditions expressed in (6.30) produce
the following set of equations:{
ψo(tmax) = ψo(0) + ∆ψo
(
1− e tmax−t0τ
)
dψo
d t
(tmax) = ∆ψo e
− tmax−t0
τ
(6.40)
from which it is obtained: τ =
ψo(0)−ψ¯o(tmax)+∆ψo
d ψ¯o
d t
(tmax)
t0 = τ log
(
1
∆ψo
d ψ¯o
d t
(tmax)
)
+ tmax
(6.41)
Therefore it is possible to get an estimation of t0 and τ as a function of ∆ψo by solving
the set of equations (6.41) for a discrete set of heading changes ∆ψo. The values of t0
and τ obtained with this approach depend on the trim condition considered and are
therefore function of altitude ho and airspeed Vo.
It is therefore possible to estimate the heading angle dynamics ψo(t) by running
the simulator described in [157] with a step heading angle command with intensity
∆ψo. The evolution with thime of the variable ψo(t) obtained from the simulation
can be then used to estimate the values of the parameters t0 and τ can be obtained
according to the previous formula. If this operation is then repeated for a discrete set
of heading angle command values ∆ψo, it is possible to obtain the related set of values
t0 and τ as shown in fig. 6.8. From these sets, the following conservative polynomial
approximations of t0 and τ can be defined:
τ = 0.0327∆ψ2o − 0.0018∆ψo + 1.3789 (6.42)
t0 = −0.0002∆ψ9o + 0.0009∆ψ8o + 0.0039∆ψ7o − 0.0125∆ψ6o − 0.0290∆ψ5o+
+ 0.0549∆ψ4o + 0.0928∆ψ
3
o − 0.0710∆ψ2o − 0.1110∆ψo + 7.5833
(6.43)
6.5.3 Horizontal Manoeuvre Optimisation
When a conflict risk is detected, an avoidance manoeuvre should be executed. This
could be achieved in the horizontal plane by applying a step change ∆ψo to the heading
angle autopilot command. As can be seen in fig. 6.9, the resulting heading angle
response ψo(t) is characterised by a settling phase followed by a steady state condition.
(a) (b)
Figure 6.8: estimation of the heading angle response parameters for a discrete grid of
heading angle commands ∆ψo and comparison with the linear segments approximation in
cruise condition at an altitude of 80 m and an airspeed of 15 m s−1: (a) τ , (b) t0
This includes the time range elapsed before the settling time ts that is identified in the
figure.
During the settling phase it is difficult to estimate the true ownship’s heading
angle ψo(t) and the trajectory of the i-th threat ~Pr,i(t) in the real flight. This is due to
the interaction effects between longitudinal and lateral-directional dynamics and the
environmental disturbances such as turbulence and gusts. However, a conservative
estimation of the i-th threat’s trajectory ~Pr,i(ts) can be obtained from (6.17).
During the steady state phase, the threat’s trajectory is approximately a straight
line passing through the point ~Pr,i(ts) of the trajectory. Hence, during this phase, the
smallest distance di between the i-th threat and the ownship can be estimated with
the following relationship derived from vectorial geometry considerations:
dt,i =
∣∣∣∣∣∣~Pr,i(ts)×
~Vr,i(ts)∣∣∣~Vr,i(ts)∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (6.44)
where ~Vr,i(t) is the threat speed expressed in the reference frame moving with the
ownship defined with the usual relationship as follow:
~Vr,i(t) =
d ~Pr,i
d t
(t) (6.45)
Therefore the cost function ∆d to optimise the resolution manoeuvre can be defined
by the following formula:
∆d =

∑Nt
i=1 (dt,i − rs − ru) if ∀i|i ∈ {1, 2, ..., Nt}
dt,i ≥ rs + ru ∧ ~Pt,i(ts) · ~Vt,i(ts) ≤ 0
5
∣∣∣∑Nti=1 (dt,i − rs − ru)∣∣∣ if ∃i|i ∈ {1, 2, ..., Nt}
dt,i ≥ rs + ru ∨ ~Pt,i(ts) · ~Vt,i(ts) > 0
(6.46)
Figure 6.9: resolution manouevre phases and uncer-
tainties related with its estimation: the gray strip is
the uncertainties of the threat trajectory estimation
in the ownship reference frame, the circle with the
label PUZ is the position uncertainty zone and the
locus SZ is the safety zone
Figure 6.10: graphical representa-
tion of the safe resolution heading
range ∆Ψres and the trajectory pro-
duced by the two extremes of the
range defined.
where the vectorial condition ~Pt,i(ts) · ~Vt,i(ts) ≤ 0 is imposed to avoid solutions in
which the steady state phase is reached after the ownship enters the SZ. The above
optimisation problem can be solved using the fmincon function of the Optimization
Toolbox of Matlab R©. The solution of the problem defines in the range [−pi, pi] a set
∆Ψres, (see example in fig. 6.10) of the heading angle commands ∆ψres that includes
the heading angle command changes suitable to avoid all the conflicts. This range
includes all the values of ∆ψres for which the first condition of the system (6.46) holds,
that is, in the case of head-on encounters, the range not including the value ∆ψres = 0.
It is worth mentioning that this optimisation problem could be characterised by
two, one or none solution in the range [−pi, pi] for a multiple head-on encounters sce-
nario. In the first case the algorithm used for the resolution manoeuvre selection,
described in section 6.7, selects the option with the lowest absolute value for the pro-
posed horizontal resolution manoeuvre. In the second case the only available solution
is the proposed horizontal resolution manoeuvre. In the third one the range ∆ψres is
empty and the algorithm does not consider any possible horizontal resolution. In this
case the algorithm considers only the vertical manoeuvres according to the procedure
defined in the next section.
Figure 6.11: approach used for the vertical resolu-
tion evaluation: the red aircraft on the right-hand
side is considered as the threat and the gray one to
the left is the ownship
Figure 6.12: estimation of the tc val-
ues for a discrete grid of ∆h value
and comparison with the approxima-
tion (vertical view)
6.6 Vertical Resolution Manoeuvre Definition
As fig. 6.11 shows, a safe resolution manoeuvre in the vertical plane can be produced
by a suitable altitude change ∆hres. This should place the ownship in a final condition
in which the vertical distance from threats is equal or greater than the half-height hs
of the safety zone. Therefore the range ∆Hres of the altitude changes suitable for a
safe resolution manoeuvre is:
∆Hres = [−∞, ho(t)− (min(Hi(t)) + hs)]∪
∪ [ho(t) + (max(Hi(t)) + hs),+∞]
(6.47)
where Hi(t) is defined as the set of the current altitude values hi(t) of the detected
threats or:
Hi(t) = {hi(t)|i = 1, . . . , n} (6.48)
For each of the two finite extremes obtained, the safety of the related resolution
manoeuvre has to be evaluated. It can be accomplished by verifying that the horizontal
distance necessary for the aircraft to reach the new commanded altitude is low enough
to avoid all the threats of entering the ownship safety zone. In order to verify if this
condition is true, it is necessary to estimate the rise time tc, which is the time taken by
the aircraft to move from the current altitude to the new commanded altitude. The
rise time can be estimated from the response of the aircraft based on a discrete set
of altitude variations ∆h, which starts from the same initial cruise condition. These
values can be used to get a linear segment regression as given in the equation below
and shown in fig. 6.12:
tc =
{
0.16∆hres ∆hres ≥ 0
−0.14∆hres ∆hres < 0 (6.49)
Once tc is estimated, the horizontal distance dh,i between the ownship and the i-th
threat after which the ownship reached the new altitude can be calculated as:
dh,i =
∣∣∣~Pr,i(0)∣∣∣
h
−
∣∣∣~Vr,i(0)∣∣∣
h
cos
(
α
(
~Vr,i(0)
)
− α
(
~Pr,i(0)
))
tc (6.50)
where ~Vr,i(0) is:
~Vr,i(0) = ~Vi(0) +
 Vo0
0
 (6.51)
and, for an arbitrary vector ~v, the azimuth angle α(~v) is defined by the following
relationship:
α(~v)
∆
= arctan
vy
vx
(6.52)
Therefore the vertical manoeuvre is safe if the following condition holds:
dh,i ≥ rs + ru ∀i|i ∈ {1, 2, ..., Nt} (6.53)
If this condition is not valid for one of the two ranges considered in (6.47), the related
range needs to be removed from the set ∆Hres. Similarly to the horizontal case, the
selected solution used for the resolution manoeuvre is still the option with the lowest
absolute value among the range boundaries with a finite value.
6.7 Manoeuvre Selection and Autonomous Resolu-
tion
The two ranges ∆Ψres and ∆Hres produced respectively for the horizontal and verti-
cal manoeuvres, as described in sections 6.5.3 and 6.6, could be easily displayed on
GCS HMI interface. Moreover, it gives the UAV operator a wide range of selectable
resolution options. This in turn allows more freedom with regards to the resolution
manoeuvre planning and execution.
Among the resulting horizontal and the vertical resolution manoeuvres, the first
one is preferred when the required variation in heading angle change is less than a
certain threshold (in our case 60◦). When this condition is not verified or when the
algorithm does not provide an empty set ∆Ψres of feasible horizontal manoeuvres, then
the vertical manoeuvre is selected.
In manual navigation mode, as the two feasible solutions defined in sections 6.5.3
and 6.6 decrease to one, then the resolution manoeuvre is autonomously performed. In
autonomous navigation mode, an optimal navigation is obtained where the resolution
manoeuvre is initiated as soon as the collision risk is detected. In both modes, the
resolution manoeuvre is concluded when the threat passes the current ownship position
and is outside of the safety zone.
6.8 Comparison of the algorithm with previous ap-
proaches
Section 3.8 covered the main design factors considered in previous research on S&A
system by other researchers. The algorithm described in this chapter is characterised
by many novelties and advantages regarding these factors when compared with other
proposed solutions.
First of all, the approach used for the future threats state projection, described in
section 3.8.1, is one of the main aspects. More precisely, despite the algorithm is based
on the straight projection hypothesis, this approach offers more refined predictions than
this hypothesis. It is based, in fact, on a frequent update of the information on the
motion state of detected threats. The prediction keeps itself therefore very close to
the real evolution of the threat’s state, cause of the reduced time span of prediction.
Moreover, despite this reduced error in the prediction, this solution avoids the higher
computational requirements on which more refined approaches are based, such as worst
case projection and probabilistic methods.
These results are furthermore obtained avoiding the complexity in terms of com-
munication hardware necessary for solutions such as path plan sharing. The path plan
sharing requires different aircraft in the workspace to communicate detailed informa-
tion about their current motion state. This implies that path plan sharing is able to
avoid conflicts only between aircraft equipped with cooperative sensors, as defined in
section 3.8.1. Differently, the approach described in this chapter could be based on
the horizontal and vertical speed, and heading information derived by simpler non-
cooperative sensors (see section 3.8.1).
The proposed algorithm is advantageous also regarding the definition of the avoid-
ance manoeuvre. Firstly, the computational requirement of such an approach is for
sure lower in respect with optimised escape trajectory approaches, e-field methods and
hybrid S&A systems (see section 3.8.2). From the point of view of sensors configura-
tion requirements, this solution does not require the detailed exchange of information
about flight plan that characterises protocol based decentralised collision avoidance.
The advantage in terms of sensors requirements are clear also in respect with prede-
fined collision avoidance and optimised escape trajectory approaches. This is supported
by the following example, which assumes to use the same radar model to detect the
ground obstacles for the algorithm here proposed and these two approaches. For clarity,
the solutions based on predefined collision avoidance and optimised escape trajectory
are indicated in this paragraph with the acronyms PCA and OETA, respectively. In
this case, it can be considered the evolution of the encounter geometry sketched in the
sequence of figures displayed in fig. 6.13. In this scenario, despite the detected impact
risk with the terrain, it is supposed that the UAV keeps moving on a straight trajectory
controlled by the autopilots. The angle α displayed in the figures is the minimum track
angle change required to avoid the conflict risk. It can be evaluated as a function of the
(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 6.13: evolution of suggested avoidance
manoeuvre in a scenario including a terrain im-
pact: (a)t = t1, (b)t = t2 and (c)t = t3.
profile of the ground obstacles detected
and the UAV dynamics. The profile of
the ground obstacle detected is that in-
cluded inside the circle representing the
UAV radar range. Generally speaking,
α increases when the UAV gets closer to
the ground obstacle.
In this scenario, for t = t1
(fig. 6.13(a)), all the algorithms are
equivalent if they are designed in order
to suggest a track angle change equal
to α1. For t = t2 (fig. 6.13(b)), where
α2 > α1,it would be necessary for PCA
to impose a track angle variation equal
to α2 both for t = t1 and t = t2. This
implies to consider a sub-optimal result
for PCA for t = t1, due to the higher de-
viation from the original trajectory. Re-
garding OETA, the change in track an-
gle variation is captured only if this al-
gorithm is sufficiently quick.
On the other hand, optimised es-
cape trajectory approaches are generally
characterised by high computation times
necessary for the optimisation problem
solution. Therefore there is the risk for
OETA to be an unreliable solution in
this scenario. Considering finally t = t3
(fig. 6.13(c)), it is clear the advantage
of designing the algorithm in order to
allow switching between horizontal and
vertical avoidance manoeuvres, as that
described in section 6.7. This ability
is particularly useful, e.g., when sug-
gested track angle variation α3 is supe-
rior to a threshold indicating the maxi-
mum allowed horizontal deviation from
planned track. In this case, the option
to switch to a vertical manoeuvre could
be of paramount importance in reducing
the deviation of the avoidance manoeu-
vre from the planned route. The imple-
mentation of this option makes the PCA
structure more complex. Similarly it can
be implemented on a OETA algorithm, but at the cost of a significant algorithm’s com-
plexity increase.
6.9 Chapter Summary
This chapter describes the S&A algorithm developed in this project. It is designed
to operate with the levels of autonomy ranging from manual navigation mode to fully
autonomous navigation mode. It is based on a multiple conflict management approach
considering both airborne and ground threats. The UAV flight performances and
Rules of Air are both considered in the resolution manoeuvre evaluation. Regarding
the moving threats, the algorithm uses the hypothesis of a threat moving on a straight
trajectory to get a quick evaluation of the advisories about the suggested resolution
manoeuvre. The value of these commands are optimised in order to get respectively
a sufficient horizontal and vertical separation between the ownship and all the threats
detected during the overall manoeuvre. In the definition of the suggested resolution
manoeuvre, the horizontal manoeuvres are preferred to the vertical ones when the
required heading variation is inferior to a predefined threshold of 60◦. The evalu-
ated conflict geometry and the related resolution manoeuvre are updated at 1 Hz, to
take into account changes of the conflict geometry caused by unpredictable trajectory
changes of the threats.
As explained in the previous section, the frequent update of the evaluated conflict
geometry allows to get a prediction very close to the real evolution, cause of the re-
duced time span of prediction. Moreover, the algorithm is characterised by a lower
computational requirements in respect with more refined approaches, such as worst
case projection and probabilistic methods. The algorithm avoids moreover the com-
plexity in terms of communication hardware necessary for solutions such as path plan
sharing and protocol based decentralised collision avoidance. More precisely, the solu-
tion can be based in fact on non-cooperative sensors instead of the cooperative sensors
necessary for path plan sharing. Regarding the definition of the avoidance manoeuvre,
the computational requirement of such an approach is finally lower in respect with
optimised escape trajectory approaches, e-field methods and hybrid S&A systems.
C H A P T E R 7
GCS Mock-Up
This chapter describes the GCS mock-up implemented to test the algorithm perfor-
mances and study the integration of S&A systems functions in the GCS. This mock-up
was moreover used in simulations and pilots interviews to test the effectiveness of the
proposed solutions. This set of information display and the related input devices were
chosen to support the pilot in the flight management task defined in section 2.4. The
pilot’s interactions with the parts related with other tasks (communications, systems
and tasks management) are not relevant for the simulation scenarios chosen for this
preliminary validation of the concept.
The configuration selected for the HMI is defined in section 7.1. The information
display configuration is then illustrated in section 7.2. Section 7.3 includes some notes
on the implementation from the point of view of hardware employed. Section 7.4
continues with the description of the solution used for the S&A system advisories
integration in the GCS. The ND is illustrated in section 7.5. The layout of the PFD
integrating the S&A advisories is given in section 7.6. The chapter concludes then with
a quick illustration of the simulation controller, described in section 7.7, implemented
to allow the supervisor to control the simulations during the pilots test.
7.1 Control Interface
The mock-up used for pilots tests is displayed in fig. 7.1. As already stated in sec-
tion 5.4, the ANS system is designed in order to allow operations in both manual
navigation mode and autonomous navigation mode. For this reason, it was necessary
to include in the mock-up a mixed solution integrating both a direct and a supervisor
control interface. The direct control interface (as previously described in section 2.5)
is based on joystick and throttle controllers for UAV real-time direct control by the
pilot. The supervisory controller interface (see section 2.3) is based on the integration
of some soft controls (see section 2.8.1). The aim of these controls is to provide the
operator override function prescribed in section 2.2 and S&A autonomous resolution
function switching.
The joystick used is the Microsoft Sidewinder Joystick identified by label 3 in
fig. 7.1. It provides conventional aircraft ailerons and elevator controls and also trim
controls. The trim controls are programmed on the joystick buttons highlighted in
fig. 7.2 according to the following convention, defined in order to be as close as possible
to the manned aviation standard and pilot preferences:
Figure 7.1: GCS mock-up used for pilots tests which in-
cludes the following elements: a)forward camera view dis-
play, b)ND, c)PFD, d)simulation controller display, 2)throt-
tle, 3)joystick, 4)mouse.
Figure 7.2: identification of
the buttons functions on the
Microsoft Sidewinder Joystick :
a)elevator trim-up control,
b)elevator trim-down control,
c)rudder trim-right control,
d)rudder trim-left control
a) elevator trim-up control
b) elevator trim-down control
c) rudder trim-right control
d) rudder trim-left control
The Thrustmaster R© HOTAS WarthogTM, identified by label 2 in fig. 7.1, is used to
provide the throttle input. All displays used are not touch-screen and therefore the soft
controls are controlled by mouse-clicks. The mouse, identified by 4, is the Microsoft
Intellimouse Optical 1.1 model in fig. 7.2.
7.2 Information Display Configuration
As will further be explained in next sections of this chapter, the information display set
was designed in order to provide the operator an adequate level of situation awareness
for real-time control of the UAV, when it is operating in the manual navigation mode.
Moreover, the requirements on display layout optimisation described in sections 4.2
and 4.3 were taken into account. As shown in fig. 7.1 three displays were used and
their function is described in the following list:
a. Forward Camera View (fig. 7.3) provides the UAV operator a real-time
glance of the external environment and includes an HUD layer for supporting
the operator and increasing his/her situation awareness with regards to flight
condition and conflict avoidance manoeuvres;
Figure 7.3: snapshot of the forward camera
view
Figure 7.4: snapshot of the forward camera
view while a CLIMB advisory is issued
b. Navigation Display supports the operator in the accomplishment of the
tactical navigation task of the UAV mission (see section 7.5);
c. Primary Flight Display gives the operator real-time information about cur-
rent flight conditions, detected conflict risks and related computed avoidance
manoeuvre: it moreover includes an innovative autopilots control interface
(further details can be found in section 7.6);
d. Simulation Controller to allow the operator to start/stop and set the sim-
ulation parameters during simulations (more details in section 7.7).
The camera view was simulated by running a FlightGear session linked with the
Simulink R© environment during simulation. The HUD includes two information layers.
The first one has a conventional layout such as that described in section 4.9 providing
the information about the current flight conditions. An additional layer, of which is
given an example in fig. 7.4, replicates as textual message the resolution advisories of
the S&A system.
7.3 Hardware Structure
This section describes the GCS mock-up general structure. The flowchart is displayed
in fig. 7.5 and will be shortly described here. As can be seen in the chart, the architec-
ture includes a set of controllers, including the joystick, the throttle and the mouse,
connected to the master computer. This is a HP Pavillion dv6 Notebook PC, running
the Simulink R© simulation environment and elaborating the inputs for the GCS model
implemented in Matlab R©. The master computer controls the FlightGear session run-
ning on the slave computer, and displays the enhanced PFD and the navigation map.
Finally, the slave computer, a RM DESKTOP 310, displays the FlightGear session on
the related screen.
It was necessary to use two computers because of the high computational load.
More precisely, it was decided to run on the desktop computer the session of Flight-
Gear due to its higher computational load requirements. The laptop run the Mat-
lab/Simulink R© simulation environment and the GCS displays.
master computer
simulation (Simulink R©)
PFD and ND (Matlab R©)
slave computer
forward view (FlightGear)
joystick throttle mouse
PFD ND
forward view
and HUD
Figure 7.5: GCS mock-up flowchart
7.4 S&A System Integration
Regarding the integration of the S&A system interface, the solution used was based
on an enhanced CDTI layout (described in section 7.6) and the replication of the RA
on the HUD, a mixed implementation of options presented in [106] and recalled in
section 4.5. It was chosen to avoid SVS and 3D display solutions for the following
reasons: first, a planar display like CDTI provide the operator in just one display a
depiction of conflict risks detected in all the 3D airspace. It provides the possibility
to integrate the information about altitude with labels, such as those described in
section 4.6. On the other hand, 3D displays provide just the vision of a part the
space close to the forward view direction. Moreover, the planar displays avoid spatial
judgements ambiguities (see section 4.8, usually related with 3D displays, leading to
wrong judgements both in terms of bearing and distance. This kind of errors can
be critical in collision avoidance. For this reason, it was decided to employ a display
inspired by commercial aviation CDTI layout to take advantage of the easier and more
precise position judgments than 3D displays. Finally, this implementation offered the
advantage of a mature alerting logic and symbology inspired by TCAS (as detailed in
section 3.7), together with the advantages of HUDs .
The mock-up included also the communication by aural messages of the S&A
system advisories. The alerts syntax is defined in Table 7.1. When an intruder enters
the CDZ, if a collision risk is detected a RA is directly issued with the calculated
resolution manoeuvre. Otherwise, if no conflict risk is detected, the TA defined as in
Table 7.1 is issued. The clear of conflict advisory is issued as soon as all the current
conflict risks are resolved.
7.5 Navigation Display
The ND is shown in fig. 7.6. This component of the GCS information display is
meant to support the operator situation awareness and management of the mission
Aural Advisory Condition
turn right/left this message, imposing a right/left turn
manoeuvre, is issued whenever an hori-
zontal resolution advisory is defined by
the system
climb/descent this message is related with the
climb/descent advisories produced
by the S&A system
autonomous resolution in progress this message is produced when the S&A
system start an autonomous resolution
execution
clear of conflict this is the advisory informing the pilot
that all the conflict risks previously de-
tetected were resolved
terrain this advisory is produced in case the air-
craft is too close to terrain according to
the ground separation requirements set on
the system
traffic this advisory is the only TA produced
when one or more aircraft violate the own-
ship separation zone
Table 7.1: aural advisories scheme
tasks defined in section 4.1 and includes navigation (flight plan execution) and mission
objectives (targets). In the center a navigation map is displayed designed in order to
be a tactical navigation map on which the S&A system advisories are not displayed
to avoid confusion.
It includes different layers of information controlled by related buttons on the right.
More precisely, TOPOGRAPHY is the button related with the topography layer visu-
alisation/hiding. The data of this layer are taken from the dataset OS VectorMapTM
District [158]. The ELEVATION button is used to switch on/off the elevation layer of
the map derived from ASTER Global Digital Elevation Model [156]. NAVIGATION is
finally a layer that was included just for future developments and that should include
the typical cues useful for navigation planning (e.g. radio beacons, airports, targets).
The three buttons on the left are for the control of the view modality of the
map. The button labelled CENTER MAP is related with static map modality of
the map and centers the map on the current aircraft position. The TRUE MOTION
switch controls the moving map mode in which the map moves according to aircraft’s
horizontal motion in order to keep it in its center. On the other hand, STATIC CHART
enables the static map mode where the map does not move together with the ownship.
This mode is meant to be used for strategic replanning during the flight.
Figure 7.6: navigation display
Figure 7.7: navigation map layout:
1)view controller, 2)ownship, 3) ref-
erence circles
As can be seen in the figures all the buttons
described in this section except CENTER MAP
does not perform only the function to allow the
operator to select the related mode. In fact, they
also communicate to the operator their state by
changing their color according to the operating
state of mode (blue for “on”, black for “off”).
This approach aims to maximise the number of
functions performed by every GUI control in or-
der to reduce the number of components on the
display. This design philosophy was chosen in or-
der to avoid the operator to spread its attention in
a crowd of controls on the display and to minimise
related workload.
7.5.1 Navigation Map
Figure 7.7 identify the components of the navigation map layout. The number 1 is
the controller displayed in fig. 7.8. It allows the operator to perform the following
functions:
1. when the mouse moves on the external circular sector, a “zoom-out” action is
performed on the map;
2. when the mouse moves on the central circular sector, the map shifts in the
Figure 7.8: navigation map controller:
a)zoom-out control,
b)move control,
c)zoom-in control
Figure 7.9: snapshot of the naviga-
tion map when the ownship is out of
range
direction laying onto the segment connecting the pointer and the center of
circular sector;
3. when the mouse moves on the internal circular sector the map zoom in;
This implementation was chosen to have all map range controls integrated in the
same zone of the display. Moreover, it was designed in order to make easier for
the operator to explore the map during tactical navigation planning. It was decided
to avoid the implementation of controls activated by touching the map itself. This
design philosophy was chosen in order to make possible a future development in which
the operator can interact with the map, e.g. by directly selecting waypoints. This
operating mode should allow easier tactical trajectory replanning.
The aircraft symbol represents current position and heading of ownship on the map.
Over this symbol the current latitude and longitude are shown. In STATIC CHART
mode, when the operator moves the map in a range in which the ownship is not visible,
the simbology displayed in fig. 7.9 is used to provide the operator the direction in which
the ownship is currently located. This symbology includes a triangular shape and the
current position of the aircraft portrayed on the border of map in the direction where
the aircraft is currently located.
Concentric circles centered in the current ownship position represent zones with
diameters increasing with a step of 2000 m. They are displayed to make easier for the
pilot the visual judgement of distance from map ground cues. Moreover, they can be
used for tactical navigation purposes.
7.6 Primary Flight Display
Regarding flight condition monitoring and hazards situation awareness, described in
section 4.1, it was decided to fuse these functions into the same display in order to re-
duce the operator’s workload. The resulting display is meant as a testing/development
environment tool that could need further testing and improvements for employment
in real operating environment. It is a concept of enhanced PFD, inspired from the
conventional PFD described in section 4.4, but with many novelties and integrating
the following functions:
• visualisation of flight condition parameters, like conventional manned aviation
PFD;
• visualisation of S&A advisories;
• visualisation and control of FPCS autopilots operating mode parameters;
The configuration of instruments/controls depends on the flight control mode, iden-
tified by the highlighted indicator/button displayed on the top of the panel as in the
following list:
MAN is the SAS mode defined in section 5.3, part of the manual navigation
mode described in section 5.1;
A/P is the FPCS mode defined in section 5.3, implemented to enable flight tests
without operators in the manual navigation mode described in section 5.1;
P/F is the autonomous navigation mode defined in section 5.1;
A/R is the switch that can be used in all three overmentioned modes to enable
or disable the autonomous resolution function described in section 5.1.
Colors were minimised according to guidelines defined in section 4.2. The choice
of colors and fonts size used in the different display’s elements was based on guidelines
and tools provided in [159] and on current standards for manned aviation PFD. The
following perceptual layers were identified:
Background, Terrain and Sky: culturally conventional coding (black, brown,
sky);
Measures, Indicators and Labels: white color, size standard, weight normal;
Commands: high contrast chromatic color with culturally conventional coding,
size standard, weight normal (magenta);
Limitations: high contrast chromatic color with culturally conventional coding,
size standard, weight normal (red);
Active States Buttons: high contrast chromatic color with culturally conven-
tional coding, size standard, weight normal (cian);
Selections: same color of commands but different symbology, size standard,
weight normal (magenta);
Unactive States Buttons and Selection Buttons: background color (black),
size normal, weight normal;
Markings: white color, size small, weight normal.
7.6.1 Flight Condition Parameters
A snapshot of the PFD in the MAN mode is displayed in fig. 7.10. Its general layout
is very similar to the PFD, as it is described in section 4.4. This configuration was
chosen in order to get a display easy to read for an operator used to manned aviation
standards. Below flight control buttons, on the central upper position, the artificial
horizon is displayed. On its top a roll attitude indicator is depicted in a configuration
similar to that described in section 4.4. Figure 7.11 shows an indicator of the roll
rate included in the roll angle indicator. This is a wedge moving with roll angle
indicator and with an height proportional to the roll rate. At the bottom of the attitude
indicator, as in the conventional PFD layout (described in section 4.4), a heading
indicator is displayed. On its center it is placed the CDTI described in section 7.6.2.
The concept used for the Vertical Speed Indicator (VSI), AirSpeed Indicator (ASI),
Altitude Indicator (ALT ), and Angle of Attack (AoA) indicator (AoA) implementation
are different from those used in the PFD layout. The AoA indicator itself is an
indicator not present on conventional PFD and suggested by experienced pilots. The
representation of these indicators is similar to the commercial solution proposed by
Belite Aircraft [161] for ultralight aircraft. Their operating principle is different from
instruments based on non-precision steam gauges instruments (e.g. fig. 7.12), typical of
old generation cockpits, where a cursor pointing to the current value of the parameter
moves on an angular range. They are also different from more recent linear displays
(e.g. fig. 7.13), like those used in PFD, whose range slides and the current value of
the parameter is magnified on a central fixed position. Differently, the concept here
proposed considers a fixed range on which the current value magnified slides. This
solution merges some advantages of both these solutions and try to reduce some of
their limitations. More precisely:
• The digital representation of the measured value, similarly to linear displays,
provides a more precise indication than steam gauges instruments.
• This display depicts the current value inside the range of the allowed values,
that is typically small for small UAVs , like that considered in this project.
This gives to the operator the possibility to judge the position of the current
value inside that range and to take into account the allowed range in the
short term (tactical) trajectory planning. This advantage is also given by
some steam gauge instruments. The same characteristics is absent in linear
sliding displays.
• This representation provide moreover the possibility to integrate in the dis-
play the restrictions derived by real-time information acquisition (S&A, no-fly
zones, weather, ...) in order to further support the operator in short term
planning. This is possible for linear displays and unappliable to steam gauges
instruments.
Figure 7.10: snapshot of enhanced PFD in the MAN mode
Figure 7.11: snapshot of the attitude in-
dicator during a turn: 1)roll angle indica-
tor, 2)roll rate indicator
Figure 7.12: example of conventional steam
gauge ASI [160]
During tests, the pilots suggested to include the trend indicators like those of
details 1 and 2 of fig. 7.14 to display the trend of variation of the variable. Another
pilots suggestion required to display the indicators indicated by details 3 and 4 of
fig. 7.14 close to the field displaying the current value. This suggestion was proposed
to highlight to pilot the positive or negative value in the AoA indicator and the VSI.
7.6.2 S&A System HMI
A polar grid and a circle with the radius equal to the separation distance are added
to the layout described in section 4.6. They are meant to support the pilot in the
identification of the distance of potential threats. Moreover the CDTI range is dis-
played on the upper part of the grid, as reference for the pilot. The controls for “zoom
in/out” functions are implemented with ZOOM IN and ZOOM OUT buttons. A ter-
rain awareness and a navigation layer are included together with the traffic awareness
and they can be enabled/disabled on CDTI with the following buttons:
NAV OFF/ON controls the navigation layer, enabling depiction on CDTI of
the navigation weaypoints
A/T OFF/ON is related with the airborne awareness layer visibility,
T/O OFF/ON is the layer to enable the terrain awareness visibility.
The operating principles of the traffic awareness layer is the same as that described
in section 4.6 with the following novelties, pointed out in fig. 7.15.
1. An additional line starting from the intruder position and extending to the
direction opposite to that on which the intruder aircraft symbol moves is used
to display the direction of movement. The line length is proportional to the
intruder aircraft approaching speed.
2. An additional line starting from the intruder position and with a “T” end ex-
tending in the direction of aircraft’s movement is used to provide an estimation
of the TTC. The length of this line is proportional to the TTC.
Moreover a layer for the ground impact avoidance was included (see fig. 7.16). This
layer depicts in an amber color the zones of local elevation map for which the distance
between the current aircraft altitude and the elevation is inferior to the prescribed
ground separation. Similarly, a red color is used for those zones in which this distance
is less than the PUZ. In this layer too the line with the “T” end is used in case of
impact risks.
The S&A system HMI includes the calculated safe ranges on the altitude indicator,
VSI, attitude indicator, ASI and heading indicator, as displayed in fig. 7.17. Moreover
the suggested resolution manoeuvre is visualised with a cyan line on the instrument
for horizontal manoeuvres and on the VSI, altitude indicator and attitude indicator
for vertical manoeuvres.
Figure 7.13: example of conventional PFD with linear displays [162]
Figure 7.14: snapshot of enhanced PFD highlighting the trend and side indicators imple-
mented in linear displays
Figure 7.15: snapshot of the CDTI
Figure 7.16: snapshot of the CDTI as
soon as a terrain separation violation is
detected
7.6.3 Autopilots Modes
In the A/P mode the layout of the PFD changes as shown in fig. 7.18. The operator
changes the UAVs autopilot parameters settings directly on the related instrument.
The procedure used for this action is defined in the following list according to the
sequence sketched in fig. 7.19:
1. press the side bar on the instrument on a point close to the new value;
2. adjust this value by using the up and down buttons marked with arrows;
3. confirm the new value by pressing the bar where the current value is displayed
or the central button on the compass.
Finally, the layout of display in the W/N mode, shown in fig. 7.20, does not include
any control for the autopilots but just the visualisation of the value currently setted
for the autopilot setting.
7.7 Simulation Controller
The window displayed in fig. 7.21 was designed to support the operator during tests
execution. It allows to set the simulations parameters at the start and control the
simulation execution. The Display panel includes the parameters related with general
ANS system operations. These are:
• horizontal and vertical ranges considered in the display,
• update frequency used for the overall ANS commands and advisories,
Figure 7.17: snapshot of enhanced PFD when a resolution advisory is issued
Figure 7.18: snapshot of enhanced PFD in the A/P mode
Figure 7.19: depiction of the procedure for the autopilots commands selection in the A/P
mode
Figure 7.20: Snapshot of enhanced PFD in the W/N mode
Figure 7.21: Snapshot of the simulation controller
• display’s update prequency
• switches to set the operating modes of the various system functions (e.g. au-
tonomous navigation, traffic awareness, ground awareness).
Collision zone is the panel by which the horizontal and vertical position accuracies
considered from the conflict detection module of the S&A algorithm are set. In Way-
point Navigation the operator sets the initial position and the waypoints considered
when the P/F mode is enabled.
Colors settings gives the user the possibility to change in real-time the brightness
and saturation of the colors used for the different parts of the enhanced PFD. As
portrayed in fig. 7.22, the user can select the color from a popup menu and specify the
numeric values of brightness and saturation on related text fields. Otherwise he/she
can adjust them by pressing the triangular buttons placed close to the edges of the
square sample displayed at the right of the tab. The filling of the buttons is the color
of the sample if the user maximise or minimise the related parameter;
The Conflict Detection panel defines the values considered for first-alert and colli-
sion distances. Airborne Awareness is the panel in which the user can set the separa-
tion zone dimensions to be considered in different flight segments. Terrain avoidance
requirements are specified in Terrain Awareness.
Among the buttons displayed in the lower edge, the enable traffic checkbox and the
Reset Target Tracks button allow the simulation supervisor to enable, disable or reset
the predefined traffic scenario. The Save and Cancel buttons are used to save/reset
the current settings defined in the panels previously introduced. The Run and Stop
Figure 7.22: Zoom of the Colors Settings Panel with pop-up menu of the colors
buttons run/pause or stop the current simulation. Record is the button that allows
to save videos and plots of the simulation in a user defined folder. Finally the text on
the left-bottom corner of the window indicate the current state of the simulation and
can be:
Simulation stopped appears when the simulation is paused or stopped;
Initialisation indicates that the simulation environment is currently initialising
a new simulation;
Running 30s indicates that the simulation ran for 30 s
7.8 Chapter Summary
This chapter described the mock-up implemented for integrating S&A system in GCS
and testing it with pilots. Its architecture was designed to allow operations in both
manual navigation mode and autonomous navigation mode. It is therefore a mixed
solution integrating both direct and supervisor control interfaces. The direct control
interface is based on joystick and throttle for UAV real-time control by the pilot. The
supervisory controller interface is based on the integration of some soft controls, allow-
ing the operator override function prescribed in section 2.2 and the S&A autonomous
resolution function switching.
The mock-up includes also a set of information displays set designed for support-
ing the operator particularly during manual navigation mode phases. Among these
displays the Forward Camera View provides the UAV operator a real-time glance of
the external environment and includes an HUD layer for supporting the operator and
increasing his/her situation awareness with regards to flight condition and conflict
avoidance manoeuvres. Another display is the Navigation Display, visualising an in-
teractive map supporting the operator in the accomplishment of the tactical navigation
task of the UAV mission. Regarding flight control, a fundamental component is the
Primary Flight Display providing the operator real-time information about current
flight conditions, detected conflict risks and related computed avoidance manoeuvre
with a layout optimised for UAS operations and including an innovative autopilots
control interface. Finally, a Simulation Controller allows the operator to start/stop
the simulation and set its parameters during simulations. The S&A system interface,
the solution used is based on a redundant solution including an enhanced CDTI lay-
out, the replication of the RA on the HUD and communication by aural messages of
the S&A system advisories.
The PFD layout is inspired from the configuration used in manned aviation PFD,
but includes also some novelties. In fact, its design takes into account the different
performances and operating environment of UAVs in respect with manned aviation.
The concept obtained integrates of all basic information about the flight condition,
the autopilots controls, the advisories about detected threats and suggested avoidance
manoeuvre in just one display. The benefit obtained is the reduction of the UAS
operator workload caused by the need to search the information on a set of different
displays. Among the novelties, a new concept is used for the airspeed, altitude, vertical
speed and angle of attack indicators integrating red and green bands on their range.
These bands identify the allowed or forbidden zones of the flight envelope according
to the current condition in terms of conflict risk detected, aerodynamics performances
and structural limitations. The display also includes the buttons allowing pilot to
select the autopilots mode and the controls for the autopilots settings are integrated
directly on flight parameters indicators.
C H A P T E R 8
Simulations
Simulations were used to show capabilities in critical conditions of the S&A algorithm
covered in chapter 6. Moreover, the GCS mock-up described in chapter 7 was used
to collect feedbacks from potential UAS operators about their impressions on GCS
concept itself, when operating it.
This chapter includes a selection of simulations aiming to show the S&A algorithm
capabilities and the pilots interviews regarding the GCS mock-up functions and layout.
The chapter starts with section 8.1 defining the test cases considered. Section 8.2 shows
then some simulations involving a single flying threat mirroring the ownship during the
conflict resolution. In these simulations the UAS is in the P/F control mode defined
in section 7.6. The chapter continues then with the description in section 8.3 of a
multiple flying and ground threats scenario with UAS in the P/F mode. Section 8.4
presents a multiple flying and ground threats scenario in MAN mode in which the
last-resort autonomous resolution capability of the algorithm is tested. The chapter
continues then with section 8.5 including some notes about the selection of pilots used
for this part of the project. Tests methodology is then described in section 8.6. Finally
section 8.7 summarises the findings.
8.1 Simulations Selection
The simulations sets used for the validation of this S&A algorithm was defined in order
to verify its applicability to the three layers defined in section 3.1, namely: strategic
conflict management, conflict resolution advisory, autonomous resolution. The strate-
gic conflict management is strongly related with the capability of the algorithm to:
• timely detect the conflict risk when it is still not imminent,
• track its evolution,
• generate safe small corrections of the aircraft trajectory avoiding the conflict
risk.
The conflict resolution advisory defines the capability of the algorithm to:
• generate a safe resolution manoeuvre,
• promptly update it when required by the evolution of the conflict scenario.
The autonomous resolution capability requires the algorithm to:
• be able to recognise the minimum safe time before impact defined in sec-
tion 3.2,
• autonomously initiate the manoeuvre, when the minimum safe time before
impact is reached and there is no pilot’s input to avoid the conflict.
All these performances are related with the algorithm’s capability to monitor the
conflict geometry evolution and accordingly update the resolution manoeuvre. This
can be produced by an unpredicted trajectory change of the detected threats and/or
the appearance in the conflict scenario of new threats. The chosen simulations set aims
therefore to cover all these aspects and takes into account both factors identified in
this paragraph. The included simulations were implemented in the Matlab/Simulink R©
environment covered in chapter 5 and are described in more details in next sections.
More precisely, section 8.2 illustrates a set of simulations where a flying threat
comes from different directions and tries to follow the ownship manoeuvres causing
a conflict. In these simulations, the UAS is controlled in the P/F mode defined
in section 7.6 with A/R switched on. This set of tests investigates the algorithm
performance regarding strategic conflict management and conflict resolution advisory.
Namely, it takes into account dangerous trajectory changes of the threat.
Differently from the previous section, section 8.3 considers a conflict geometry in-
cluding two flying threats and a ground obstacle. These entities cause conflict risks,
detected by the S&A system in different simulation time steps. The aim of this simula-
tion is to test the performances in the autonomous mode of the algorithm till resolution
of all detected conflict risks. The UAS is controlled in the P/F mode defined in sec-
tion 7.6 with A/R switched on. This simulation tests the algorithm’s performances
in terms of strategic conflict management and conflict resolution advisory. This test
includes, in fact, a conflict scenario including the appearance of new threats during
simulation.
Finally, section 8.4 presents a similar situation with two flying threats and a ground
obstacle. In this case, it is supposed the UAS operating in the MAN mode defined in
section 7.6 with A/R switched on. The UAV moves on a straight levelled trajectory
maintained by the UAV altitude and airspeed autopilots. The UAS operator does
not intervene with the UAV control during the whole simulation. The S&A system
starts resolution manoeuvre autonomously at the minimum safe time before impact.
This simulation tests the algorithm performance in terms of last-resort autonomous
resolution. It considers therefore the strategic conflict management and autonomous
resolution performances for multiple threats scenarios.
8.2 Mirroring Simulations
A very interesting test case for S&A algorithms is that of a single flying threat which
changes its trajectory in orded to be on the collision route with the ownship. This case
is very close to a mirroring scenario, where threat and ownship implement the same
avoidance manoeuvre to escape the collision. This is therefore a very critical case to
be taken into account in a S&A system and that was addressed in the ACAS system
described in section 3.6. The following subsections describe the results for some cases
in which the threat aircraft is coming from different directions.
In all simulations it is supposed that the ownship is moving in the W/N mode
with A/R switched on starting from the initial position latitude 53.010◦ N, longitude
0.017◦ W and altitude 80 m and moving towards North with airspeed of 15 m s−1. All
Table 8.1: Dimensions of the
CDZ, SZ and PUZ considered in
the mirroring simulations
zone radius half-height
[m] [m]
CDZ 500 50
SZ 150 40
PUZ 100 20
simulations consider just one waypoint placed exactly
Northwards of the ownship at the latitude 53.030◦ N,
longitude 0.017◦ W and altitude 80 m. The flying
threat moves in the A/P mode with autopilots al-
titude and heading commands continuosly updated
in order to point every second towords the own-
ship. These commands remain fixed until the threat
reaches a minimum distance of 250 m. The dimen-
sions chosen for zones introduced in section 6.2 are
defined in Table 8.1. The prescribed ground separa-
tion considered by S&A algorithm is 50 m.
8.2.1 Head-on Conflict Risk
In the first simulation of this set, a flying threat at the same altitude of the ownship
is considered. It moves on the same straight trajectory as the ownship, but in the
opposite direction. It is therefore on a collision route with it and therefore leading to
a conflict risk during the simulation. More precisely, the threat starts from the initial
position with latitude 53.025◦ N, longitude 0.017◦ W and altitude 80 m flying at an
airspeed of 15 m s−1 and initially heads Southwards. The results of the simulation are
plotted in figs. 8.1 and 8.2.
The ownship’s and threat’s trajectories in three dimensional space are displayed in
fig. 8.1(a). The projection of these trajectories on horizontal and vertical planes are
shown in fig. 8.1(b) and fig. 8.1(c), respectively. The plot depicts the threat initially
trying to follow the ownship during its resolution manoeuvre. The threat continues
then in the last estimated direction of motion after reaching the threshold of 250 m
from the ownship. In the meanwhile, it can be noticed that the ownship keeps on
evaluating the resolution manoeuvre till the conflict resolution. When the conflict risk
is resolved, the ownship changes its heading and flies towards the original assigned
waypoint.
Figures 8.2(a) and 8.2(b) display the evolution of the horizontal and vertical sep-
aration distances during the simulation, respectively. Figure 8.2(c) shows that the
distance between the two aircraft are both greater than the CDZ and CAZ dimensions
during the whole simulation run. The optimisation time used to monitor the conflict
scenario evolution and define the resolution manoeuvre at every simulation time step
is displayed in fig. 8.2(d). It is displayed only the period in which the conflict risk
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Figure 8.1: graphs of the head-on conflict simulation (part I): (a) 3D trajectories of ownship
and threat, (b) horizontal view of ownship and threat trajectories, (c) vertical view of ownship
and threat trajectories
resolution is in progress. The figure also shows that this time reach its maximum,
almost 0.05 s, for just few seconds after the detection of the conflict risk. The value
of this time is smaller than the threshold of 0.01 s during the whole simulation run,
except for a tight peak close to the end of the resolution manoeuvre execution.
Figure 8.2(e) and fig. 8.2(f) show the evolution of computed safe heading and
altitude ranges, and threat’s position. This position is displayed in terms of bearing
and vertical distance, respectively, in respect with the ownship. The threat position
is plotted just for the time range where the conflict risk resolution is in progress. The
parameter displayed in the horizontal axis is the distance to the point in which the
manoeuvre is concluded. It substitutes the simulation time in order to show how the
command evolves while the ownship approaches the potential collision point.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure 8.2: graphs of the head-on conflict simulation (part II): (a) evolution of the horizon-
tal separation distance between ownship and threat and comparison with the CDZ and CAZ
thresholds, (b) evolution of the vertical separation distance between ownship and threat and
comparison with the CDZ and CAZ thresholds, (c) horizontal/vertical separation between
ownship and threat plot, (d) computational time employed by the algorithm for advisories
update, (e) evolution of ownship heading angle, autopilot command and computed safe range
during simulation and comparison with threat bearing in those time ranges in which a con-
flict risk is detected, (f) evolution of ownship altitude, autopilot command and computed safe
range during simulation and comparison with threat vertical position in those time ranges
in which a conflict risk is detected
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Figure 8.3: simulation graphs of descending threat scenario (part I): (a) 3D trajectories of
ownship and threat, (b) horizontal view of ownship and threat trajectories, (c) vertical view
of ownship and threat trajectories
8.2.2 Descending Threat
Another interesting simulation considers a threat on a descending route causing a
potential conflict with the ownship. In this case the threat starts from the initial
position with latitude 53.025◦ N, longitude 0.017◦ W and altitude 120 m. It moves
with an airspeed of 15 m s−1 and initially heads Southwards. The simulation’s results
are plotted in figs. 8.3 and 8.4.
The ownship’s and threat’s trajectories in three dimensional space are displayed
in fig. 8.3(a). The projection of these trajectories on horizontal and vertical planes
are shown in fig. 8.3(b) and fig. 8.3(c), respectively. The plots clearly depict the
threat initially trying to follow the ownship with both manoeuvres in horizontal and
vertical plane. In fact, it tries to intercept it with a left turn during the resolution
manoeuvre execution. Moreover, the threat descends in the vertical plane in order to
follow the ownship. In the meanwhile, the ownship keeps on following the computed
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Figure 8.4: simulation graphs of descending threat scenario (part II): (a) evolution of the
horizontal separation distance between ownship and threat and comparison with the CDZ
and CAZ thresholds, (b) evolution of the vertical separation distance between ownship and
threat and comparison with CDZ and CAZ thresholds, (c) horizontal/vertical separation
between ownship and threat plot, (d) computational time employed by the algorithm for
advisories update, (e) evolution of ownship heading angle, autopilot command and computed
safe range during simulation and comparison with threat bearing in those time ranges in
which a conflict risk is detected, (f) evolution of ownship altitude, autopilot command and
computed safe range during simulation and comparison with threat vertical position in those
time ranges in which a conflict risk is detected
resolution manoeuvre. This manoeuvre is not modified by the S&A algorithm during
the simulation. In fact, the CDZ is wide enough to take into account the change of
trajectory. The same plots show also that, as soon as the conflict risk is resolved, the
ownship heads back to the assigned waypoint.
Figures 8.4(a) and 8.4(b) display the evolution of the horizontal and vertical sep-
aration distances during the simulation, respectively. Figure 8.4(c) shows that the
threat stays outside of the CDZ and CAZ during the whole simulation run. The S&A
algorithm optimisation time is displayed in fig. 8.4(d). It depicts only the period in
which the conflict risk resolution is in progress. The figure also shows that this time
is close to a maximum of 0.05 s for just few seconds after conflict risk detection. Its
value is smaller than the threshold of 0.01 s for the rest of the simulation time.
Figure 8.4(e) and fig. 8.4(f) show the evolution of computed safe heading, computed
safe altitude ranges and position of the threat. This position is displayed in terms of
bearing and vertical distance, respectively, in respect with the ownship. The threat
position is plotted just for the time range of conflict risk resolution is in progress. The
parameter displayed in the horizontal axis is the distance to the final manoeuvre’s
point. It replaces the simulation time to show directly how the command evolves
while ownship approaches the potential collision point.
8.2.3 Climbing Threat
The climbing threat scenario shows results quite similar to the previous one. In this
case, the threat starts from the initial position with latitude 53.025◦ N, longitude
0.017◦ W and altitude 40 m. It moves with an airspeed of 15 m s−1 and initially heads
Southwards. The results of the simulation are plotted in figs. 8.5 and 8.6.
Ownship’s and threat’s trajectories in three dimensional space are displayed in
fig. 8.5(a). The projection of these trajectories on horizontal and vertical planes are
shown in fig. 8.5(b) and fig. 8.5(c), respectively. Also in this case the threat initially
tries to catch the ownship with both an horizontal and a vertical manoeuvre to follow
the ownship during the avoidance manoeuvre. These are a climb and a left turn.
In the meanwhile, the ownship avoid the conflict risk by executing a left turn. This
manoeuvre is effective on keeping the threat far from the CDZ and, therefore, does not
require the S&A algorithm to update the resolution manoeuvre. Once again, when
conflict risk is resolved, the ownship heads back to the assigned waypoint and continues
performing the predefined flight plan.
Figures 8.6(a) and 8.6(b) displays the evolution of horizontal and vertical separation
distances during the simulation, respectively. Figure 8.6(c) shows that also in this case
the threat keeps outside the CDZ during the whole simulation run. The optimisation
time used by the algorithm to perform the evaluation of the S&A operations during the
simulation is plotted in fig. 8.6(d). It is displayed only the period in which the conflict
risk resolution is in progress. The optimisation time value exceeds the threshold of
0.04 s just for some seconds immediately after the conflict risk detection. After that,
(a)
(b) (c)
Figure 8.5: simulation graphs of climbing threat scenario (part I): (a) 3D trajectories of
ownship and threat, (b) horizontal view of ownship and threat trajectories, (c) vertical view
of ownship and threat trajectories
it maintains a value smaller than 0.01 s.
Figure 8.6(e) and fig. 8.6(f) show the evolution of the computed safe heading and
altitude ranges, and the threat’s position. This is displayed in terms of bearing and
vertical distance, respectively, in respect with the ownship. The threat position is
plotted just for the time range in which the conflict risk resolution is in progress. The
parameter displayed in the horizontal axis is the distance to the point in which the
manoeuvre is concluded. It replaces the simulation time to show directly how the
command evolves while the ownship approaches the potential collision point.
8.2.4 Threat Approaching from Left
Some scenarios were also selected to show the capabilities of the algorithm for threats
starting from the same altitude of the ownship. A scenario considering a threat ap-
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Figure 8.6: simulation graphs of climbing threat scenario (part II): (a) evolution of the
horizontal separation distance between ownship and threat and comparison with the CDZ
and CAZ thresholds, (b) evolution of the vertical separation distance between ownship and
threat and comparison with the CDZ and CAZ thresholds, (c) horizontal/vertical separation
between ownship and threat plot, (d) computational time needed by the algorithm to update
advisories, (e) evolution of ownship heading angle, autopilot command and computed safe
range during simulation and comparison with threat bearing in those time ranges in which a
conflict risk is detected, (f) evolution of ownship altitude, autopilot command and computed
safe range during simulation and comparison with threat vertical position in those time
ranges in which a conflict risk is detected
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Figure 8.7: graphs of the simulation with threat approaching from left (part I): (a) 3D
trajectories of ownship and threat, (b) horizontal view of ownship and threat trajectories,
(c) vertical view of ownship and threat trajectories
proaching from the left side is here presented. The threat starts from the initial
position with latitude 53.025◦ N, longitude 0.022◦ W and altitude 80 m. It moves with
an airspeed of 15 m s−1 and an initial heading of 240◦ from North. The results of the
simulation are plotted in figs. 8.7 and 8.8.
The trajectories of ownship and threat in three dimensional space are displayed in
fig. 8.7(a). The projection of these trajectories on horizontal and vertical planes are
shown in fig. 8.7(b) and fig. 8.7(c), respectively. Some initial oscillations in the threat
horizontal trajectory are noticeable. This is due to the fact that the threat tries to
catch the ownship. No altitude change is noticeable because the ownship does not
change its altitude. According to the Right of Way rules, a right-turn is chosen by the
algorithm as avoidance maneuvre. The ownship changes then its motion direction to
the assigned waypoint once that the conflict risk is resolved.
Figures 8.8(a) and 8.8(b) display the evolution of horizontal and vertical separa-
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Figure 8.8: graphs of the simulation with threat approaching from left (part II): (a) evolu-
tion of the horizontal separation distance between ownship and threat and comparison with
the CDZ and CAZ thresholds, (b) evolution of the vertical separation distance between own-
ship and threat and comparison with the CDZ and CAZ thresholds, (c) horizontal/vertical
separation between ownship and threat plot, (d) computational time employed by the algo-
rithm for the advisories update, (e) evolution of ownship heading angle, autopilot command
and computed safe range during simulation and comparison with threat bearing in those
time ranges in which a conflict risk is detected, (f) evolution of ownship altitude, autopilot
command and computed safe range during simulation and comparison with threat vertical
position in those time ranges in which a conflict risk is detected
tion distances during the simulation. Figure 8.8(c) shows that the threat is safely
kept outside the CDZ during all the simulation. The optimisation time used by the
algorithm to perform the S&A operations evaluation during the simulation is plotted
in fig. 8.8(d). It is displayed only the period in which the conflict risk resolution is
in progress. From the graph it is clear that the optimisation time is costantly under
0.01 s except for an initial peak exceeding 0.04 s.
Figure 8.8(e) and fig. 8.8(f) show the evolution of computed safe heading and
altitude ranges, and the position of threat. This position is displayed in terms of
bearing and vertical distance, respectively, in respect with the ownship. The threat
position is plotted just for the time range where the conflict risk resolution is in
progress. The parameter displayed in the horizontal axis is the distance to the point in
which the manoeuvre is concluded. It substitutes the simulation time to show directly
how the command evolves while the ownship approaches the potential collision point.
8.2.5 Threat Approaching from Right
Another case in the horizontal plane is the simulation of a threat coming from right.
The initial position of threat is at latitude 53.025◦ N, longitude 0.011◦ W and altitude
80 m. The aircraft is supposed to move with an airspeed of 15 m s−1 and an initial
heading of 150◦ from North. The results of simulation are plotted in figs. 8.9 and 8.10.
Trajectories of ownship and threat in three dimensional space are displayed in
fig. 8.9(a). The projection of these trajectories on horizontal and vertical planes are
shown in fig. 8.9(b) and fig. 8.9(c), respectively. Similarly to the previous case the
threat try to catch the ownship in the horizontal plane and initially obscillate to get
the proper heading to reach it. In the meanwhile, the ownship initially try a vertical
maneouvre. Then, some seconds after the threat starts climbing, it change its strategy
by trying a right turn. Once the conflict is resolved, it heads back to the assigned
waypoint.
Figures 8.10(a) and 8.10(b) displays the evolution of horizontal and vertical separa-
tion distances during the simulation. Once again, fig. 8.10(c) shows that the constraints
about CDZ and CAZ are respected during the whole simulation run. The optimisation
time used by the algorithm to perform the evaluation of the S&A operations during
the simulation is plotted in fig. 8.12(d). It displays only the period in which the con-
flict risk resolution is in progress. The optimisation time has a more complex profile
in this case, despite it never reach the threshold of 0.05 s.
Figure 8.10(e) and fig. 8.10(f) show the evolution of computed safe heading and
altitude ranges, and threat’s position. This position is displayed in terms of bearing
and vertical distance, respectively, in respect with the ownship. The threat position
is plotted for the limited time range where the conflict risk resolution is in progress.
The parameter displayed in the horizontal axis is the distance to the point in which
the manoeuvre is performed. It substitutes the simulation time to show directly how
the command evolves while the ownship reaches the potential collision point.
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Figure 8.9: graphs of the simulation with threat approaching from right (part I): (a) 3D
trajectories of ownship and threat, (b) horizontal view of ownship and threat trajectories,
(c) vertical view of ownship and threat trajectories
8.2.6 Threat Descending from Left
Another interesting case, cause of the presence of a long pursuit final phase, is that
of a descending threat from the left of the ownship. The initial condition considers a
threat starting from the initial position with latitude 53.025◦ N, longitude 0.022◦ W
and altitude 120 m. It moves with an airspeed of 15 m s−1 and an initial heading of
240◦ from North. The results of simulation are plotted in figs. 8.11 and 8.12.
The trajectories of ownship and threat in three dimensional space are displayed in
fig. 8.11(a). The projection of these trajectories on horizontal and vertical planes are
shown in fig. 8.11(b) and fig. 8.11(c). In this case also, some oscillations are necessary
to threat to settle on the motion condition suitable to intercept the ownship. Finally
a long pursuit takes place before the threat stops following the ownship. This time,
the manoeuvre chosen by the ownship is a right-turn, once again according to the
Right of Way rules. When the conflict risk is resolved, the ownship changes its motion
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Figure 8.10: graphs of the simulation with threat approaching from right (part II): (a) evo-
lution of horizontal separation distance between ownship and threat and comparison with
CDZ and CAZ thresholds, (b) evolution of the vertical separation distance between ownship
and threat and comparison with the CDZ and CAZ thresholds, (c) horizontal/vertical sepa-
ration between ownship and threat plot, (d) computational time needed by the algorithm to
update the advisories, (e) evolution of ownship heading angle, autopilot command and com-
puted safe range during simulation and comparison with threat bearing in those time ranges
in which a conflict risk is detected, (f) evolution of ownship altitude, autopilot command
and computed safe range during simulation and comparison with threat vertical position in
those time ranges in which a conflict risk is detected
(a)
(b) (c)
Figure 8.11: graphs of the simulation with threat descending from left (part I): (a) 3D
trajectories of ownship and threat, (b) horizontal view of ownship and threat trajectories,
(c) vertical view of ownship and threat trajectories
direction in order to point to the assigned waypoint.
Figures 8.12(a) and 8.12(b) display the evolution of horizontal and vertical sepa-
ration distances during the simulation. Figure 8.12(c) demonstrates that the threat
never enters the CDZ. The optimisation time used by the algorithm to perform eval-
uation of the S&A operations during the simulation is plotted in fig. 8.12(d). It is
displayed only the period in which the conflict risk resolution is in progress. The
optimisation time is smaller than 0.01 s in fig. 8.12(d), despite some peaks reaching a
maximum value smaller than 0.045 s.
Figure 8.12(e) and fig. 8.12(f) show the evolution of computed safe heading and
altitude ranges, and the threat’s position. This position is displayed in terms of bearing
and vertical distance, respectively, in respect with the ownship. The threat position
is plotted just for the time range where the conflict risk resolution is in progress.
The parameter displayed in horizontal axis is the distance to the point in which the
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Figure 8.12: graphs of the simulation with threat descending from left (part II): (a) evo-
lution of the horizontal separation distance between ownship and threat and comparison
with CDZ and CAZ thresholds, (b) evolution of the vertical separation distance between
ownship and threat and comparison with CDZ and CAZ thresholds, (c) horizontal/vertical
separation between ownship and threat plot, (d) computational time employed by the algo-
rithm for the advisories update, (e) evolution of ownship heading angle, autopilot command
and computed safe range during simulation and comparison with threat bearing in those
time ranges in which a conflict risk is detected, (f) evolution of ownship altitude, autopilot
command and computed safe range during simulation and comparison with threat’s vertical
position in those time ranges in which a conflict risk is detected
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Figure 8.13: graphs of the simulation with threat climbing from left (part I): (a) 3D tra-
jectories of ownship and threat, (b) horizontal view of ownship and threat trajectories, (c)
vertical view of ownship and threat trajectories
manoeuvre is performed. It substitutes the simulation time to show directly how the
command evolves while the ownship approaches the potential collision point.
8.2.7 Threat Climbing from Left
Another case characterised by a long pursuit is that of a climbing threat from the
left of ownship. Here, the initial condition considers a threat starting from the initial
position with latitude 53.025◦ N, longitude 0.022◦ W and altitude 40 m. It moves
with an airspeed of 15 m s−1 and an initial heading of 240◦ from North. The results of
simulation are plotted in figs. 8.13 and 8.14.
The ownship’s and threat’s trajectories in three dimensional space are displayed in
fig. 8.13(a). Projections on horizontal and vertical planes are shown in fig. 8.13(b) and
fig. 8.13(c), respectively. The threat trajectory’s oscillations are due to the attempt
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Figure 8.14: graphs of the simulation with threat climbing from left (part II): (a) evolution
of the horizontal separation distance between ownship and threat and comparison with the
CDZ and CAZ thresholds, (b) evolution of the vertical separation distance between ownship
and threat and comparison with the CDZ and CAZ thresholds, (c) horizontal/vertical sepa-
ration between ownship and threat plot, (d) computational time employed by the algorithm
for advisories update, (e) evolution of ownship heading angle, autopilot command and com-
puted safe range during simulation and comparison with threat bearing in those time ranges
in which a conflict risk is detected, (f) evolution of ownship altitude, autopilot command
and computed safe range during simulation and comparison with threat vertical position in
those time ranges in which a conflict risk is detected
of threat to catch the ownship both in horizontal and vertical plane. It changes
its heading in order to follow the ownship during the resolution manouevre. In the
meanwhile, the ownship keeps on following the computed resolution manoeuvre. The
suggested resolution manoeuvre does not change with time. This is due to the fact
that CDZ is wide enough to take into account the threat’s change of trajectory. When
the conflict risk is resolved, the ownship changes its motion direction in order to point
to the assigned waypoint.
Figures 8.14(a) and 8.14(b) display the evolution of horizontal and vertical separa-
tion distances during the simulation. Figure 8.14(c) shows that the distance between
the two aircraft is greater than both the CDZ and CAZ during the whole simulation
run. The optimisation time spent by algorithm to perform the evaluation of the S&A
operations during the simulation is plotted in fig. 8.14(d). It is displayed only the
period in which the conflict risk resolution is in progress. This figure shows that this
parameter assumes a value smaller than 0.05 s.
Figure 8.14(e) and fig. 8.14(f) show the evolution of computed safe heading and
altitude ranges, and the threat’s position. This position is displayed in terms of bearing
and vertical distance, respectively, in respect with the ownship. The threat position
is plotted just for the time range where the conflict risk resolution is in progress. The
parameter displayed in the horizontal axis is the distance to the point in which the
manoeuvre is performed. It substitutes the simulation time to show directly how the
command evolves while the ownship approaches the potential collision point.
8.2.8 Threat Descending from Right
Another case characterised by oscillations in the horizontal plane is that of the de-
scening threat from the right of the ownship. The initial condition considers a threat
starting from the initial position with latitude 53.025◦ N, longitude 0.011◦ W and alti-
tude 120 m. It moves with an airspeed of 15 m s−1 and an initial heading of 240◦ from
North. The results of the simulation are plotted in figs. 8.15 and 8.16.
The trajectories of ownship and threat on the three dimensional space are dis-
played in fig. 8.15(a). The projection of the trajectories in the horizontal and vertical
planes are shown in fig. 8.15(b) and fig. 8.15(c), respectively. The threat trajectory’s
oscillations are due to the fact that the threat tries to catch the ownship both in the
horizontal and vertical plane. In particular, it changes the heading in order to follow
the ownship during the resolution manouevre. In the meanwhile, the ownship keeps on
following the computed resolution manoeuvre. The suggested resolution manoeuvre
does not change with time. This is due to the fact that CDZ is enough wide to take
into account the threat’s change of trajectory. When the conflict risk is resolved, the
ownship changes its direction of motion in order to point to next waypoint.
Figures 8.16(a) and 8.16(b) displays the evolution of horizontal and vertical sep-
aration distances during the simulation, respectively. Figure 8.16(c) shows that the
distance between the two aircraft is greater both than the CDZ and CAZ during the
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Figure 8.15: graphs of the simulation with threat descending from right (part I): (a) 3D
trajectories of ownship and threat, (b) horizontal view of ownship and threat’s trajectories,
(c) vertical view of ownship and threat’s trajectories
whole simulation run. The optimisation time used by the algorithm to perform the
evaluation of S&A operations during the simulation is plotted in fig. 8.16(d). It is
displayed only the period in which the conflict risk resolution is in progress. This
figure shows that this parameter is smaller than 0.05 s.
Figure 8.16(e) and fig. 8.16(f) show the evolution of computed safe heading and
altitude ranges, and the threat’s position. This position is displayed in terms of bearing
and vertical distance, respectively, in respect with the ownship. The threat’s position
is plotted just for the time range where the conflict risk resolution is in progress. The
parameter displayed in the horizontal axis is the distance to the point in which the
manoeuvre is concluded. It substitutes the simulation time to show directly how the
command evolves while ownship approaches the potential collision point.
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(c) (d)
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Figure 8.16: graphs of the simulation with threat descending from right (part II): (a) evolu-
tion of the horizontal separation distance between ownship and threat and comparison with
CDZ and CAZ thresholds, (b) evolution of the vertical separation distance between own-
ship and threat and comparison with the CDZ and CAZ thresholds, (c) horizontal/vertical
separation between ownship and threat plot, (d) computational time employed by the algo-
rithm for the advisories update, (e) evolution of ownship heading angle, autopilot command
and computed safe range during simulation and comparison with threat bearing in those
time ranges in which a conflict risk is detected, (f) evolution of ownship altitude, autopilot
command and computed safe range during simulation and comparison with threat vertical
position in those time ranges in which a conflict risk is detected
(a)
(b) (c)
Figure 8.17: graphs of the simulation with threat climbing from right (part I): (a) 3D
trajectories of ownship and threat, (b) horizontal view of ownship and threat trajectories,
(c) vertical view of ownship and threat trajectories
8.2.9 Threat Climbing from Right
Finally, for completeness, it is presented also a simulation considering a threat starting
from the initial position with latitude 53.025◦ N, longitude 0.011◦ W and altitude 40 m.
It moves with an airspeed of 15 m s−1 and initial heading of 240◦ from North. The
simulation’s results are plotted in figs. 8.17 and 8.18.
The trajectories of ownship and threat on the three dimensional space are displayed
in fig. 8.17(a). The projection of these trajectories in the horizontal and vertical planes
are shown in fig. 8.17(b) and fig. 8.17(c), respectively. The oscillations in threat’s
trajectory are due to the fact that the threat try to catch the ownship both in the
horizontal and vertical plane. In particular, it changes the heading in order to follow
the ownship during the resolution manouevre. In the meanwhile, the ownship keeps on
following the computed resolution manoeuvre. The suggested resolution manoeuvre
does not change with time. This is due to the fact that the CDZ is wide enough to
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure 8.18: graphs of the simulation with threat climbing from right (part II): (a) evolution
of the horizontal separation distance between ownship and threat and comparison with CDZ
and CAZ thresholds, (b) evolution of the vertical separation distance between ownship and
threat and comparison with CDZ and CAZ thresholds, (c) horizontal/vertical separation
between ownship and threat plot, (d) computational time employed by the algorithm for the
advisories update, (e) evolution of ownship heading angle, autopilot command and computed
safe range during simulation and comparison with threat bearing in those time ranges in
which a conflict risk is detected, (f) evolution of ownship altitude, autopilot command and
computed safe range during simulation and comparison with threat vertical position in those
time ranges in which a conflict risk is detected
take into account the change of trajectory of the threat. When the conflict risk is
resolved, the ownship changes its direction of motion in order to point to the assigned
waypoint.
Figures 8.18(a) and 8.18(b) display the evolution of the horizontal and vertical
separation distances during the simulation, respectively. Figure 8.18(c) shows that
the distance between the two aircraft is greater both than the CDZ and CAZ during
the whole simulation run. The optimisation time used by the algorithm to perform
the evaluation of the S&A operations during the simulation is plotted in fig. 8.18(d).
It is displayed just the period in which the conflict risk resolution is in progress. This
figure shows that this parameter is smaller than 0.05 s.
Figure 8.18(e) and fig. 8.18(f) show the evolution of computed safe heading and
altitude ranges, and the threat’s position. This position is displayed in terms of bearing
and vertical distance, respectively, in respect with the ownship. The threat position
is plotted just for the time range where the conflict risk resolution is in progress. The
parameter displayed in the horizontal axis is the distance to the point in which the
manoeuvre is concluded. It substitutes the simulation time to show directly how the
command evolves while the ownship approaches the potential collision point.
8.3 Multiple Threats Scenario in P/F Mode
This scenario is characterised by the presence of two flying threats moving on a straight
trajectory and a ground relief placed on the ownship flight route. The ownship’s and
the threats’ initial conditions are defined in Table 8.2. The ownship is supposed to
be controlled in the P/F mode with A/R switched on. It is routed to the waypoint
defined by latitude 53.021◦ N, longitude 0.030◦ W and altitude 80 m. The dimensions
chosen for the zones introduced in section 6.2 and the prescribed ground separation
are the same chosen in section 8.2. The simulation’s results are plotted in figs. 8.19
and 8.20.
The ownship’s and threats’ trajectories in three dimensional space are displayed
in fig. 8.19(a). The projection of these trajectories on horizontal and vertical planes
are shown in fig. 8.19(b) and fig. 8.19(c), respectively. In this case both the threats
Table 8.2: Data of the aircraft involved in the multiple threats
scenario in P/F mode: A/S is the airspeed, ψ the heading, h the
altitude
aircraft latitude longitude A/S ψ [◦ from h
[m s−1] North] [m]
ownship 53.021◦N 0.001◦W 15 270 80
intr. 1 53.025◦N 0.014◦W 15 150 80
intr. 2 53.017◦N 0.015◦W 15 30 80
move on a straight
levelled trajectory. In
all this plots the
local ground eleva-
tion map is displayed
to provide the in-
formation about the
separation with the
ground.
Figure 8.20(a) and
fig. 8.20(b) display
(a)
(b) (c)
Figure 8.19: simulation graphs of the multiple threats scenario in P/F mode (part I): (a) 3D
trajectories of ownship and threat, (b) horizontal view of ownship and threats trajectories,
(c) vertical view of ownship and threats trajectories
Table 8.4: Data of the aircraft involved in the last-resort scenario
aircraft latitude longitude airspeed heading altitude
[m s−1] [◦ from North]
ownship 53.012◦N 0.012◦W 15 10 cruising at 80 m
intr. 1 53.021◦N 0.014◦W 14 140 cruising at 70 m
intr. 2 53.040◦N 0.030◦W 14 190 descent after 8 s
(150 m-50 m)
the evolution of horizontal and vertical separation distances between ownship and
flying threats during the simulation, respectively. Figure 8.20(c) shows that the dis-
tance between ownship and threats is greater both than CDZ and CAZ during the
whole simulation run. The optimisation time used by the algorithm to perform the
S&A operations evaluation during the simulation is plotted in fig. 8.18(d). Here is dis-
played just the period in which the conflict risk resolution is in progress. This figure
shows that this parameter is smaller than 0.05 s.
Figure 8.20(e) and fig. 8.20(f) show evolution of the computed safe heading and al-
titude ranges, and the threats’ position. This position is displayed in terms of bearing
and vertical distance, respectively, in respect with the ownship. Figure 8.20(f) plots
also the local elevation. The ground obstacle bearing is not displayed in fig. 8.20(e)
because it is close to zero. In fact, the obstacle is in front of the ownship in its
direction of motion. The threats position is plotted just for the time range where
the conflict risk resolution is in progress. The parameter displayed in the horizon-
tal axis is the distance to the point in which the manoeuvre is concluded. It sub-
stitutes the simulation time to show directly that the command evolves while the
Table 8.3: Dimensions of the
CDZ, SZ and PUZ considered
in the last-resort scenario
zone radius half-
height
[m] [m]
CDZ 500 50
SZ 150 35
PUZ 100 25
ownship approaches the potential collision point.
8.4 Last-Resort Scenario
For the last-resort simulation it was decided to consider
the simulations presented in [163]. These include the
same conflict geometry used for a simulation with UAS in
MAN mode and another one in the P/F mode in order to
compare the algorithm performances. Both simulations
consider the A/R function switched ‘ON’. In the first
case it is assumed that the UAV operator does not react
to the detected collision risk and the resolution manoeuvre is therefore autonomously
executed. The scenario considers an head-on encounter with two flying threats as per
the conditions listed in Table 8.4 and a ground obstacles. The dimensions chosen for
the zones introduced in section 6.2 are set as in Table 8.3. The waypoints used in the
P/F are tabulated in Table 8.5.
(a) (b)
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Figure 8.20: simulation graphs of the multiple threats scenario in P/F mode (part II): (a)
evolution of the horizontal separation distance between ownship and threats and comparison
with CDZ and CAZ thresholds, (b) evolution of the vertical separation distance between own-
ship and threats and comparison with the CDZ and CAZ thresholds, (c) horizontal/vertical
separation between ownship and threats plot, (d) computational time employed by the algo-
rithm for the advisories update, (e) evolution of ownship heading angle, autopilot command
and computed safe range during simulation and comparison with threats bearing in those
time ranges in which a conflict risk is detected, (f) evolution of ownship altitude, autopilot
command and computed safe range during simulation and comparison with threats vertical
position in those time ranges in which a conflict risk is detected
Table 8.5: Data of the WPs considered in the P/F sim-
ulation of the last-resort scenario
WP latitude longitude altitude airspeed
1 53.030◦N 0.002◦E 80 m 15 m s−1
2 53.040◦N 0.030◦W 150 m 15 m s−1
Simulations results for the
ANS in MAN and P/F
mode are shown in figs. 8.21
and 8.22, respectively. The
altitude and heading profiles
are compared with their esti-
mation by the algorithm and
the autopilot command dur-
ing the avoidance manoeuvre in the same figures. In particular, figs. 8.21(a) and 8.22(a)
refer to the altitude and figs. 8.21(c) and 8.22(c) to the heading angle. Moreover, it is
shown in figs. 8.21(d) and 8.22(d) the comparison between:
• the dynamics profile,
• the ranges ∆Ψres and ∆Hres,
• the chosen autopilot command,
• the position of flying threats and the closest impact point.
More precisely, figs. 8.21(b) and 8.22(b) refer to the altitude and figs. 8.21(d) and 8.22(d)
to the heading angle. These plots show on the horizontal axis the distance from the
ground threats position. The ground obstacle heading in figs. 8.21(d) and 8.22(d) is
not reported because it is close to zero. In fact, the obstacle is in front of the ownship
in its direction of motion. The horizontal and vertical separation and the diagram of
the function of these two variables are reported in Figs. 8.21(e), 8.21(f) and 8.21(g)
and Figs. 8.22(e), 8.22(f) and 8.22(g) for MAN and P/F mode, respectively. Fi-
nally, figs. 8.21(h) and 8.22(h) show the trajectories of ownship, threats and the local
elevation map.
As can be noticed in figs. 8.21(h) and 8.22(h) the chosen manoeuvre is a turn in
both cases. Therefore it is noticeable a limited variation with a maximum amplitude of
0.8 m for the altitude value close to the trim value cause of the altitude autopilot action.
In figs. 8.21(c) and 8.22(c), the heading angle profile estimation is conservative for the
first value of the heading angle command, because slower than the real dynamics. It
is moreover important to observe that the forbidden manoeuvre ranges reported in
figs. 8.21(b), 8.21(d), 8.22(b) and 8.22(d) include the positions of threats and ground
obstacle in the forbidden range. Finally, as illustrated in figs. 8.21(g) and 8.22(g), in
both cases the horizontal and vertical separation profiles keep outside the boundaries
defined by the PUZ. Despite this, some violation is noticeable for the SZ, that is the
reason why this zone is considered in the algorithm.
8.5 Simulation Tests Operators Selection
The big differences between manned aviation and UASs in terms of human factors,
highlighted in section 1.4, are related also with the different skills required to pilots
and UAV operators. On the other hand, as stated in section 1.5, UAV operators have
(a) (b)
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(e) (f)
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Figure 8.21: simulation graphs of the last-resort scenario in MAN mode: (a) altitude
dynamics profile, (b) altitude command profile and safe manoeuvres ranges, (e) horizontal
separation between threats and ownship, (f) vertical separation between threats and ownship,
(g) horizontal/vertical separation diagram between threats and ownship, (h) ownship and
threats trajectories and local elevation map of the simulation
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
(g) (h)
Figure 8.22: simulation graphs of the last-resort scenario in P/F mode simulation: (a)
altitude dynamics profile, (b) altitude command profile and safe manoeuvres ranges, (e)
horizontal separation between threats and ownship, (f) vertical separation between threats
and ownship, (g) horizontal/vertical separation diagram between threats and ownship, (h)
ownship and threats trajectories and local elevation map of the simulation
to operate their vehicles at an ELOS with manned aircraft. This implies that they
have to be aware and use the same rules defined for flight safety in order to make the
UAV’s behaviour predictable for manned aviation pilots and therefore interoperable
with manned aircraft. Moreover the UAV operator is expected to share some of the
qualifications requirements of manned aviation pilot.
For this reason, it was decided to use for these experiments a selection of pilots
operating in Cranfield University airport. The selected pilots have different levels of
flight experience. This characteristic was useful in order to obtain feedbacks derived
from different levels of experience. The pilots interviewed were 11. In this sample, the
following classes were identified:
novice pilot including 5 pilots with less than 500 hours of flight;
medium experience instructors including the 3 pilots with a maximum num-
ber of flight hours of 3000 hours;
expert pilots including 3 test pilots with a number of flight hours between 4500
and 17900 hours.
8.6 Simulation Tests Methodology
The tests were designed in order to collect the maximum amount of feedbacks from
pilots and maximise their effectiveness. This analisys considered in particular the PFD
concept described in section 7.6. It included the following six phases:
Phase 1: description to pilots of the GCS mock-up,
Phase 2: simulation of a free flight,
Phase 3: interview on the general layout of the PFD,
Phase 4: simulation with a test scenario,
Phase 5: interview on the effectiveness of the advisory scheme,
Phase 6: interview about the previous flight experience.
This procedure was repeated for every pilot. At first the pilot was briefed regarding
the aim of the experiment. The HMI layout chosen for the GCS and the mock-up
structure described in section 7.3 were moreover illustrated.
In the following simulation, the pilot was requested to perform a free flight in the
MAN mode. The simulation started from a cruise condition (altitude 80 m, airspeed
12 m s−1, heading North). None conflict risks was simulated during this phase. This
phase aimed to get the pilot used with aircraft dynamics and simulation environment.
This simulated flight phase went on till pilot’s request to stop it.
This simulation was followed by an interview in which the pilot was asked to
communicate his/her first impressions about the proposed PFD layout. Then he was
asked to give an evaluation about the following design solutions used on the PFD:
• heading indicator layout,
• altimeter layout,
• vertical speed indicator layout,
• airspeed indicator layout,
• angle of attack indicator layout,
• visualisation of the safety range in the indicators.
Figure 8.23: Citroe¨n 2CV (Deux Chevaux)
model avilable in FlightGear
In the fourth phase the pilot was re-
quested to perform a flight starting from
the same cruise condition of the previous
simulation. In this case, the pilot was in-
structed to fly the UAV in order to detect
and follow a car, the black and yellow
Citroe¨n 2CV (Deux Chevaux) displayed
in fig. 8.23, moving on the ground. Dur-
ing the same simulation, another Piper
J3 Cub 40 UAV coming from North-East
was moving on a collision route with the
UAV flown by the operator. In this sim-
ulation phase the A/R switch defined in
section 7.6 was set in OFF position. The
pilot was not preliminary informed about
the presence of another aircraft. This was
done in order to avoid the reaction to be influenced from the preliminary knowledge
about this conflict risk. The simulation was stopped in the middle of the conflict
resolution in order to avoid the pilot forgetting his/her immediate feedback about the
S&A system advisories during the most critical phase, i. e. the conflict detection and
immediate resolution management.
Similarly to the previous simulation test an interview followed this phase. In this
case, the pilot was requested a general preliminary impression about the advisory
scheme and an evaluation of the effectiveness of the following design solutions:
• CDTI polar grid and range indication,
• indication of flying threats trajectory on the CDTI,
• indication of the collision distance of the detected conflict risks on the CDTI,
• aural alerts sequence,
• resolution indication on the indicators,
• indication of the resolution manoeuvre on the HUD,
Finally the pilot was asked to summarise its previous flight experience in terms of
flight hours and aircraft flown. This interview was done at the end of the test in order
to avoid the influence of this information on test supervisor’s judgement regarding
pilot’s feedback and on the evolution of discussion.
8.7 Simulation Tests Results
This section summarises the pilot feedbacks and try to identify some guidelines for
future developments of the project. These concepts are classified according to the
related GCS design factor.
General PFD Layout A novice suggested to differentiate the linear displays by
graphical means (e.g. shape and color). He recommended moreover to increase the
separation between these displays in order to avoid confusion.
Linear Gauge Instruments Instructors and expert pilots highlighted their lack of
acquaintance with this concept applied to the airspeed and altitude indicators. For
this reason, the expert pilots repeated the free flight simulation twice and continued
it for a quite long time. A general conclusion was however that such a concept would
require an adequate training, if the operator is a manned aviation pilot, in order to
get him/her used to it.
Some instructors observed that, differently with conventional altitude indicators of
manned aviation PFDs , such an indicator could require a bigger workload to manned
aviation pilot. It requires the operator to search the current airspeed or altitude
value in all indicator’s extension. This is related with the fact that, as described
in section 7.6.1 the box with the magnified altitude value is moving. On the other
hand, one of the instructors stated that the airspeed indicator was quite effective in
communicating to the operator the airspeed value changes cause of the limited range
of variation. Differently this result was not obtained for the altitude indicator cause
of the wider range.
The reaction of novices was quite uniform with a general appreciation for the
idea of the sliding value on the range. They stated more precisely that it is effective
in communicating to the operator its position on the range of allowed airspeeds or
altitudes.
The angle of attack indicator received a general appreciation both regarding the
idea to integrate it into the display, both regarding the layout used. It was in fact
acknowledged as an useful tool to detect and signal the stall conditions. The only
exception was a novice who considered it unuseful. Also the vertical speed indicator
layout was appreciated, despite none detailed comment was collected on it.
Safety Ranges on Indicators The idea to depict the safety limitations of the flight
envelope on the indicators with red and green bands was generally appreciated. Only
a novice observed that he was disturbed by the constant presence of red color shapes
on the display. On the other hand, an instructor suggested to add also an intermediate
level yellow or orange strip on the instruments to warn the operator when approaching
the unsafe values range. Moreover, an expert pilot suggested to display the increases
in the minimum flight altitude. More precisely, it was suggested to display a yellow
strip extending from the previous minimum flight altitude to the new one, as soon as
the aircraft approaches a different airspace zone.
Resolution Indication on the Indicators This indicator is another feature re-
ceiving positive comments by all the expert pilots and two of the novices. However, one
of the expert pilots suggested to remove this visualisation from the altitude indicator.
He asserted that it could cause wrong behaviours on the operator by making him/her
indefinitely increase the climb or descent angle cause of the much slower altitude’s
dynamics. Another one recommended instead to avoid the visualisation of the reso-
lution heading on the attitude indicator to avoid confusion. Regarding the graphical
representation, one of the novices proposed to use an arrow instead of the blue line
to get more noticeable indications. The only exception to these positive comments
was the fact that one of the instructors did not appreciated the idea to display the
resolution indication on the instruments: he judged it confusing.
CDTI A general appreciation was shown for the CDTI layout by the novices, despite
with the following comments. One of them suggested to move the label displaying the
size of the the CDTI range (2NM) outside the CDTI. This recommandation was
done in order to avoid the superposition with the symbols displaying presence of other
aircraft or ground obstacles. The grid displayed was not appreciated by two instructors
and two novices that simply suggested to remove it from the CDTI. Another novice
suggested to increase the step of the radial grid in order to declutter it, particularly
when a big amount of traffic is displayed on the display. Regarding the visualisation of
the intruder trajectory on the CDTI, the reactions were very different. All the expert
pilots and four novices appreciated it, while one novice and two instructors found
it unnecessary. Not a lot of feedbacks were collected on intruder collision distance’s
depiction. Positive appreciation were expressed by an expert pilot and an intruder.
One of the instructors judged it unrelevant for safe operations and cause of unnecessary
cluttering on display.
Indication of the resolution manoeuvre on the HUD All expert pilots and
three novices appreciated the depiction of the suggested resolution manoeuvre on the
HUD. One of them recommended the integration of information on the detected
conflict risks and threats, a part the suggested avoidance manoeuvre, on the HUD.
It was moreover suggested by the same pilot to include the angle of attack indicator
on the HUD. Another comment requested the inclusion of the suggested new altitude
on the displayed message. Also one of the instructors really appreciated the idea to
display the resolution indication on the HUD. One of the instructors suggested to
integrate the resolution indication as text message in the PFD, maybe on the attitude
indicator.
Aural Alerts Sequence All the expert pilots, two instructors and three novices
appreciated the idea of aural alerts. One of the expert pilots, one of the instructors and
two of the novices suggested moreover to add a preliminary level of advisories issuing
a message like “Traffic traffic” in the aural alerts sequence. Another suggestion was
to make the indication of the resolution manoeuvre being preceded by a preliminary
advisory of detected conflict risk.
8.8 Chapter Summary
This chapter illustrates a set of simulations aiming to show capabilities in critical
conditions of the S&A algorithm described in chapter 6. Further simulations are then
used to collect feedbacks from potential UAS operators about their impressions on
GCS mock-up described in chapter 7. The simulations presented for the validation of
the S&A algorithm show the performances in terms of strategic conflict management,
conflict resolution advisory, autonomous resolution. More precisely, they deal with
the algorithm’s capability to monitor the conflict geometry evolution and accordingly
update the resolution manoeuvre.
Firstly it is considered a set of simulations where a flying threat comes from dif-
ferent directions and tries to follow the ownship manoeuvres causing a conflict. In
these simulations, the UAS is controlled in the P/F mode defined in section 7.6 with
A/R switched on. This set of tests investigates the algorithm performance regarding
strategic conflict management and conflict resolution advisory.
Then it is simulated a conflict geometry including two flying threats and a ground
obstacle. These entities cause conflict risks detected by the S&A system in different
simulation time steps. The UAS is controlled in the P/F mode defined in section 7.6
with A/R switched on. This simulation tests the algorithm’s performances in terms
of strategic conflict management and conflict resolution advisory.
Finally, section 8.4 presents a similar situation with two flying threats and a ground
obstacle. In this case, it is supposed the UAS operating in the MAN mode defined in
section 7.6 with A/R switched on. The S&A system starts resolution manoeuvre au-
tonomously at the minimum safe time before impact while moving on straight levelled
trajectory without reaction from UAS operator. It considers therefore the strategic
conflict management and autonomous resolution performances for multiple threats
scenarios.
The experiments on the GCS mock-up effectiveness were made with a selection of
pilots with different levels of flight experience. This tests are based on the following
procedure. At first the pilot is briefed regarding the aim of the experiment. The HMI
layout chosen for the partial GCS mock-up are moreover illustrated. Then, the pilot is
requested to perform a free flight in the MAN mode. This is followed by an interview
in which the pilot communicates his/her first impressions about the proposed PFD
layout. The pilot is finally instructed to fly the UAV in order to detect and follow a
car moving on the ground. In the meanwhile, a conflict risk with another aircraft is
produced. The test is then concluded with the request to the pilot to give his general
impression about the advisory scheme and an evaluation of the effectiveness of the
HMI included in the partial GCS mock-up.

C H A P T E R 9
Conclusions and Future Works
This chapter concludes the thesis with the conclusions and the future works suggested
for the project. The project aims were the development of a S&A algorithm and the
implementation of its HMI on GCS, designed to provide an effective system advisories
communication to the operator. The solutions used for both S&A algorithm and GCS
partial mock-up and the conclusions derived by preliminary tests are shortly recalled
in section 9.1. The suggested future developments are then identified in section 9.2.
9.1 Conclusions
The S&A algorithm was designed for scenarios including multiple non-cooperative fly-
ing threats and ground obstacles. It is based on the hypothesis of a threat moving on
a straight trajectory in order to get a fast evaluation of the advisories about the sug-
gested resolution manoeuvre. The advisories are however updated with a very short
time step (1 s) to constantly track the conflict geometry evolution. The resolution
manoeuvres are step changes in heading or altitude autopilots commands, generating
simple horizontal or vertical manoeuvre, respectively. They are evaluated in order to
minimise the deviation from predefined trajectory. The value of these commands are
optimised in order to maintain a minimum horizontal and vertical separation between
ownship and every threat detected during the resolution manoeuvre. The separation
is computed considering a prediction of the future ownship and threats trajectories.
This estimation is based on a aircraft performances model based on fitting relation-
ships. The algorithm chooses horizontal manoeuvres for the conflict resolution when
the required heading variation is inferior to a predefined threshold, otherwise vertical
manoeuvres are used to avoid the conflict. Resolution manoeuvres are autonomously
executed by the system by switching on heading and altitude autopilots, when they
are disabled, and applying the evaluated step command.
From the design point of view the S&A algorithm proposed was designed for mul-
tiple threats scenarios including both air and ground threats. The resulting solution
is a system integrating both the ACAS and TAWS system for UAVs accordingly to
the guidelines defined in section 4.5 and with the advantages defined in section 6.8 in
respect with main solutions proposed in literature. The algorithm takes into account
vehicle manoeuvring capabilities and right of way rules.
From the point of view of the performances, the simulations showed moreover that
the typical times necessary for the S&A algorithm to update the advisories are largely
less than 1 s. More precisely, they are less than 0.05 and therefore smaller by almost
two orders of magnitude compared to the prescribed update frequency of 1 Hz.This
verifies that the algorithm allows to update conflict risks and resolution manoeuvres
advisories at a constant rate of 1 Hz. This gives the possibility to take into account
sudden trajectory changes of dynamic threats. The proposed algorithm is therefore
potentially able to provide better results than more complex projection approaches
cause of its lower computational resources.
The simulations of chapter 8 showed moreover that the algorithm produces reli-
able results for both manual (MAN ) and autonomous (P/F ) navigation modes. More
precisely, as shown in section 8.2, the algorithm in PF mode exhibited good perfor-
mances in non-cooperative collision scenarios, considering in particular the critical
case of intruders mirroring the ownship manoeuvre. Section 8.3 showed the algo-
rithm’s capability to manage complex scenarios including multiple threats once more
in P/F. According to the simulations described in section 8.4, the algorithm is able
to generate safe last-resorts resolutions and integrating effectively the human operator
involvement in the MAN mode. This implies that the proposed algorithm is partic-
ularly suitable both for RPV as a safety pilot support tool and also to be integrated
with an autonomous navigation algorithm, such that described in this work.
Regarding the GCS mock-up, the proposed integration of the S&A algorithm is
based on an innovative PFD layout integrated in the GCS. The choice of location on
display and layout of instruments are inspired by the configuration used in manned
aviation PFD. The PFD concept presented here is designed to provide in an effective
way the information about flight parameters, navigation and S&A advisories in the
new PFD concept proposed. Among the novelty introduced, it is noticeable the use of
an original concept of digital displays for airspeed, altitude, vertical speed and angle of
attack indicators. This concept is characterised by the presence of the parameter value
moving on a linear range integrating red and green bands. These bands identify the
allowed or forbidden zones of the flight envelope according to the current condition in
terms of conflict risk detected, aerodynamics performances and structural limitations.
Some other original solutions are the presence on the display of buttons allowing pilot
to select the autopilot mode and the choice to integrate the controls for autopilots
settings directly on the flight parameters indicators.
The GCS mock-up here proposed was tested by pilots. The tests aimed to get
feedbacks mainly regarding the PFD concept, the HUD layer and the aural advisories
scheme. Regarding the PFD, pilots showed a general acceptance for the layout despite
some refinements were proposed to avoid confusion between the instruments. The lin-
ear gauges concept showed a better acceptance by novice pilots instead of expert ones
when applied to airspeed and altitude indicators. However, a general positive judge-
ment was shown for vertical speed indicator and angle of attack indicator. The idea of
integrating safety ranges through green/red bands on the instruments was also gener-
ally appreciated. The same judgement was given to the resolution indication depiction
on instruments, despite some refinements were proposed regarding its graphical form.
Plenty of suggestions were given by pilots regarding CDTI decluttering. The visuali-
sation by textual messages of the resolution advisories on the HUD was appreciated.
However, it was suggested to enhance the S&A system HMI layout on the HUD with
TA replication. A similar comment was made on the aural alerts sequence with the
suggestion to include a preliminary TA before the phase where the RA is issued.
9.2 Future Works
The presented ANS algorithm showed quite good results in the simulations illustrated.
However, further works could be suggested to go on with its development. Regarding
the S&A algorithm, the potential conflict geometries, the UAV dynamics and the
effects of wind disturbances should be analysed in order to identify critical conditions
regarding the definition of SZ dimensions and the values to be considered in order to get
safe flight operations. Further validation of the algorithm should be done considering
more complex conflict geometries including also converging and overtaking encounter
geometries. It could moreover be interesting to test this S&A algorithm with non-
cooperative sensors, as these are defined in section 3.8.1, such as radars and cameras.
Regarding the GCS mock-up, the pilots feedbacks, particularly on advisories syn-
tax and sequences in aural alerts and messages displayed on HUD, should be taken
into account to improve the current layout of the GCS mock-up. Moreover, it could
be worthy to go on with pilots tests defining a set of further test scenario that are
critical for the GCS layout design. In particular, it could be interesting to validate
by simulations the autopilots interface described in section 7.6.3. Finally, the ND de-
scribed in section 7.5 should be developed in order to include all the information and
functions necessary to support the pilot in the tactical navigation task.
Regarding the complete ANS, the autonomous navigation capabilities of the devel-
oped system could then be enhanced by substituting the PF algorithm with a more
refined optimal waypoint navigation system based on stochastic filtering techniques
(e.g. Kalman filter). From the point of view of the complete system, it could be inter-
esting to test the integration of other hazard layers, such as no-fly zones and weather
hazards in the S&A algorithm and the GCS PFD.
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